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Section 2 of the Sherman Act penalizes those firms that
"monopolize" or "attempt to monopolize" any relevant market.1
Unfortunately, the term "monopolize" does not define itself. In
one sense "monopolization" is any conduct that leads to or pro-
tects monopoly. Still, the statute does not purport to forbid the
mere status of monopoly, and such a definition of "monopolize"
would sweep quite broadly. After all, firms may take over a
market, or protect a monopoly they already have, in a variety of
ways. At one extreme, firms can murder their competitors or
destroy their factories. At the other extreme, firms can build a
better mousetrap or reduce the cost of building an average
mousetrap. Finally, a firm that produces a better mousetrap
can devise some method for minimizing the cost of distributing
the trap to consumers.
Each of these tactics can create or protect monopoly. In
that sense, then, each such tactic "monopolizes" the market in
question. Nonetheless, any rational society would want to dis-
tinguish between the various tactics that might produce or pro-
tect a monopoly. The innovative firm that invents the better
mousetrap may harm its rivals, but at the same time, also does
society a great service. The injured rival that burns down the
innovator's factory or slanders its product does not. A defensi-
ble definition of "monopolize" would presumably distinguish be-
tween the two.
For nearly a century, antitrust courts have maintained just
such a distinction.2 In particular, early decisions held that
''normal" or "ordinary" conduct does not offend the Sherman
Act, including section 2, even if such conduct leads to or pro-
tects a monopoly. 3 More recently, courts have relied upon a
1. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004)).
2. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (noting that section 2 does not forbid aggressive pricing
by a monopolist that preserves its dominant position); United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-81 (1911) (concluding that section 2 only for-
bids monopoly obtained or maintained by unnatural means).
3. See United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927)
(stating that section 2 does not make mere size an offense); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Co. of N.J., 247 U.S. 32, 64-66 (1918) (holding that section
2 does not forbid normal conduct that preserves a monopoly); Am. Tobacco,
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slightly different formulation, condemning only that conduct
which they deem "exclusionary."4
Neither formulation is particularly illuminating on its face.
For one thing, business practices do not announce themselves
as "normal" or "abnormal." Moreover, an inquiry into whether a
practice is "exclusionary" merely restarts the inquiry into the
meaning of "monopolize." After all, the firm that invents a bet-
ter mousetrap "excludes" its competitors from the market just
as surely as the firm that employs force or other tortious tac-
tics.
Current law seeks additional precision by drawing a dis-
tinction between two different sorts of conduct that can "ex-
clude" rival firms from the marketplace. On the one hand, "in-
ternal" conduct, including decisions on product design,
marketing strategies, refusals to buy or sell, and pricing and
output, are treated as "competition on the merits" and pre-
sumed lawful, even if they drive competitors from the market-
place. This presumption is extremely robust: plaintiffs can only
rebut it by showing that, for instance, a particular price is be-
low some measure of cost, or that the practice produces no
plausible benefits. Thus, the vast majority of internal conduct,
including above-cost pricing, is simply lawful per se, even if
such conduct has led, or will lead, to a monopoly by excluding
rivals. On the other hand, "external" conduct, that is, agree-
ments or other practices that contractually constrain other
firms, are presumed unlawful whenever they impair or tend to
impair significantly the opportunities of rivals. While this pre-
sumption is rebuttable, defendants that seek to do so face a
heavy burden. Not only must defendants show that the chal-
lenged arrangement produces significant benefits; they must
also show that the practice is no broader than necessary to
achieve those benefits. Thus, even where such conduct produces
more benefits than harm, courts will still condemn it if plain-
tiffs establish that there is a "less restrictive means" of achiev-
221 U.S. at 178-81 (holding that section 2 only forbids "undue" restraints that
lead to or protect monopolies); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (holding that the Sherman Act forbids only unreasonable re-
straints of trade and does not forbid "monopoly in the concrete"); United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (holding that section 1 of
the Sherman Act does not forbid "indirect" restraints of trade or "ordinary con-
tracts and combinations"); infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
4. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also
infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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ing the objective in question. This distinction between "inter-
nal" and "contractual" exclusion corresponds roughly to a dis-
tinction between property and contract. While conduct that
takes place "within" the firm and excludes rivals involves the
exercise of a single entity's property rights, contractual exclu-
sion involves agreements with one or more other firms.
This Article offers a critique of antitrust's distinction be-
tween "internal" and "contractual" exclusion as well as the
preference for property-based "competition on the merits" on
which this distinction rests. In particular, the Article shows
that antitrust's modern distinction between "competition on the
merits" and contractual exclusion reflects the undue influence
of neoclassical price theory, the economic paradigm that domi-
nated the study of industrial organization for most of the twen-
tieth century. Price theory, it is shown, produced a theory of the
firm and related model of "workable competition" that natu-
rally gave rise to a distinction between "internal" and "contrac-
tual" exclusion.
Built on the perfect competition model, price theory treats
the business firm as a sort of "black box," an impersonal entity
that takes in inputs and transforms them into outputs. In this
way, the firm performs a crucial function: the allocation of re-
sources from input markets to output markets. By its nature
this process involves the generation of wealth, as firms trans-
form raw materials and other inputs into finished products-
property-desired by consumers. The process of transforma-
tion, e.g., the amount and type of inputs required to produce a
given output, depends upon technology, which determines the
firm's production function. According to price theory, after
transforming inputs into a finished product, the firm relies
upon "the market"-an impersonal, exogenous institution-to
transfer the property's title to consumers.
While price theory began with the model of perfect compe-
tition, it also recognized certain narrowly defined departures
from the model's assumptions. These departures gave rise to
the theory of "workable competition," under which activities in-
ternal to the firm, such as innovation and replication, alter
production technology. Such changes in technology, in turn,
lead to improved product quality or productive efficiencies,
usually in the form of economies of scale. These improvements
manifest themselves by changing the nature or price of the
property that the firm could sell to purchasers. Except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, price theory and its workable com-
[89:743
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petition model presume these property-based activities benefi-
cial, even if such practices exclude one or more competitors
from the marketplace.
Contractual exclusion fares far worse under price theory's
conception of the firm and derivative workable competition
model. In the world of workable competition, firms can rely
upon costless markets to purchase and sell inputs and outputs.
Efficiencies are technological in origin, arising and ending
within the boundaries of the firm. Once a firm produces a
product and transfers title by selling the item to a consumer or
other firm, there is no price-theoretic rationale for the firm to
exercise contractual influence over the item or its purchasers
by, for instance, forbidding purchasers to buy from others.
Within the price-theoretic framework, then, any contract that
reaches "beyond" the firm and interferes with the opportunities
of rivals is presumed an artificial and unlawful "barrier to en-
try," obtained through the coercive exercise of market power.
Far from furthering workable competition, such conduct actu-
ally thwarts "competition on the merits" and is thus presump-
tively anticompetitive within price theory's workable competi-
tion paradigm.
For more than three decades, price theory and its narrow
version of "workable competition" exercised significant influ-
ence over enforcement agencies and courts, and this influence
gave rise to the "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust law.5 While
price theory and the inhospitality tradition it bred had its most
noteworthy impact upon antitrust's treatment of "contracts,
combinations and conspiracies" analyzed under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, monopolization doctrine did not escape this in-
fluence.
The most telling manifestation of the influence of the
workable competition model on monopolization doctrine was
United States v. United Shoe Machinery.6 There, a district court
employed a Harvard economist as a special law clerk, who pre-
pared a lengthy report that doubled as a dissertation.7 Relying
on this report, the court announced a distinction between
"competition based on pure merit," on the one hand, and "un-
natural" contractual exclusion, on the other. The court recog-
5. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
6. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
7. CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY
CORPORATION (1956).
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nized that both sorts of conduct made entry by rivals more dif-
ficult. Nonetheless, the former conduct was "normal" and
"natural" and the result of "inevitable economic laws." The lat-
ter was "conscious business policy" and thus raised barriers to
entry "unnecessarily." The Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion, which rested implicitly on a distinction between property
and contract, and this distinction still forms the basis for the
law of monopolization today.8
Price theory's own monopoly over the subject of industrial
organization did not last forever. Just as price theory's influ-
ence reached its peak, a competitor emerged in the form of
transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE offered a new explana-
tion for the very existence of firms and, thus, a new lens for ex-
amining all forms of conduct-internal and external-that
might be deemed "exclusionary" for purposes of section 2. In
particular, TCE dispensed with price theory's "technological"
conception of the firm and instead suggested that the firm is a
special form of contract that arises to avoid the cost of transact-
ing, that is, relying upon the market to conduct economic activ-
ity. TCE also revealed that "the firm" is not the only sort of con-
tract that can reduce transaction costs and thus overcome
market failure. Instead, many contractual practices that price
theory deemed inconsistent with workable competition were in
fact methods of reducing the cost of relying upon "the market"
to conduct economic activity in the same way that reliance on
the firm itself reduces such costs. Given its conclusion that "the
firm" is just one more nonstandard contract, TCE suggests that
any line between "contractual" and property-based forms of ex-
clusion is illusory and based upon a misconception of the eco-
nomic distinction between firms and markets. In fact, TCE
suggests that many nonstandard contracts, including the firm,
can create the economic equivalent of property rights by con-
centrating the costs and benefits of particular activities in a
"single owner," even in cases in which the firm does not hold ti-
tle to its inputs or outputs. By creating such "contractual prop-
erty," parties can overcome market failures and thus enhance
society's welfare by producing a more efficient allocation of re-
sources.
While the Supreme Court has on occasion invoked TCE in
litigation under section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts have not
8. See infra notes 226-90 and accompanying text (examining the United
Shoe Machinery decision and its influence on subsequent law).
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internalized the lessons of TCE when developing monopoliza-
tion doctrine. To the contrary, as the recent United States v.
Microsoft Corp. case9 illustrates, monopolization doctrine has
been comparatively impervious to the teachings of TCE, even
within expert enforcement agencies. As a result, monopoliza-
tion doctrine has remained relatively unchanged since the
1950s. Rational administration of the antitrust laws requires
courts supervising monopolization litigation to learn the les-
sons of TCE and apply them when developing antitrust doc-
trine under section 2.
Part I of this Article reviews the law of monopolization as
it has evolved since Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890
to the present. Using the celebrated recent decision in United
States v. Microsoft Corp. as an example, this part shows that
modern monopolization law as articulated by courts and the en-
forcement agencies rests upon a distinction between "competi-
tion on the merits" and "internal" exclusion, on the one hand,
and contractual exclusion, on the other. This distinction, it is
shown, corresponds roughly to a distinction between property
and contract. Part II argues that modern law's distinction be-
tween "internal" and "contractual" exclusion rests upon neo-
classical price theory, its theory of the firm, and the derivative
model of "workable competition," the latter of which formed the
basis for antitrust policy for several decades after World War
II. Part III examines a competing economic paradigm, TCE,
which arose in response to price theory in the 1960s. TCE, it is
shown, offers a novel theory of the firm that suggests benevo-
lent explanations for exclusionary contracts that price theory
deemed "monopolistic." In particular, TCE suggests that many
contractual restraints can be characterized as efforts to create
the equivalent of property rights that align the interests of oth-
erwise independent trading partners and thus reduce the cost
of relying upon market transacting to conduct economic activ-
ity. Part IV examines TCE's implications for monopolization
doctrine, concluding that courts should abandon their hostility
to contractual exclusion and treat such agreements with the
same deference they currently accord activities that are "inter-
nal" to the firm. In particular, proof that a restraint produces
significant benefits by overcoming a market failure should im-
munize the conduct from antitrust challenge.
9. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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I. DEFINITION OF 'MONOPOLIZE" UNDER SECTION 2
A. GENERAL MONOPOLIZATION STANDARDS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids any "contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy" that "restrains trade or commerce." 10 Sec-
tion 2 of the Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize" or "attempt
to monopolize" "any part" of the trade or commerce of the
United States.' One could read this second section to ban any
conduct that allows a firm to gain or preserve a dominant sell-
ing position over some product, regardless of the economic ef-
fect of that dominance or the social benefits of the conduct that
creates or preserves it. Still, the earliest decisions interpreting
this section rejected such a "no fault" approach to the statute. 12
Most importantly, in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the so-called "Rule of Reason"
announced in Standard Oil v. United States and implicitly ap-
plied in earlier decisions under section 1.13 Just as section 1 of
the Act did not reach "normal" or "ordinary" contracts, so too
did section 2 recognize a safe harbor for ordinary and normal
conduct that "advanced" or "furthered" trade, even if that con-
duct might lead to or protect a monopoly. 14 Thus, in the same
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
11. See id. § 2.
12. But cf. John J. Flynn, Statement to the Federal Trade Commission, 48
ANTITRUST L.J. 845 (1979) (advocating "no conduct" approach to monopoliza-
tion doctrine, whereby proof of monopoly would itself establish liability under
section 2); Eleanor M. Fox, Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law To-
wards a More Competitive Economy, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (1980)
(same).
13. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 177-81 (1911); see
also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-66 (1911) (holding that
the Sherman Act forbids only "unreasonable" restraints of trade).
14. See Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 177-81; see also Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 460-61 (1927) (stating that Standard Oil reaffirmed the
principles announced in Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe); Standard Oil, 221
U.S. at 59-64 (concluding that section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids only un-
reasonable restraints); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211, 240-42 (1899) (holding that liberty of contract does not protect the sort of
direct restraints of interstate trade forbidden by the Sherman Act); id. at 235-
38 (finding the restraint in question "direct" because it raised prices above the
level "competition" would produce); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171
U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (" [T]he act of Congress must have a reasonable construc-
tion, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business-
men that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon
interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it." (quoting Hopkins v. United
States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))); id. at 566-68 (holding that the Sherman
Act does not outlaw "ordinary contracts and combinations" protected by liberty
[89:743
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way that section 1 only bars "undue" restraints, section 2 for-
bids only those restraints or practices that can only be ex-
plained by the possession or expectation of market power.15 A
broader proscription, the Court said, would interfere with lib-
erty of contract and the rights of property and at the same time
bring commerce to a halt.16 Put another way, the Court inter-
preted the statute so as not to forbid what modern scholars call
the "efficient monopolist."17 As William Howard Taft would put
things shortly after American Tobacco, the Sherman Act does
not protect inefficient firms from rivals that enjoy lower costs
or produce better products.18 Subsequent decisions would reach
similar results. 19
American Tobacco's invocation of the Rule of Reason and
its economic criterion for liability implied that courts would
employ economic theory to determine whether, in fact, a chal-
of contract); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 802-05 (1965) (noting the simi-
larities between the "direct/indirect" test and the "unreasonableness" test);
Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1,
54-56, 61-67 (1999) (noting that the formative era case law understood "di-
rect" restraints as those which would be deemed "unreasonable" under Stan-
dard Oil).
15. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 83-89 (detailing the Rule of Reason's prohibition of
"undue" restraints).
16. See Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180.
17. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26-31 (1966) (showing that legislative history
of the Act indicates no intent to punish firms that achieve monopoly via supe-
rior efficiency and skill); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1036 (2000).
18. See WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME
COURT 124 (1914) (stating that the Sherman Act is not designed to "destroy
the larger businesses whose capital and large plants enable them to produce
goods cheaply, in order that small plants that cannot produce them as cheaply
may live").
19. See United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927)
("The law, however, does not make the mere size of a corporation, however im-
pressive, or the existence of unexerted power on its part, an offense, when un-
accompanied by unlawful conduct in the exercise of its power."); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (emphasizing that the Sherman Act does not for-
bid "monopoly in the concrete"); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223-24 (1993) (noting that section 2 of
the Sherman Act does not forbid above-cost pricing by a monopolist); Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) ("[I]t is in the interest of
competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition, in-
cluding price competition." (quoting Arthur S. Langender, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson
Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.) (1984))).
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lenged practice was "undue" or "normal."20 This, of course, was
the practice of common law courts applying the Rule of Reason
to contracts that allegedly restrained trade, and Standard Oil
had expressly endorsed this approach when announcing its
Rule of Reason.21 Economic theory is not static, of course, and
common law courts applying the Rule of Reason sometimes al-
tered doctrine to reflect changed understandings of the eco-
nomic impact of challenged restraints. 22 In the same way,
courts applying "reason" when evaluating trade restraints
naturally employ the most plausible theory, even if that theory
may differ from that in place when the statute was passed.23
20. See Meese, supra note 15, at 89-92 (explaining how early Rule of Rea-
son decisions presumed that application of test would require courts to apply
evolving economic theory). Judge Bork reached a similar conclusion nearly
four decades ago:
It should be stressed that [Standard Oil's] test was phrased wholly in
economic terms, giving no evidence of concern for possibly competing
values. A corollary of this value choice is that the law should develop
according to the progress of economic thought. The law is, therefore,
neither made inflexible by controlling precedent nor required to
change only through abrupt shifts of basic doctrine. Thus a court
could alter the law without repudiating the theory underlying prior
decisions by explaining that those decisions had misconceived the
economic effect of particular agreements or practices. This character-
istic is, of course, inherent in Peckham's and Taft's statements of the
rule of reason, as it is in any law governed by economic analysis.
Bork, supra note 14, at 805.
21. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57-58 (noting that, during the late
nineteenth century, American courts and legislatures adjusted common law
restrictions in response to changed understandings of the economic effects of
various agreements); id. at 55-56 (noting that the "development of more accu-
rate economic conceptions and the changes in conditions of society" caused re-
peal of overbroad English statutes and adjustment in English common law).
22. See Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (stating that
the original rules governing restraints of trade were "made under a condition
of things, and a state of society, different from those which now prevail, [with
the result that] the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has been
considerably modified"); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525(1880) ("It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or en-
forceable now than they were at any former period, but that the courts look
differently at the question as to what is a restraint of trade."); Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 420-22 (N.Y. 1887); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123,
138-41 (Wis. 1851); see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51-58 (describing com-
mon law's evolving treatment of trade restraints); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-82 (6th Cir. 1898) (examining the evolution of
doctrine governing restraints of trade).
23. See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15-22 (1997) (relying upon changed
economic perceptions to overrule per se ban on maximum resale price mainte-
nance); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ('The
Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic po-
[89:743
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While the principle animating the Rule of Reason remains con-
stant, applications change, as courts "translate" the principle in
light of new information. 24
B. THE EARLY YEARS: THE INTENT TEST
Courts did not always share current law's strong prefer-
ence for "competition on the merits" and hostility toward con-
tractual exclusion. Instead, for several decades courts abjured
any formalistic distinction between "internal" and contractual
exclusion. In American Tobacco, for instance, the Court found
that the defendant had offended the statute "not alone because
of the dominion and control over the tobacco trade which actu-
ally exists," but also because the evidence established a "wrong-
ful purpose" behind the acquisition of that dominion.2 5 That
evidence included a variety of disparate tactics, including nu-
merous acquisitions and combinations, price wars, the pur-
chase of factories for the purpose of shutting them down, and
consistent imposition of covenants not to compete on individu-
als who sold assets to the firm.26 Taken together, the Court
said, these tactics exhibited "conscious wrongdoing" and the
tential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content
that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890."); Kor's Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (noting that the Court in
Standard Oil read the Sherman Act to empower courts to ban contracts
"which new times and economic conditions would make unreasonable"); Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911) ("With
respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common
law has been substantially modified in adaptation to modern conditions.");
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-29 (1897);
see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 268 (1991)
("One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began
to adopt an 'economic approach' to antitrust problems only in the 1970's. At
most, this 'revolution' in antitrust policy represented a change in economic
models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its incep-
tion."); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust
Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226 (1995) ("In almost every era of antitrust
history, policymakers have employed economic models to explain or modify the
state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement.").
24. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165,
1247-51 (1993) (describing such an approach to interpretation and application
of the Sherman Act); Meese, supra note 15, at 91-92, 141-45 (collecting and
discussing decisions that invoke evolving economic theory to support doctrinal
changes); see also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 91-93 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
"translate" tying doctrine in light of recent changes in economic theory).
25. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911).
26. See id. at 182-83.
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"intention... to use the power of the combination as a vantage
ground to further monopolize the trade in tobacco."27
Moreover, in the decades following American Tobacco,
courts continued to focus on the "intent" of the alleged monopo-
lizer without evincing any particular hostility toward contrac-
tual exclusion.28 In its first case against the United Shoe Ma-
chinery Company, for instance, the Government claimed that
the defendant had monopolized the market for shoe machinery,
first by merging with several competitors, and then by pursu-
ing a variety of exclusionary practices. 29 These practices in-
cluded a policy of leasing its machines instead of selling them
outright and requiring lessees to purchase repair and mainte-
nance service from the defendant instead of independent
firms.3 0 The Court's assessment of these restrictions did not
rest upon a distinction between "competition on the merits" and
contractual exclusion. Instead, the Court approved the restric-
tions because they were normal practices that did not depend
on the possession or acquisition of monopoly power.31 Other de-
cisions of the era took a similar, intent-driven approach, dis-
cerning "intent" from a fact-based inquiry into a defendant's
conduct.32
27. Id. at 182.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (holding
that possession of a monopoly violates section 2 if "coupled with the purpose or
intent to exercise that power"); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417,
450-53 (1920); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 41-64
(1918) (discerning "intent" from a fact-based inquiry into a defendant's con-
duct and rejecting the Government's argument that United Shoe had violated
section 2 through mergers with several competitors, a policy of leasing its ma-
chines instead of selling them outright, and requiring lessees to purchase re-
pair and maintenance from United); United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234
F. 964, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 214 F. 987,
993-99 (D. Minn. 1914); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 188 F. 127,
134 (D. Del. 1911). Two scholars summarized the case law of this era as fol-
lows: "[These cases] revolved about an intent to monopolize, revealed by merg-
ers, conspiracy, and a wide-ranging variety of practices aimed clearly at driv-
ing out competitors, often involving fraud and bad faith and sometimes
verging on coercion, as well as by the success of the practices in most of the
cases." CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 106 (1959).
29. United Shoe Mach., 247 U.S. at 35.
30. Id. at 48-65 (describing and evaluating these practices); see also infra
notes 226-90 and accompanying text (describing subsequent litigation against
United Shoe Machinery under section 2 of the Sherman Act).
31. See United Shoe Mach., 247 U.S. at 63-64.
32. See supra note 28; see also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 43-56 (1955) (concluding that
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Reliance on an intent standard naturally begged the ques-
tion: intent to do what? Given the normative premises em-
braced in American Tobacco, intent simply to obtain or main-
tain a monopoly could not suffice. 33 Nor, for that matter, would
it suffice to show that the defendant possessed the intent to in-
jure or exclude a rival.34 Instead, the question was whether the
defendant had the "intent" to obtain or maintain monopoly
power by relying upon practices that were not "ordinary" or
"normal."35 In the end, then, courts applying the intent test
generally found the requisite intent based upon an evaluation
of the possible justifications--or lack thereof-for the chal-
lenged conduct. 36
C. MODERN LAW
Nearly a century later, courts and scholars still embrace
American Tobacco's foundational construction of the Act. Under
current law, then, a plaintiff alleging unlawful monopolization
must establish two elements: (1) that the defendant possesses
monopoly power in a properly defined relevant market, and (2)
that the defendant has acquired or maintained that power by
means of "exclusionary conduct."37 By itself, this test is not par-
ticularly illuminating; any number of practices can make it
more difficult-even impossible-for rivals to enter or remain
in the marketplace. 38 Following American Tobacco courts have
Supreme Court precedent made proof of "intent to monopolize a prerequisite to
liability under section 2").
33. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
36. See United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 370 (1912) ("Of course,
if the necessary result [of a practice] is materially to restrain trade .... the
intent with which the thing was done is of no consequence."); JOEL B. DIRLAM
& ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST POLICY 49-55, 65 (1954) ("The test of intent [in monopolization
cases] is not a test of the purity of a company's motives, but an evaluation of
its conduct.").
37. See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 878-79 (2004); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech.
Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595 (1985); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
576 (1966); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
342 (1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
38. See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
651(c), at 78-79 (2d ed. 2002); Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1036-37; Tho-
mas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the
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held that it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that a firm has
"excluded" its competitors from the marketplace in the ordinary
sense of that word.39 Instead, plaintiffs must show that a prac-
tice excludes competitors from the market "on some basis other
than efficiency." 40 Under this test, conduct constitutes "unlaw-
ful exclusion" if it only makes sense if the defendant possesses
or will possess market power.41 While courts recognize that ef-
ficient conduct may in some cases exclude rivals and result in
monopoly, they tolerate such behavior on the grounds that
more intrusive regulation would chill beneficial behavior, de-
stroy wealth, and slow progress. 42
Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 825 n.82 (2000) ("No market is unlim-
ited, and every business knows that by increasing its market share it is ex-
cluding competitors from a portion of the market.").
39. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993)
(noting that hard competition that injures rivals does not itself offend section
2); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 (noting that mere negative impact on rivals
does not render conduct exclusionary for section 2 purposes); id. at 605-07
(concluding that a court must consider conduct's impact on consumers when
determining whether activity is properly deemed "exclusionary").
40. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 (holding that conduct is exclu-
sionary for section 2 purposes if it "exclude[s] rivals on some basis other than
efficiency" (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138 (1978))); see
also Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (concluding that a plaintiff must
show the defendant's "use of monopoly power" to exclude rivals from the mar-
ketplace).
41. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483.
42. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (finding that pricing at or above cost constitutes "competi-
tion on the merits," which is beyond scrutiny under the antitrust laws); Spec-
trum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458-59 (noting that the Sherman Act tolerates hard
competition unless such tactics interfere with proper workings of the market);
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1986) (noting that
penalizing above-cost pricing by a monopoly would produce a "perverse" result
by depriving consumers of low prices); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independ-
ence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984) (stating that undue scrutiny of
single-firm conduct could "dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive
entrepreneur"); id. at 775 ("Subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial
scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage competitive enthusi-
asm that the antitrust laws seek to promote."); Verizon Communications, 124
S. Ct. at 879 (explaining that the possession of monopoly power is an impor-
tant element of the free enterprise system because the prospect of exercising
such power "attracts 'business acumen' in the first place"); id. at 882-83 (ex-
plaining that overbroad enforcement of section 2 could chill beneficial con-
duct); Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1039-41 (noting that competition on the
merits is beyond antitrust scrutiny because it benefits consumers); John E.
Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Wel-
fare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 387-92 (2001) (explaining how overly intru-
sive monopolization standards could chill beneficial conduct); Piraino, supra
note 38, at 824-25 ("To punish a firm simply because it has achieved a monop-
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Stated at this level of generality, current law makes perfect
sense and constitutes a faithful implementation of American
Tobacco's safe harbor for efficient monopolies. Over time, how-
ever, courts have developed a series of subsidiary rules that
give greater content to this generalization. In particular, courts
have drawn a distinction between what are best termed "inter-
nal" conduct, and "contractual" conduct. 43 Internal or "unilat-
eral" conduct consists of activity that takes place within the
boundaries of a single firm and does not require cooperation
with other firms or individuals. Such conduct includes activi-
ties like research and development, the creation of new prod-
ucts, realization of economies of scale, acquisition and enforce-
ment of patents, refusal to share technology with rivals, and
pricing decisions. 44 Contractual conduct, on the other hand,
consists of practices like the negotiation and enforcement of ex-
clusive dealing contracts, tying contracts, and even provisions
requiring dealers or distributors merely to prefer a manufac-
turer's product. 45 It can even include a firm's decision to lease
oly is to discourage superior business performance."). Two scholars have sum-
marized current law and its policy premises as follows:
[Current law reflects] a uniquely American, market-affirming re-
sponse to power: to end dominance when attained in unapproved
ways, yet to give dominance wide latitude when it is inevitable or
earned by merit. The response assumes that strong incentives pro-
mote efficiency, and that power, unless bolstered either by unfairly
aggressive conduct or by government support, will erode under the
pressure of market developments. Moreover, where supracompetitive
pricing accompanies power, erosion of the power is thought to be more
likely because high prices signal the need and promise a reward for
entry.
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 73 (2000).
43. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600 ("The central message of the
Sherman Act is that a business entity must find... higher profits through in-
ternal expansion-that is, by competing successfully rather than arranging
treaties with its competitors." (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975))).
44. See Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002)
(noting that realization of economies of scale cannot offend section 2); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75, 281-82 (2d Cir.
1979) (finding that realization of economies of scale or technological innova-
tions cannot violate section 2).
45. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (finding
five-year exclusive contracts inconsistent with section 2); Lepage's, Inc. v. 3M,
324 F.3d 141, 154-64 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding exclusive dealing contracts and
so-called "bundling discounts" prima facie unlawful under section 2); Conwood,
290 F.3d at 778; United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 68-71 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding that contracts requiring America Online and other Internet ac-
cess providers to prefer Microsoft's Internet browser violated section 2); cf.
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its products instead of selling them outright.46
Under existing precedents, courts apply radically different
levels of scrutiny to internal and contractual conduct. Internal
conduct is presumed lawful, and courts only allow plaintiffs to
rebut this presumption in rare instances. 47 A firm may, for in-
stance, consistent with section 2, create a better product, invent
a more efficient production process, refuse to purchase from a
supplier, refuse to sell to rivals, or adopt innovative means of
promotion or quality control.48 Courts and the enforcement
agencies characterize such behavior as "competition on the
merits," even if it creates or preserves a monopoly by excluding
competitors.49 Courts have recognized only one sure exception
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ex-
plaining that Microsoft initially obtained its monopoly by lawful means, and
thus did not violate section 2 in doing so).
46. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 578 (holding that defendant's lease-only pol-
icy was "coercive" exclusionary conduct that offended section 2); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (finding that defendant's lease-only policy violated
section 2); In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 367 (1975) (consent decree forbid-
ding defendant's lease-only policy as alleged violation of section 2).
47. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600 (explaining that the Sherman Act re-
quires firms to obtain new customers through "competition," defined as inter-
nal expansion); Conwood, 290 F.3d at 783 (finding that the realization of
economies of scale cannot violate section 2).
48. See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 879-80 (2004) (holding that, without more, mere re-
fusal to deal does not violate section 2); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (finding that above-cost pric-
ing is "competition on the merits" even if it drives less efficient competitors out
of business); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340
(1990) (holding that above-cost pricing cannot cause "antitrust injury" com-
pensable under the antitrust laws); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596-97 (approv-
ing jury instruction stating that monopolists may enjoy economies of scale);
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 279-88 (noting that introduction and promotion of
new product by a monopolist almost never offends section 2); see also NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) ("[F]reedom to switch suppliers
lies close to the heart of the competitive process that the antitrust laws seek to
encourage."); Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452 (noting that Microsoft earned its mo-
nopoly by means of perfectly lawful conduct and marketing practices).
49. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223 (holding that above-cost pricing is
"competition on the merits" even if it drives less efficient competitors out of
business); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (noting that section 2 does not
forbid "competition on the merits," even if such competition protects or leads to
a monopoly); id. at 600 (equating "competing successfully" with "internal ex-
pansion"); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116
(1986) (stating that the antitrust laws encourage even monopolists to engage
in vigorous price competition); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281-82 ("[A] monopo-
list is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the
merits [and] any success that it may achieve 'through the process of invention
[89:743758
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to this safe harbor-prices that are below a firm's costs, and
thus presumptively "predatory."50 Even below-cost pricing is
not automatically unlawful; courts still allow firms, including
monopolists, to justify such conduct and thus avoid liability in
many instances. 51 Other forms of unilateral conduct are lawful
unless a plaintiff can show that the conduct (1) severely ham-
pers a rival's ability to compete, and (2) cannot be explained ex-
cept as-an effort to protect or create market power.52 Under this
test, proof that even severely exclusionary conduct produces
some modest benefits suffices to insulate the behavior from sec-
tion 2 liability.53
Various forms of contractual exclusion receive much
stricter scrutiny. According to courts and the enforcement
and innovation' is clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws." (quoting United
Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344)); Intel Corp., No. 9288, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 145, at
*1 (Aug. 3, 1999) (decision and order); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
38, 1 65 1(c), at 78 (defining competition on the merits as "aggressive but non-
predatory pricing, higher output, improved product quality, energetic market
penetration, successful research and development, cost-reducing innovations
and the like"); infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (describing Depart-
ment of Justice's invocation of "competition on the merits" in the Microsoft
litigation). As shown below, this language is unchanged from Professor
Areeda's 1978 treatise. See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text; see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1040 (embracing identical language to describe
"competition on the merits").
50. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-27 (detailing standards governing
analysis of predatory pricing claims); see also United States v. AMR Corp., 335
F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting predatory pricing suit because the Gov-
ernment failed to offer proof that defendant set prices below relevant measure
of cost); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 353-60 (2d ed.
1999) (discussing lower courts' application of various cost-based tests for
predatory pricing).
51. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 68 (suggesting that Microsoft's policy
of giving its Internet browser away for free did not constitute predatory pric-
ing under section 2).
52. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608-11 (finding a refusal to deal unlaw-
ful where the refusal severely hampered a rival and the defendant offered no
beneficial explanation for the conduct); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a refusal to deal
must foreclose rival from the entire market to violate section 2); Twin Labs.,
Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1990) (same);
see also Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-91 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence of a legitimate business justification itself
precludes section 2 liability for refusal to deal absent a showing that the justi-
fication is pretextual).
53. See Transport, 964 F.2d at 189-90; Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 279-88;
Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 926-28 (10th Cir. 1975); see also Microsoft,
253 F.3d at 67 (rejecting a challenge to a particular aspect of Windows design
where Microsoft invoked modest efficiency justification).
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agencies, proof that a monopolist has entered an agreement
that excludes its rivals from a significant portion of the mar-
ketplace gives rise to a prima facie case, regardless of whether
the challenged agreement actually drives the aggrieved com-
petitors from the market. 54 Nor is there any requirement that
the plaintiff show that such exclusion has produced or will pro-
duce actual consumer harm.55 While this presumption is rebut-
table, defendants that seek to overcome it face an uphill climb.
First, the monopolist must demonstrate to a court's satisfaction
that the challenged arrangement produces significant benefits
for consumers. 56 Second, a challenged practice that does, in
fact, produce significant benefits is nonetheless unlawful if it is
broader than necessary to produce the benefits in question.
5 7
54. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
483-84 (1992) (finding tying contract that denied competitors access to certain
portion of the copier service market was presumptively unlawful under section
2); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600-08 (holding that defendant's creation of
travel packages that excluded competitor from consideration were presump-
tively unlawful); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578 (1966)
(holding that five-year exclusive contracts and lease-only policies violated sec-
tion 2); Lepage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 157-59 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding ex-
clusive dealing arrangements presumptively unlawful even though "victim" of
such contracts remained a significant force in the marketplace); Microsoft, 253
F.3d at 70-71 (holding that primary dealing contracts that deprived rival of
access to part of "one of the two major [distribution] channels" were presump-
tively unlawful even though aggrieved rival retained part of the relevant mar-
ket and had access to market through numerous alternative channels of dis-
tribution); Intel Corp., 1999 FTC LEXIS 145, at *8 (approving consent decree
that voided agreements between Intel and its customers that purportedly
raised customers' costs of producing competing product); cf. John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Eco-
nomics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 211-13 (1999) (outlining nu-
merous alternate channels of distribution that were open to Netscape despite
Microsoft's tactics).
55. See Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through
The Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 502-03 (1999) (concluding
that Supreme Court precedent does "not consider effect on competition in de-
termining whether the monopolization offense [can] be found," but instead re-
lies on impact of conduct on rivals); see also infra notes 113-16 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that the Microsoft decision did not require proof of
actual harm to consumers).
56. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84; Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59
(outlining standards governing a defendant's attempt to justify a prima facie
unlawful practice).
57. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484-86 (holding that proffered justi-
fication for contractual exclusion did not entitle it to summary judgment
where defendant could purportedly achieve legitimate objectives via less re-
strictive means); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (explaining that conduct
excluding rivals from a portion of the market is unlawful if it is broader than
necessary); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 67-74 (finding agreements that interfered
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Under this approach, such conduct is unlawful if a court de-
termines that the defendant could have achieved the benefits in
question in a different manner. 58 Application of such a "less re-
strictive alternative" test rests upon the implicit assumption
that the benefits produced by such restraints necessarily coex-
ist with the anticompetitive harm presumed once a plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case.59 Practices that fail this test, it is
said, constitute an exercise of monopoly power, raise barriers to
entry, interfere with "competition on the merits" and thus "mo-
nopolize" in violation of section 2.60
The distinction between "internal" and "contractual" exclu-
sion corresponds roughly to the distinction between property
and contract. 61 On one hand, conduct is "internal" for purposes
of section 2 if it involves the monopolist's creation or disposition
of its own property, which is at that point "within" the bounda-
ries of the firm, before the passage of title. On the other hand,
conduct is "contractual," and thus subject to more severe scru-
tiny, if, before it has taken title, or after title has passed, the
monopolist is attempting to influence the manner in which a
supplier or customer disposes of its property. Thus, a firm that
with rival's access to the market unlawful where defendant failed to proffer a
justification that explained the full extent of the exclusion).
58. See Meese, supra note 15, at 112-13 (explaining that application of
the less restrictive alternative test under section 1 of the Sherman Act re-
quires courts to ban some restraints because they do not sufficiently enhance
society's welfare).
59. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (assuming that benefits and harms of
restraints coexist); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 658(f), at 135-
36 (same); see also Meese, supra note 15, at 167-69 (showing that application
of the less restrictive alternative test in Rule of Reason litigation rests on as-
sumption that a restraint's benefits coexist with harms); 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW 1502 (1986) (same).
60. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 62 (finding that unjustified licensing re-
striction that prevented original equipment manufacturers from encouraging
consumers to use competing browsers interfered with "competition on the mer-
its"); Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (finding that tying contracts and re-
lated practices constituted a "use of monopoly power" to foreclose competition);
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (finding that practices that are more re-
strictive than necessary to produce benefits are "exclusionary" and unlawful
under section 2); see also Piraino, supra note 38, at 827-28 (noting that the
Sherman Act distinguishes between "lowering prices, developing new prod-
ucts, and expanding output," and the use of monopoly power to interfere with
competition).
61. See generally Rudolph J. Peritz, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law:
Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1989) (con-
tending that the Supreme Court's approach to vertical restraints has reflected
greater deference to restraints that purport to exercise a manufacturer's prop-
erty rights).
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creates intellectual or other property is presumptively engaged
in "internal" competition on the merits. 62 So is a firm that offers
to sell its property at a particular price or refuses to buy or sell
at all. 63 By contrast, a firm that enters a contract prohibiting
another from selling its property to the firm's competitors is
seeking to influence the disposition of someone else's property
and is thus engaged in contractual exclusion.
D. APPLICATION: THE MICROSOFT CASE
The distinction between contractual exclusion and "compe-
tition on the merits" recently received a ringing endorsement in
United States v. Microsoft Corp.64 Consideration of this decision
will illustrate the distinction between internal and contractual
exclusion as well as the disparate treatment that these two
categories of conduct currently receive.
Microsoft did not obtain its monopoly by chance. 65 For one
thing, the firm continually upgraded the quality of its operating
system.66 In addition, the firm partnered with a personal com-
puter (PC) maker-IBM-that had the good sense to allow
other firms to clone its version of the PC.67 The firm also in-
vested hundreds of millions of dollars annually to encourage
independent software vendors (ISVs) to produce software appli-
cations compatible with Windows. 68 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the consumption of operating systems is charac-
terized by so-called "network effects."69 In particular, as more
62. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56
STAN. L. REV. 253, 294-305 (2003) (relying upon property logic to justify very
relaxed review of refusals to deal and other internal conduct).
63. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (noting
that the refusal to purchase from a particular supplier is a fundamental aspect
of a free market).
64. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affg in part, rev'g in part 87 F. Supp. 2d
30 (D.D.C. 2000).
65. Cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (noting
that a monopoly obtained by means of "historic accident" does not violate sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act).
66. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 21 (D.D.C.
1998) (stating that 'Microsoft continually releases 'new and improved' versions
of its PC operating system"); cf. Lopatka & Page, supra note 42, at 392 (argu-
ing that a monopolist of durable products like operating systems must con-
tinually upgrade its products if it hopes to maintain a profit stream).
67. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
68. See id. at 21 (finding that Microsoft invests "hundreds of millions of
dollars each year ... inducing ISVs to write applications for Windows").
69. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Eco-
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consumers employ a particular operating system, ISVs are
more likely to write applications that are compatible with the
operating system in question.70 Microsoft realized the full bene-
fits of these so-called network effects, as consumers increas-
ingly turned to Windows because of the large pool of applica-
tions compatible with it.71 Ultimately, Microsoft obtained its
monopoly because it provided consumers with a product they
preferred.72
By the mid-1990s, Microsoft faced a potential challenge to
its dominance of the operating system market in the form of
Netscape and its Navigator Web browser. 73 Not content to serve
as the world's leading browser, with an 80% share of the mar-
ket,74 Netscape resolved to transform its browser into so-called
"middleware," capable of performing some functions normally
performed by operating systems. 75 Had Netscape been success-
ful, it is said, an ISV would have been able to write one, Net-
scape-compatible version of its application, which would then
run on any PC that contained Netscape. 76 In such an environ-
ment, consumers could theoretically have chosen an operating
system without regard to the number of applications compati-
ble with it, thereby undermining the chief basis for Windows'
dominance.77
In 1995, Microsoft introduced its own Internet browser,
Internet Explorer (IE), investing substantial resources in en-
hancing IE's quality. 78 At one time, the firm employed over a
nomics of Networks, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 36, 36 (1996) (stating that
network externalities can arise when increasing demand for a product "spurs
the demand for and production of complementary products"); see also Mark A.
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483-84 (1998).
70. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, PC Software, 44 ANTITRUST
BULL. 739, 757 (1999) ("All else the same, a platform with many users is more
attractive to applications software developers than one with a small following.
Consequently the number and variety of application programs written to run
on a given platform is greater if that platform supports many users.").
71. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20-21.
72. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (recounting position of
the Department of Justice that Microsoft obtained its monopoly legally).
73. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
74. See id. at 98-99.
75. See id. at 28-29.
76. See id. at 29.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 43.
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thousand programmers in its effort to improve the browser.79
These investments soon paid off, by 1997 most independent re-
viewers opined that IE was equal to or superior to Netscape's
Navigator.8 0 At the same time, Microsoft took steps to physi-
cally integrate its browser and operating system, ultimately
creating an environment in which "browser functionality" was
simply one of the many features of the Windows operating sys-
tem.8 1
Microsoft adopted several other aggressive strategies to
promote IE. First, it engaged in vigorous price competition, giv-
ing IE away for free.8 2 Second, the firm expended massive sums
in advertising and promotion, even going so far as to pay some
Internet service providers (ISPs) a bounty for each new cus-
tomer they enrolled.8 3 Finally, the firm also paid numerous PC
makers-also known as original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs)-to promote IE.84
In addition to these "internal" or "unilateral" tactics, Mi-
crosoft also entered a variety of contractual arrangements with
firms that distributed Internet browsers to ultimate consumers.
For instance, the firm entered contracts that required OEMs
that purchased Windows also to purchase IE, and to install it
on PCs shipped to consumers. 85 These contracts did not pre-
clude OEMs from also installing other browsers, however, and
some OEMs felt perfectly free to do so. 86 The firm also entered
exclusive or primary dealing arrangements with Internet ac-
cess providers (IAPs) like America Online (AOL), and a handful
of ISPs like MindSpring.8 7 These contracts either prevented
these firms from distributing Netscape and other browsers, or
placed a ceiling on the proportion of such browsers that lAPs or
79. See id. (noting that Microsoft increased the number of developers
working on IE from "five or six in early 1995 to more than one thousand in
1999").
80. See id. at 43-44.
81. See id. at 50-53.
82. See id. at 49.
83. See id. at 45 (noting Microsoft spent $30 million per year marketing
IE and describing Microsoft's agreement to pay AOL a bounty for each cus-
tomer the firm converted to IE).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 49-50.
86. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
87. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 45-48 (explaining the distinction be-
tween IAPs and ISPs).
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ISPs could distribute.8 8 At the same time, however, the con-
tracts left Netscape free to rely upon thousands of other ISPs to
distribute its browser.8 9
In 1998, the Government claimed that Microsoft had mo-
nopolized the market for PC operating systems based on Intel
chip technology. 90 In so doing, the Government relied heavily
upon the distinction between internal exclusion, on the one
hand, and contractual exclusion, on the other. Thus, the Gov-
ernment made no attempt to challenge Microsoft's initial acqui-
sition of a 95% share of the relevant market.91 Instead,the Gov-
ernment focused its fire on the claim that Microsoft had "main-
tained" its monopoly by entering into various contracts the
Government deemed "exclusionary."92 None of these contracts,
either alone or in conjunction with others, completely excluded
alternative browsers from the relevant market. On the con-
trary, the agreements left Netscape free to distribute its prod-
uct through any number of alternative channels. 93 Indeed, the
88. See id. at 49-50.
89. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 222-25.
90. See id. at 176-83 (describing theory of Government's complaint).
91. See Brief for Appellees United States of America and the State Plain-
tiffs at 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (No. 95-5037), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7200/7230.pdf.
It should be noted that the Government did challenge Microsoft's decision
to physically integrate its browser with the Windows operating system. See
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64-67 (D.C. Cir.), aff'g in part,
rev'g in part 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (describing and evaluating this
challenge under relaxed standards governing product designs).
92. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 761, 772-75 (2001) (summarizing the Government's case
against Microsoft). It should be noted that, early in the litigation, the Gov-
ernment also claimed that Microsoft's practice of giving its Internet browser
away for free was predatory, since it represented below-cost pricing. See Plain-
tiffs' Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply
in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7-8, United States v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232). The district court
rejected this argument, holding that Microsoft's inclusion of its browser in
Windows at no extra charge enhanced competition in the browser market and
thus produced significant consumer benefits. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at
110-11. The Government abandoned this argument on appeal, and the court
of appeals went out of its way to conclude that such below-cost pricing was not
"exclusionary" for section 2 purposes. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 68 ("The rare
case of price predation aside, the antitrust laws do not condemn even a mo-
nopolist for offering its product at an attractive price, and we therefore have
no warrant to condemn Microsoft for offering... [IE] free of charge or even at
a negative price.").
93. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 211-13, 222-27 (outlining vari-
ous distribution channels that remained open to Netscape despite Microsoft's
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Government did not even argue that the agreements would
have this effect, as Netscape was still a significant force in the
market several years after Microsoft had introduced its own
browser. 94 Nor did the Government attempt to establish just
how much such practices raised Netscape's costs of distribu-
tion.95 Finally, the Government did not attempt to establish the
extent to which Netscape's downfall was the result of the pur-
portedly exclusionary agreements that it challenged, as op-
posed to Microsoft's admittedly procompetitive, "internal" con-
duct.96
Nonetheless, in various briefs filed in the district and ap-
pellate courts, the Government took the position that the
agreements were presumptively unlawful, simply because they
"tend[ed] to impair rivals' opportunities."97 In so doing, the
Government drew a distinction between "competition on the
practices and arguing that Microsoft's various agreements with firms that dis-
tributed Internet browsers did not significantly impact Netscape's costs of dis-
tribution).
94. See Kenneth G. Elzinga et al., United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or
Malady?, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 633, 673 (reporting that Netscape possessed a
29% share of the browser market in 2000).
95. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 210-13, 222-27 (arguing that
challenged provisions resulted in "trivial" increase in Netscape's marginal
costs of distribution).
96. See Meese, supra note 92, at 790-92 (concluding that the trial court
failed to delineate the effect that anticompetitive tactics had on Netscape's
market share); see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 67-68 (finding that Microsoft's
tactic of giving its browser away for free and providing bounties to IAPs that
convinced consumers to use the firm's browser were procompetitive promo-
tional tactics). The district court expressly found that several of Microsoft's
tactics improved IE vis-A-vis Netscape's browser, making the former more at-
tractive to consumers:
The debut of Internet Explorer and its rapid improvement gave
Netscape an incentive to improve Navigator's quality at a competitive
rate. The inclusion of Internet Explorer with Windows at no separate
charge increased general familiarity with the Internet and reduced
the cost to the public of gaining access to it, at least in part because it
compelled Netscape to stop charging for Navigator. These actions
thus contributed to improving the quality of Web browsing software,
lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby benefiting
consumers.
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 110-11; see also id. at 102 (stating that, by 1998,
IE was comparable in quality to Netscape's Navigator and that Netscape's
share of the browser market would have declined even in the absence of Mi-
crosoft's unlawful tactics, but that the unlawful tactics accelerated the de-
cline).
97. Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 16, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (emphasis
added).
766 [89:743
2005] MONOPOLIZATION
merits" and "exclusionary conduct."98 Competition on the mer-
its, the Government argued, took the form of internal activities,
such as efforts to reduce production costs and improve product
quality, which were lawful per se.99 By contrast, Microsoft's
various contracts with OEMs, IAPs, ISPs, and ICPs limited
consumer choice and the discretion of these firms, and thus, the
Government said, were presumptively unlawful because they
raised barriers to entry and tended to inhibit merits-based
competition. 100
The Government did not, it should be noted, claim that the
challenged contracts were ipso facto unlawful. 10 1 Instead, it ac-
knowledged the possibility that Microsoft could overcome the
98. See Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 47-
51, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-
5212); Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 2, United States v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) ("Section 2 of the
Sherman Act prohibits a firm with monopoly power from maintaining that
monopoly power through means that go beyond competition on the merits.");
id. at 15 ("The Court has used the language of 'exclusionary' or 'anticompeti-
tive' or 'predatory' to label the unlawful conduct and to distinguish it from the
competition on the merits reflected in Grinnell's reference to 'superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident."' (quoting United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966))).
99. See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law, at 15, United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (referring to
"competition on the merits" as involving "superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident" (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71)). The Government
contended that apparently exclusionary conduct can only be justified "as nec-
essary to further legitimate goals of lowering prices, improving quality, or in
other ways promoting or expanding consumer choice."). Id. at 17. The Gov-
ernment further asserted that any act that limits consumer choice is "telling
evidence" that the defendant is not engaged in "competition on the merits." Id.
at 19.
100. Id. at 22-23; see also id. at 19 (arguing that any act that contractually
limits consumer choice is "telling evidence" that the defendant is not engaged
in "competition on the merits"); Plaintiffs' Joint Response to Microsoft's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motions for Preliminary
Injunction at 21, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.
2000) (No. 98-1232) at 10-11 (contending that 'Microsoft's exclusionary
agreements with PC manufacturers, ISPs, and ICPs have raised barriers to
competition and effectively foreclosed competitors from significant distribution
channels").
101. The Government did, however, argue that the requirement that OEMs
purchase IE as a condition of receiving Windows was unlawful per se under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of
Law at 53-60, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.
2000) (No. 98-1232); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984) (holding that ties imposed by firms with market power are
unlawful per se).
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presumption against them.102 Still, this possibility was, under
the standard the Government propounded, more illusory than
real. In particular, the Government argued that Microsoft could
only prevail if it demonstrated that each of the challenged ex-
clusionary agreements furthered "competition on the merits"
and was no broader than necessary to achieve tangible com-
petitive benefits. 103
The Government's position had substantial basis in Su-
preme Court decisions, and, more importantly, both the district
court and the D.C. Circuit completely endorsed the Govern-
ment's account of the law of monopolization and its application
of that law to the facts of the case. 04 For instance, both courts
held that Microsoft's primary dealing arrangements with IAPs
and ISPs were presumptively unlawful because they foreclosed
rivals from one of the two most important channels for distrib-
uting Internet browsers. 105 This was so, the courts said, despite
the fact that Netscape remained free to rely upon thousands of
other ISPs to distribute its browser. 06 Neither the D.C. Circuit
nor the district court explained how (partial) exclusion from
102. See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 16, United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232).
103. See id. at 21-22
104. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C.
Cir. 2001), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (endors-
ing general standards applied by the district court in evaluating section 2
claims); id. at 68-71 (finding that primary dealing contracts were prima facie
unlawful under section 2 because they foreclosed rivals from a "significant"
portion of the market); id. at 69 (holding that primary dealing contracts are
prima facie unlawful where they "significantly limit.., the opportunities for
other traders to enter"); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38
(D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("If the
evidence reveals a significant exclusionary impact in the relevant market, the
defendant's conduct will be labeled 'anticompetitive'-and liability will at-
tach-unless the defendant comes forward with specific procompetitive busi-
ness motivations that explain the full extent of its exclusionary conduct."); see
also Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1047-49 (concluding that the court in Mi-
crosoft properly articulated and applied monopolization law).
105. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70-71; Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42;
see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 47 (D.D.C. 1999)
(finding that the OEM and IAP distribution channels were the most efficient
channels for distributing Internet browsers). It should be noted that the dis-
trict court did not attempt to calculate the relative costs of relying upon differ-
ent distribution channels. Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals, Costs to Achieve Power Over Price,
96 YALE L.J. 209, 254-62 (1986) (arguing that proof that restraint produces
significantly higher costs for rivals is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for such restraints to be anticompetitive).
106. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 222-25.
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one such channel could harm consumers to such an extent that
it should suffice to establish a prima facie case.10 7 Moreover,
both courts held that Microsoft's contractual requirement that
OEMs install IE and display the IE icon on the PC desktop
were themselves prima facie unlawful, even though the restric-
tions left OEMs contractually free to install and display com-
peting browsers as well.108 Indeed, OEMs Apple and IBM testi-
fied at trial that they felt perfectly free to install competing
browsers.10 9 Here again, neither court explained how this re-
striction could, by itself, raise Netscape's costs to such an ex-
tent as to harm competition.11 0 Instead, the D.C. Circuit simply
held that OEMs were one of two important channels for
browser distribution, and that the restriction effectively pre-
vented "many" OEMs from preinstalling a second browser.11
The court did not say "how many" OEMs were restricted in this
way, or whether they were sufficiently important market par-
ticipants to affect Netscape's browser share in a meaningful
way.112
Perhaps most importantly, the district court found that
Microsoft's quality improvements and low prices themselves
might have eroded Netscape's market share.1 13 Yet it declined
to find that Microsoft's contractual tactics, and not these im-
provements in IE's quality and low prices, had reduced Net-
107. To be sure, the court went on to find that Microsoft's technological in-
tegration of IE with Windows, combined with certain licensing restrictions,
effectively excluded Netscape from the other important distribution channel,
namely, OEM PC manufacturers. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60-67. However,
the court's analysis of the exclusive and primary dealing arrangements does
not mention this finding and instead treated the exclusion of rivals from one
important channel as sufficient to give rise to a prima facie case. See Micro-
soft, 253 F.3d at 70-71; cf. id. at 72 (finding that relatively small foreclosure
worked by agreements with ISVs established a prima facie case because other
arrangements had blocked larger distribution channels).
108. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60-61.
109. See id. at 61; Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 210-14 (questioning
the claim that a requirement that OEMs install IE would preclude OEMs from
installing Netscape).
110. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 61 (finding that these restrictions were
"anticompetitive" because the OEM channel is "one of the two primary chan-
nels for distribution of browsers").
111. See id.
112. See id. (conceding that IBM and Apple, for instance, felt free to install
second browsers despite these provisions).
113. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 112 (D.D.C.
1999) ("There is insufficient evidence to find that, absent Microsoft's actions,
Navigator and Java already would have ignited genuine competition in the
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems.").
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scape's market share enough to thwart its middleware strat-
egy. 114 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that no such finding
was necessary. 115 In particular, relying upon the leading trea-
tise in antitrust law, the court held that the Government did
not have to show that Netscape would have evolved into a bona
fide competitor to Microsoft but for the challenged agreements
because it was appropriate that "the defendant is made to suf-
fer the consequences of its own undesirable conduct." 116 This
argument was entirely circular, however, as it begged the ques-
tion of whether the contracts should be deemed "undesirable"
simply because they "foreclosed" Netscape from portions of par-
ticular market channels.1 1 7 In short, the most important anti-
trust decision of the past decade embraced the distinction be-
tween internal exclusion, or "competition on the merits," and
contractual exclusion.1 18 Several scholars have endorsed the
114. See generally Elzinga et al., supra note 94, at 672-79 (arguing that
"[t]o whatever extent Netscape and Java were ever potential platform com-
petitors of Microsoft, they remain so today"); Meese, supra note 92, at 790-94.
115. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80 ("[C]ausation affords Microsoft no defense to
liability for its unlawful actions undertaken to maintain its monopoly in the
operating system market.").
116. See id. at 79 (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 651(c), at 78 (1996)); see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, su-
pra note 38, 651(d)(2) (contending that conduct that "clearly injures rivals
and has no business justification" presumptively harms consumers); infra
notes 308-09 and accompanying text (documenting Professor Areeda's signifi-
cant influence in the federal courts). It should be noted in this connection that
the district court fastidiously avoided any finding that Netscape's middleware
strategy in fact posed a significant competitive threat to Microsoft. Microsoft,
84 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18. Thus the record in the case contains no finding that
Microsoft's conduct had an actual anticompetitive effect. See Lopatka & Page,
supra note 42, at 369 ("The court did not find that Microsoft's monopoly would
have vanished before trial but for Microsoft's exclusionary practices. Rather, it
held that Microsoft's practices delayed the emergence of competing platform
technologies that might eventually have threatened Microsoft's dominance.").
117. Cf. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 224-25 (1993) (observing that the Sherman Act does not forbid "an act of
pure malice by one competitor against another" absent some showing of actual
consumer harm). See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985), (noting that a negative impact on a rival does
not itself prove harm to competition sufficient to establish prima facie case
under section 2).
118. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 56 ("[This case] is... about Microsoft's ef-
forts to maintain this [monopoly] position through means other than competi-
tion on the merits."); id. at 62 (finding that contractual limitations on OEMs'
ability to promote competing browsers "ha[ve] a substantial effect in protect-
ing Microsoft's market power, and do so through a means other than competi-
tion on the merits," and are thus "anticompetitive"); see also Eleanor M. Fox,
What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Ef-
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approach taken by the enforcement agencies and the courts. 1 19
Indeed, in one sense the test announced by the D.C. Circuit
was more hostile to Microsoft than that advanced by the Gov-
ernment. Recall that the Government had assumed that Micro-
soft could justify arrangements deemed prima facie unlawful by
showing that the restrictions were no broader than necessary to
achieve significant competitive objectives. 120 While a showing of
benefits was necessary to avoid liability under the test pro-
pounded by the D.C. Circuit, it was not sufficient. According to
this court, proof that a restriction produced benefits did not
undermine the initial conclusion that it was "anticompetitive,"
with the result that the court should balance the restraint's
benefits against its harms. 12 1 Thus, even if a restraint was the
least restrictive means of producing significant benefits, the
plaintiff would still be free to show that the benefits of such a
restraint were outweighed by the harms. 122
II. PRICE THEORY, COMPETITION ON THE MERITS, AND
CONTRACTUAL EXCLUSION
As explained above, courts applying section 2 of the
Sherman Act initially employed a fact-based inquiry into a de-
fendant's "intent." This test, on its best days, ultimately in-
fect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 390 (2002) (noting that the Microsoft decision dis-
penses with any requirement of actual anticompetitive effects); Piraino, supra
note 38, at 812-13 (describing importance of the Microsoft case); supra notes
105-10 and accompanying text.
119. E.g., John J. Flynn, Standard Oil and Microsoft-Intriguing Parallels
or Limping Analogies?, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 645 (2001); Hovenkamp, supra
note 17, at 1047-49; see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38,
651(d)(2) (stating that courts should condemn conduct that injures rivals
without justification); Piraino, supra note 38, at 862-71 (discussing the courts'
approach); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Eco-
nomic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617
(1999) (same).
120. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
121. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59, 61 (noting that the court should "bal-
ance" anticompetitive effects against procompetitive benefits and finding that
the license restrictions were "anti-competitive").
122. See id. at 59 (stating that a plaintiff could prevail by establishing that
"the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive bene-
fit" and characterizing analysis under section 2 as a "balancing approach" un-
der the rubric of the Rule of Reason). See generally Capital Imaging Assocs.,
P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (ar-
ticulating Rule of Reason balancing test); Meese, supra note 15, 108-13 (exam-
ining similar approach to the evaluation of asserted benefits under section I's
Rule of Reason).
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volved an assessment of the welfare implications of the prac-
tices under review. 123 Yet the intent test is dead and buried,
replaced by a standard that distinguishes between "internal"
conduct, or "competition on the merits," on the one hand, and
"contractual" exclusion, on the other.124 The demise of the in-
tent test begs an obvious question: what accounts for that de-
mise and, more importantly, the test that resulted? This section
argues that modern monopolization law, particularly the dis-
tinction between "internal" and "contractual" exclusion, derives
from neoclassical price theory, the economic paradigm that
dominated the study of industrial organization during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. Part A of this section exam-
ines price theory, its theory of the firm, and the "workable com-
petition" model that it spawned. Part B explains how this
conception of the firm and the workable competition model
came to influence monopolization law during the 1950s and
continues to do so today.
A. WORKABLE COMPETITION, EXCLUSION, AND THE THEORY OF
THE FIRM
For decades economists embraced a uniform approach to
analyzing microeconomic problems: neoclassical price theory. 125
Not surprisingly, price theory and its assumptions dominated
the subject of industrial organization, that is, the study of how
firms organize themselves and conduct their activities. Indeed,
during this period industrial organization was not so much a
separate subject as it was applied price theory. 126 Price theory
123. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
124. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir.
1945) (rejecting intent test); supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
125. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 7 (1985) (describing dominance of price theory from 1940 into the
1970s).
126. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in
POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
59, 61-63 (V. Fuchs ed., 1972) (arguing that, as of 1972, the study of industrial
organization consisted simply of applied price theory). Indeed, after reviewing
two of the period's leading industrial organization texts, Professor Ronald
Coase concluded that "[e]ssentially, [both authors] consider the subject of in-
dustrial organization as applied price theory." Id. at 62; see also JOE S. BAIN,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 25-27 (1968) (portraying industrial organization
as price or resource allocation theory); RICHARD CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY:
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 14 (1967) ("The subject of 'industrial
organization' applies the economist's models of price theory to the industries
in the world around us."); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
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and the industrial organization paradigm that it produced of-
fered a unified, coherent methodology for analyzing the causes
and consequences of commercial activities, including trade
practices pursued by actual or potential monopolists.
Like physicists who imagine a world without friction, price
theorists began with the model of "perfect competition," an at-
omistic world in which numerous firms sold homogenous prod-
ucts and no individual or firm could unilaterally influence
prices, output, or any other terms of trade. 127 First formalized
in the 1920s, this model had antecedents dating from the late
nineteenth century.128 The model rested upon several interre-
lated assumptions that combined to portray a world in which
firms and individuals could costlessly rely upon the market to
conduct economic activity.129 For one thing, the perfect competi-
tion model assumed that purchasers had perfect information
about the items they bought, or that firms could convey such
INDUSTRY 1 (1968).
127. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT:
ECONOMICS OF AN ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, 95-135 (1948); FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 3-5 (1921) (analogizing unrealistic assump-
tions in economics to "simplified conditions" assumed in theoretical physics);
TIBOR SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 16-19, 229-46 (1951) (employ-
ing perfect competition model to analyze behavior of consumers and firms);
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PRICE 24 (1942) (analogiz-
ing assumptions of the perfect competition model to physicists' assumption of
a world without friction); see also Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect
Competition and the Creativity of the Market, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 479
(2001) (detailing historical development of the perfect competition model and
contending that the model ultimately rested on core assumption that all firms
are price takers).
128. See, e.g., JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, at v
(1931) (arguing that "the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a
natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to
every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent creates");
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 113 (1898) (arguing that eco-
nomics' "chief work is connected with the measurement of motives by the price
which, as a 'normal' or general rule, is sufficient to induce a person of a par-
ticular class under given conditions to undertake a certain task"); A.C. PIGOU,
WEALTH AND WELFARE 172-79 (1912) (describing the market behavior of
firms in "simple competition"); see also FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT
COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMICS 159-81, 268-76
(1995) (describing the historical development of the perfect competition model
and its assumptions); Makowski & Ostroy, supra note 127, at 482-96 (same);
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 1, 11 (1957) (concluding that Professor Knight was the first to com-
pletely formulate the theory of perfect competition).
129. See KNIGHT, supra note 127, at 76-86 (detailing various assumptions
of the perfect competition model).
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information, and buyers could absorb it, without cost.13° More-
over, perfect competition assumed that bargaining and en-
forcement costs were nonexistent, with the result that trading
partners could negotiate complete contracts governing every
aspect of their relationship--contracts that courts would easily
enforce.131
The perfect competition model also assumed away a com-
mon economic phenomenon, namely, opportunism directed
against consumers or trading partners. 132 Thus, a firm could
rely upon trading partners to perform economic activities as
though they had the firm's own interests at heart. Some schol-
ars simply assumed away opportunism by fiat.133 Others were
130. See STIGLER, supra note 127, at 21-23; KNIGHT, supra note 127, at
77-78 (assuming perfect knowledge by rational economic actors and "perfect,
costless intercommunication" between economic actors); see also MACHOVEC,
supra note 128, at 241-49 (detailing the development of perfect competition's
assumptions); Stigler, supra note 128, passim (same).
131. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 7 (noting that, in the perfect com-
petition model, "disputes were disregarded because of the presumed efficacy of
court adjudication"); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activ-
ity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 60 (Robert H. Haveman &
Julius Margolis eds., 1970) ("[T]he existence of vertical integration may sug-
gest that the costs of operating competitive markets are not zero, as is usually
assumed in our theoretical analysis.") (emphasis added); Richard N. Langlois,
Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 834-35 (1989)
("The traditional economic theory of the firm feeds off of... the 'classical' the-
ory of contract. Briefly put, classical contracting involves homogenous goods
traded among anonymous transactors with all the (possibly contingent) terms
explicitly spelled out in advance.").
Frank Knight, writing about the perfect competition model, observed:
We must also assume complete absence of physical obstacles to
the making, execution, and changing of plans at will; that is, there
must be 'perfect mobility' in all economic adjustments, no cost in-
volved in movements or changes. To realize this ideal all the elements
entering into economic calculations--effort, commodities, etc.-must
be continuously variable, divisible without limit .... The exchange of
commodities must be virtually instantaneous and costless.
KNIGHT, supra note 127, at 77-78; see also STIGLER, supra note 127, at 22 (ex-
plaining that absent perfect knowledge, "perfect competition" depends upon
enforcement of contracts, protection of private property, and prevention of
fraud).
132. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 30 (defining opportunism as a
condition of "self-interest seeking with guile").
133. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of Homo
Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 83, 83 (1993) (contending that price theory and the perfect com-
petition model rested upon assumption that all market actors behaved as "Vic-
torian gentlemen"); Makowski & Ostroy, supra note 127, at 490-91 (detailing
tendency of some devotees of perfect competition to assume away possibility of
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more precise, arguing that the combination of perfect informa-
tion and perfect contracting would prevent opportunism. 134 Still
others assumed that firms could combat opportunism by adopt-
ing "less restrictive" provisions that did not limit rivalry. 135
Taken together, these various assumptions ensured that reli-
ance upon the market to, conduct economic activity-
transacting-was costless.136
For perfect competition, "the market" was a collection of
firms, each of which interacted by means of spot market con-
tracting. Within this milieu, "the firm" was the basic, funda-
mental unit of analysis; economists did not concern themselves
with how firms organized themselves or what occurred within
them. 13 7 Thus, scholars employing the perfect competition
opportunism by fiat).
134. See KNIGHT, supra note 127, at 78-79 (noting that when we assume
rationality and perfect information, "[w]e formally exclude all preying of indi-
viduals upon each other.... [we] exclude fraud or deceit and theft or brigand-
age"); see also STIGLER, supra note 127, at 23 (explaining that the complete
knowledge assumption of the perfect competition model ensured that fraud
would not occur and that parties would know whether trading partners would
perform obligations). See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 7 (noting
that price theorists assumed that courts could costlessly resolve disputes).
135. See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 185-86 (contending that manu-
facturers can achieve benefits of exclusive dealing by other means); KAYSEN &
TURNER, supra note 28, at 158-59 (arguing that less restrictive means will
serve the same legitimate objectives as tying contracts); Donald F. Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 699 (1962) (arguing that a require-
ment that dealer use its best efforts within an area of "primary responsibility"
will assure effective promotion by dealers).
136. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 6 (1988) (not-
ing that "the concept of transaction costs.., is largely absent from [price] the-
ory"); see also Stigler, supra note 128, at 5-6 (explaining that perfect competi-
tion equates "competition" with "the market").
137. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 127, at 10-94 (describing various attributes
and types of firms, without considering why firms exist in the first place);
SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at 109-80 (discussing behavior of the firm without
examining rationale for its existence); STIGLER, supra note 127, at 102-15;
ALFRED R. OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 7-35
(1951); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1992) (arguing that, in the realm of price theory, the
'economist does not interest himself in the internal arrangements within or-
ganizations but only in what happens on the market, [that is] the purchase of
factors of production, and the sale of the goods that these factors produce");
Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26
J.L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983) ("It is a mistake to confuse the firm of economic
theory with its real-world namesake. The chief mission of neoclassical econom-
ics [i.e., price theory] is to understand how the price system coordinates the
use of resources, not to understand the inner workings of real firms."); Harold
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model generally took the firm for granted, treating the entity as
a black box, an indivisible unit that performed unique techno-
logical and allocational functions. 138 To this end, the firm pur-
chased inputs on impersonal markets and transformed them
into a product, which it sold in impersonal markets. 139 How
much a firm produced and at what cost was determined by the
firm's "production function," a mathematical representation of
the relationship between input costs and the firm's output.1 40
This relationship, in turn, was solely a function of production
technology, exogenous to the market or related institutions,
which determined the number and combination of inputs-
including labor-required to produce a given quantum of out-
Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 143
(1988) ("'Firm' in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical device adopted to
facilitate discussion of the price system."); Lionel Robbins, The Representative
Firm, 38 ECON. J. 387, 389 (1928) (explaining that the representative business
firm in Marshall's Principles of Economics was an economic construct, inde-
pendent of legal structure); George J. Stigler, The Place of Marshall's Princi-
ples in the Development of Economics, in CENTENARY ESSAYS ON ALFRED
MARSHALL 8 (John K. Whitaker ed., 1990) ('The very purpose of the study of
the firm [under price theory and the perfect competition model] is to deduce
from its behavior the properties of industry demands for inputs and supplies of
outputs.").
138. In 1948, Professor Joe S. Bain described the business firm as follows,
with no elaboration on its purposes: "[i]n a money exchange economy, such an
enterprise operates by buying and selling. It purchases materials, equipment,
land, and labor, combines them in a finished product, and sells them to a
buyer." BAIN, supra note 127, at 10. In 1942, Stigler discussed "the nature of
costs and the production function" without explaining why firms exist. See
STIGLER, supra note 127, at 102-15; see also SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at
109-21 (devoting entire chapter to description of the activities of "the firm"
without explaining why entity arises in the first place).
139. See Coase, supra note 137, at 714 (noting that price theory treated the
firm as a black box); Langlois, supra note 131, at 834 ("[Tjhe economist's
firm-at least until recently-was a black box, a production function that took
in inputs and transformed them into outputs."); see also R.H. Coase, The Na-
ture of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of
the Firm] (stating that one view treats firms within the economic system as
"islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious [market] co-operation
like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk").
140. See Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the
Passage of Time, in COSEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 2-4 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) (describing
technological focus of so-called "Pigouvian Price Theory"); WILLIAMSON, supra
note 125, at 7-8; see also KELVIN LANCASTER, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 73
(1969) ("A general statement of all outputs that can be obtained from all effi-
cient input combinations is called the production function."); SCITOVSKY, supra
note 127, at 113-21 (explaining the concept of the production function);
STIGLER, supra note 127, at 109-12 (same).
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put.14 1 In essence, then, the firm of price theory was a sort of
calculating machine. This machine observed the price set by
"the market" for its product, observed the price set by "the
market" for its inputs (including labor), and set its own level of
output accordingly. 142 Where the other assumptions of perfect
competition obtained, this process would lead to consumption
and production decisions that maximized the welfare society
could realize from its limited resources. 143
141. LANCASTER, supra note 140, at 61-62 (stating that the nature of
available production processes is determined by technology); SCITOVSKY, su-
pra note 127, at 113 ('"The production function represents the scope and limi-
tations of production as determined by technical conditions, which the econo-
mist cannot change and must accept as given."); STIGLER, supra note 127, at
109-10 ("Production functions are descriptive of techniques or systems of or-
ganization of productive services, and they are therefore taken from disci-
plines such as engineering and industrial chemistry: to the economic theorist
they are data of analysis."); Oliver E. Williamson, Technology and Transaction
Cost Economics: A Reply, 10 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 355 (1988).
142. One Nobel laureate characterized the production function as follows:
Underlying economics is technology. As far as we are concerned,
the technical expert has completed his job when he has handed on to
the economist, accountant, or cost engineer the physical relationship
between output and various inputs. This relationship is called the
"production function." The production function tells us how much out-
put we can hope to get if we have so much labor and so much capital
and so much land, etc.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 546 (2d ed.
1951). See COASE, supra note 136, at 3 ("The firm to an economist... is 'effec-
tively defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of the firm]
is simply the logic of optimal pricing and input combination."' (quoting Martin
Slater, Foreword to EDITH T. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE
FIRM, at ix (2d ed. 1980))); MACHOVEC, supra note 128, at 16 (explaining that
under price theory's model of perfect competition, "the only acceptable behav-
ior of firms is to mechanically reallocate capital in response to a new set of
perfect information emissions-provided like manna from heaven, indiscrimi-
nately and simultaneously-to the roboticized helmsmen of each firm"); Dem-
setz, supra note 137, at 143 (stating that under conventional price theory,
"[t]asks normally to be expected of management... are performed without er-
ror and costlessly, as if by a free and perfect computer."); see also BAIN, supra
note 127, at 10 (describing behavior of "the firm" in this manner); SCITOVSKY,
supra note 127, at 109-42 (same). See generally FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, The
Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 92-94
(1948).
143. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 12-19 (1970) (describing the theory of general competitive
equilibrium and its allocative consequences); SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at
339-70 (explaining that perfect competition results in allocative and produc-
tive efficiency that maximizes social welfare); see also Edward S. Mason, The
Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. REV.
1265, 1266-67 (1949) (stating that perfect competition was only desirable be-
cause it produced a certain end-the maximization of economic welfare).
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Perfect competition's conception of the firm implied a par-
ticular theory of firm scope. This theory purported to explain a
given firm's choice between purchasing an item or service "on
the market" or producing the item itself (i.e., vertical integra-
tion). According to the model, firms made each "make or buy"
decision by comparing the cost of internal (self) production to
the price the firm would have to pay for the same item on the
"open market."144 These relative costs, in turn, depended upon
production technology. So, for instance, a firm would choose to
"buy" a particular item from an outside supplier if (1) the firm's
own needs were relatively modest; and (2) technology and mar-
ket demand were such that outside suppliers could realize sig-
nificant economies of scale in producing the item. 145 If, by con-
trast, there were no economies of scale, and if technology were
such that locating two physical activities "under the same roof'
reduced the cost of production, a firm would choose to conduct
both activities itself. The classic example given by price theo-
rists was the integration of iron and steel manufacturing to re-
duce fuel costs associated with reheating iron to transform it
into steel.1 46 Given the assumptions of the model, there was no
other legitimate rationale for vertical integration. Absent some
explanation rooted in technological efficiencies, vertical inte-
gration was presumed to be an attempt to acquire or protect
market power.1 47
144. See George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of
the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. at 185, 187-89 (1951); see also BAIN, supra note
126, at 177-80 (arguing that rivalry will cause firms to choose an efficient
level of vertical integration based upon relative costs of internal production
and reliance upon the market).
145. See Stigler, supra note 144, passim (arguing that vertical integration
depends upon the extent of the market and the resulting opportunities for spe-
cialization by firms and their suppliers). Similarly, a future disciple of Stigler's
concluded that there were two beneficial purposes of vertical integration:
"enabling the firm so organized to bypass a monopoly at one level, or ... ena-
bling the achievement of internal efficiencies." Robert H. Bork, Vertical Inte-
gration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconcep-
tion, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 200 (1954).
146. Several leading texts of the price-theoretic era employed this example
to illustrate the sort of technological economies that vertical integration might
produce. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 126, at 381; DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note
36, at 23; KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 120; SCHERER, supra note 143,
at 70; GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE
ENTERPRISE 64-65 (1951).
147. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC
WELFARE: AN INTRODUCTION 37 (1970) ("The cost advantages in a firm may be
of two types: technical and pecuniary. Only technical economies represent a
genuine improvement in social efficiencies."); WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at
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To be sure, price theorists neither believed that the real
world mimicked the world imagined by perfect competition nor
that perfect competition was in fact desirable in all respects.
148
For instance, economists recognized the existence of negative
and positive externalities that might cause markets to fail to
achieve the optimum allocation of resources. 149 Moreover,
economists recognized that consumers in any given market
possessed heterogeneous preferences, and that firms might
seek to satisfy these preferences by producing differentiated
products. 150 Such differentiation, in turn, could confer a small
degree of market power on the firm that catered to consumer
preferences. 51 Finally, economists recognized that firms often
strove to improve their products or discover new (technological)
methods of production, thus altering the production function
366 (demonstrating that according to neoclassical price theory, "efforts to re-
configure firm and market structures that violated 'natural' boundaries were
believed to have market power origins"); Meese, supra note 15, at 115-19 (ex-
plaining how neoclassical price theory treated integration as monopolistic ab-
sent a showing that such integration produced technological efficiencies). A
leading price theorist concluded that most vertical integration was designed to
increase market power:
[T]he trained observer tends to form a considerable suspicion from
casual observation that there is a good deal of vertical integration
which, although not actually uneconomical, is also not justified on the
basis of any cost savings. This is apparently true in particular of the
integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms. In most
cases the rationale of the integration is evidently the increase of the
market power of the firms involved rather than a reduction in cost.
BAIN, supra note 126, at 381.
148. See Mason, supra note 143, at 1267 ("None of the markets encoun-
tered [in antitrust litigation] meet the tests of pure competition .... "); Edward
S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 35 (1937) (ac-
knowledging that economic theory properly recognizes the existence of "mo-
nopoly elements in the practices of almost every firm"); see also KNIGHT, supra
note 127, at 9 (remarking that the real world economy "is obviously not at all
completely or perfectly competitive").
149. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 13 n.12; SAMUELSON, supra
note 142, at 743-44; SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at 181-87; SHEPHERD, supra
note 147, at 27-28; see also K. WILLIAM KAPP, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE 13 (1950); A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 11-20
(1932).
150. See BAIN, supra note 127, at 15-16; JOHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR
COMPETITION 114-15 (1941).
151. See BAIN, supra note 127, at 246-47 (concluding that monopolistic
competition created by product differentiation confers a relatively small de-
gree of market power on firms producing such products); EDWARD HASTINGS
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56-57, 71-73
(1962); FRANK H. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 90-92 (1951);
SAMUELSON, supra note 142, at 495-97.
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and lowering costs.152 These efforts could lead firms to expand
significantly, sometimes by merger, taking advantage of (tech-
nological) economies of scale. 153 Some industries were thus
populated by only a few sellers, with the result that firms in
these industries could often exercise some power over price. 154
The market power associated with product differentiation
and economies of scale resulted in a misallocation of society's
resources, as firms with such power reduced output below the
optimal level. 155 Despite this power, however, economists be-
lieved that such practices were often beneficial on balance. For
instance, product differentiation often catered to true distinc-
tions in consumer preferences and thus produced significant
benefits that could outweigh any losses occasioned by the exer-
cise of market power. 156 Moreover, price theorists recognized
152. See BAIN, supra note 127, at 84-85 ("In most industries, a very small
firm is quite inefficient; as the firm becomes larger it tends to become more
efficient, reaching a minimum cost per unit of output at some particular
scale."); MILLER, supra note 150, at 8 (explaining that real world competition
"may consist in an endeavor to organize and utilize factors more effectively in
producing goods and services, this involving a rivalry in technological proc-
esses as well as in economy in the use and organization of men and materi-
als"); SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at 331-33; STIGLER, supra note 127, at 132-
42; STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 146, at 54-61. It should be noted that
Professor John Miller's fulsome definition of competition did not include non-
standard contracts. See MILLER, supra note 150, at 199 (asserting that tying
contracts are only useful where a seller has a "strong monopoly position"); id.
at 210 (asserting that exclusive dealing arrangements are only useful where
there are "some elements of monopoly control"). See generally WILLIAM H.S.
STEVENS, UNFAIR COMPETITION 5-8 (1917) (contending that legitimate compe-
tition included efforts to improve processes and lower costs).
153. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 128 ("From the standpoint of
both buyers and sellers, mergers may promote efficiency. Where the appropri-
ate scale of operations or degree of integration of the firm changes, mergers
may provide the most economical method of reshaping the structures of exist-
ing firms to the new cost conditions.").
154. See George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 8-13 (Supp. II 1942) (examining the extent to which such
economies do require market power). Stigler further notes a possible "incom-
patability of competition and continuing economies of scale." Id. at 8.
155. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 127, at 152-57.
156. See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 32 ("Product differentiation, for
example, is often a means of competition that serves the public by providing
minimum assurances of quality and by catering to a real consumer desire for
product improvement or variation."); MILLER, supra note 150, at 117;
OXENFELDT, supra note 137, at 88 (acknowledging that perfect competition
may not give desirable results in a world with "rapidly changing consumer
tastes [and] a strong desire for diversity of products"); SCHERER, supra note
143, at 22 (describing existence of product differentiation as a potentially
beneficial departure from perfect competition); Mason, supra note 148, at 36
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that gains associated with economies of scale and the accompa-
nying reduction in production costs would often outweigh any
allocative losses produced by any resulting market power, with
the result that some such departure from perfect competition
was necessary to realize net efficiencies and maximize social
welfare. 157 In these circumstances, it was said, "workable com-
petition" was the best society could hope for, since any attempt
to impose perfect competition by regulatory fiat would deprive
society of significant efficiencies of production and the benefits
of product differentiation. 158 Indeed, many economists who rec-
(concluding that economists should not criticize market power that is a result
of legitimate economic activity such as product differentiation); see also BAIN,
supra note 127, at 247 n.2 (concluding that welfare consequences of market
power produced by product differentiation are minor and outweighed at least
in part by the "advantages of variety to consumers"); E.H. Chamberlin, Prod-
uct Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 85 (1950); Knight, su-
pra note 151, at 91-92 (explaining that a seller's "monopoly" over its own
brand is constrained by competition from other branded goods).
157. See, e.g., DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 33 ("Rarely does the cause
of effective competition demand an attack on an industry because of the few-
ness of the firms that make it up."); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 5-8;
MILLER, supra note 150, at 411 ("[I]t would not be feasible to pulverize indus-
try sufficiently to approximate pure competition" because doing so would "in-
terfer[e] with the attainment of the optimum scale of plant and rate of opera-
tion."); OXENFELDT, supra note 137, at 88 ("[Pure and perfect competition]
may not give desirable results in a world characterized by ... rapid techno-
logical change [and] important economies of large-scale production ....");
STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 146, at 53-61; id. at 13 ("Pure competition
can scarcely be realized in a machine age."); Edward S. Mason, Workable
Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND
THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 387 (1957) ("Some power there has to be, both be-
cause of inescapable limitations to the process of atomization and because
power is needed to do the job the American public expects of its industrial ma-
chine."); see also BAIN, supra note 127, at 84 (stating that "[i]n most industries
a small firm is quite inefficient"); id. at 153 (concluding that comparison of
output levels in monopolized and competitive industries is "idle" because mo-
nopolized industries often realize economies of scale and thus may produce
more output than a competitive industry).
In 1968, Professor Oliver E. Williamson formalized this insight, by show-
ing that a merger to monopoly that produced a slight reduction in production
costs could result in a net improvement in social welfare. In particular, Wil-
liamson showed that such a firm would realize efficiencies on each unit of its
output, while any allocative losses would only impact output at the margin.
See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
158. See BAIN, supra note 126, at 13-17 (defining concept of workable com-
petition and endorsing use of this standard as guide to public policy toward
industry); MILLER, supra note 150, at 404-22 (detailing author's call for poli-
cies that furthered "workable competition"); J.M. Clark, Toward A Concept of
Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940); Mason, supra note 157,
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ommended a policy of breaking up large firms to combat mar-
ket power recognized an exception for those industries in which
such deconcentration would eliminate significant economies of
scale. 159 For most price theorists, then, "workable competition,"
and not "perfect competition," was the chief desideratum of
public policy toward industry. 160
Still, while economists who embraced "workable competi-
tion" recognized and even endorsed certain departures from
perfect competition, these same scholars nonetheless embraced
the other assumptions of the perfect competition model when
addressing industrial organization problems. 161 For instance,
passim. Another scholar has suggested an alternative to workable competition:
An industry may be judged to be workably competitive when, after
the structural characteristics of its market and the dynamic forces
that shaped them have been thoroughly examined, there is no clearly
indicated change that can be effected through public policy measures
that would result in greater social gains than social losses.
Jesse Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competi-
tion, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 361 (1950). See generally OXENFELDT, supra note
137, at 88-90 (contending that the concept of "workable competition" was a
more useful benchmark for public policy than perfect competition, while at the
same time seeking more useful mechanisms for identifying such markets);
GEORGE W. STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY
(1961) (applying the workable competition model to various antitrust ques-
tions).
159. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 113; MILLER, supra note
150, at 411-12; STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 146, at 552-53; Mason, su-
pra note 157, at 387 ('There is no reason, however, to tolerate positions of
market power that can be lessened by appropriate antitrust action unless it
can be shown that this lessening substantially interferes with the job to be
done [by the firm].").
160. See BAIN, supra note 126, at 15-17 (endorsing workable competition
as a standard to guide public policy); MILLER, supra note 150, at 411-15;
Clark, supra note 158, passim; Mason, supra note 157, at 382-88 (embracing
workable competition as appropriate antitrust benchmark); George Stocking,
On the Concept of Workable Competition as an Antitrust Guide, 2 ANTITRUST
BULL. 3, 5-21 (1956) (describing the rise of the workable competition model
and its widespread acceptance by economists interested in antitrust policy).
161. See HAYEK, supra note 142, at 94 (asserting that most assumptions of
the perfect competition model "are equally assumed in the discussion of the
various 'imperfect' or 'monopolistic' markets, which throughout assume certain
unrealistic 'perfections"'); KNIGHT, supra note 127, at 10-11 (describing "evil
results" that flow from the failure of economists to always recognize real world
departures from the various assumptions of the perfect competition model);
Langlois, supra note 140, at 2 (noting that Joan Robinson and Edward Cham-
berlin, who pioneered the theory of "the firm," relied upon various other as-
sumptions of the perfect competition model); see also KAYSEN & TURNER, su-
pra note 28, at 7 ("[T]he rigorous model of the perfectly competitive market is
the appropriate starting point of any definition [of competition relevant to an-
titrust policy]."); id. at 8 ("[T]hough the model of [perfectly] competitive mar-
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the concept of workable competition added nothing to perfect
competition's theory of the firm.162 If anything, workable com-
petition's recognition of technology as a source of firm growth
served to bolster perfect competition's technological conception
of the firm. Moreover, economists working within the workable
competition tradition continued to embrace perfect competi-
tion's assumptions that knowledge flowed freely between firms
and consumers, bargaining costs were nonexistent, and oppor-
tunism irrelevant. 163 In this frictionless world, firms could
costlessly identify and transact with suppliers or customers.
Modified in this way, price theory implied a particular
model of legitimate "competition," a model that helped econo-
mists interpret the causes and origins of various business prac-
tices employed by monopolists and other firms.164 In particular,
ket structure is not usable as such in our definition of competition, other con-
cepts of the model are."). While Professors Donald F. Turner and Carl Kaysen
recognized that the perfect competition model could not provide the final defi-
nition of competition relevant to antitrust policy, they nonetheless assumed
that any practice that a firm would not adopt in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket reflected an exercise of market power that had to be justified. Id.
162. See infra notes 312-18 and accompanying text (explaining that the
perfect competition model lacked theory explaining the existence of firms).
163. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (detailing these as-
sumptions of the perfect competition model). For instance, one scholar who
recognized the presence of product differentiation nonetheless assumed away
opportunism when analyzing certain nonstandard contracts. See, e.g., William
S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and
Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1430 (1968). Other scholars claimed
that managerial talent was widely available and that firms could easily repli-
cate technological innovations by their competitors. See KAYSEN & TURNER,
supra note 28, at 7-8. Another scholar whose work recognized the existence of
product differentiation and economies of scale nonetheless assumed that bar-
gaining and information costs were so low that manufacturers could readily
bargain with dealers and others over the latter's promotional obligations. See
Turner, supra note 135, at 699 (noting that a requirement that a dealer use its
best efforts within an area of "primary responsibility" can assure effective
promotion by dealers); Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 66-67 (1958). See generally
DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 185-86 (arguing that parties can achieve
various benefits of exclusive dealing without relying upon contractual limits
on freedom of action); MILLER, supra note 150, at 199 (concluding that tying
contracts are necessarily the result of market power).
164. See Edward S. Mason, Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Antitrust Policy, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, AM.
ECON. REV., May 1956, at 471, 475-76 (noting that economists rely upon mod-
els to interpret the purposes and effects of business practices); cf. THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 114-17 (1970) (explain-
ing that paradigm shifts cause reinterpretation of previously-observed phe-
nomena).
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price theory and the workable competition model implied a dis-
tinction between activity that took place "within" a firm's
boundaries, on the one hand, and a firm's contractual relations
with other market actors, on the other. As noted above, the
firm hypothesized by price theory-whether in perfect or
workable competition-performed one function: allocating re-
sources by purchasing inputs and transforming them into out-
puts. 165 As such, the firm realized all possible (technological)
efficiencies internally, in the process of transforming inputs to
outputs. 166
Given the assumptions of price theory and its model of
workable competition, the process of allocation and transforma-
tion performed by firms was "efficient" or beneficial in an al-
most tautological sense. 16 7 Similarly, the workable competition
model recognized as "efficient" a firm's efforts to alter its pro-
duction technology or product quality through research and de-
velopment. These efforts to alter the firm's production function,
as well as the realization of economies of scale implied by exist-
ing technology, all took place "within" the firm, and involved
the firm's disposition of its own property. 168 Moreover, the
165. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (explaining perfect
competition's theory of the firm); see also supra notes 162-63 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that the workable competition model did not alter perfect
competition's theory of the firm).
166. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also R.H. COASE, supra
note 136, at 1, 3 ("The firm to an economist... 'is effectively defined as a cost
curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of the firm] is simply the logic of
optimal pricing and input combination."' (quoting Slater, supra note 142, at
ix)); SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at 148-49 (describing "efficiency of the firm"
as involving use of available technology to combine inputs into outputs at the
lowest possible cost); WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 371 (describing the
price-theoretic view that "true economies take a technological form, [and]
hence are fully realized within firms. [Therefore, according to the price-
theoretic paradigm,] there [was] nothing to be gained by introducing nonstan-
dard terms into market-mediated exchange."); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimit-
ing Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 272 (1987) (noting the "prevailing practice
[under price theory] of describing the firm as a production function whose
natural boundaries were defined by technology. Economic inputs were thus
transformed by the production technology into economic outputs; organiza-
tional considerations [that might explain the boundaries of firms] were effec-
tively suppressed.").
167. See SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at 148-80 (examining the general effi-
ciency of firms and industry, as well as the resulting economic activity in a
perfect competition model).
168. Cf. supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (explaining how distinc-
tion between "internal" and "contractual" exclusion corresponds to the distinc-
tion between property and contract).
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workable competition model treated these as legitimate com-
petitive activities, likely to enhance social welfare. 169 From the
perspective of the world outside the firm, these actions mani-
fested themselves in two ways, enhanced product quality
and/or lower production costs, both of which were determined
by the time of purchase and sale. Thus, the firm realized all ef-
ficiencies within its boundaries, before purchasers took title to
its product.170 While such activities could in some cases create a
monopoly, the benefits of these efforts would more than out-
weigh the social costs of any resulting market power and re-
sulting marginal misallocation of resources. 171 Public policy
should therefore take a "hands off' attitude toward such prac-
tices.
The price-theoretic assumptions that solidified workable
competition's property-based, technological conception of the
firm gave rise to a concomitant suspicion of contracts that
reached beyond it. In the frictionless world of price theory,
where information costs, bargaining costs, and opportunism
were nonexistent, there was simply no reason for a firm to in-
fluence the disposition or use of a product once it left the firm's
169. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text; see also BAIN, supra
note 127, at 84-87 (treating the realization of economies of scale as a social
benefit); DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 32 (arguing that product differen-
tiation is generally beneficial); MILLER, supra note 150, at 8 (explaining that
"[c]ompetition is a very complex phenomenon... as it may take the form of...
price competition, by informative or competitive advertising, by differentiation
of product or of the many ancillary terms and conditions of sale, or finally by
effective choice and control of the channels of distribution"); STEVENS, supra
note 152, at 5 ("In an economic sense fair competition signifies a competition of
economic or productive efficiency. In other words, an organization is entitled to
remain in business as long as its production and/or selling costs enable it to
compete in a free and open market."); id. at 5 ("Efficient concerns have by no
means always survived. All too frequently they have been destroyed, not by
superior efficiency, but by methods against which their own efficiency afforded
little or no protection .... Such artificial arrangements are clearly unjustifi-
able from an economic standpoint."); Mason, supra note 157, at 384 ("The pure
competition of the economic theorists is a concept divorced from time and
space and independent of technological and other considerations."); id. at 387-
88 (suggesting that competition policy should encourage innovations that lead
to economic growth); see also, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 83-86
(treating entrepreneurial innovation and related technological progress as an
unalloyed good).
170. See supra note 166 (collecting authorities treating "efficiencies" as
arising within a firm's boundaries).
171. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Mason,
supra note 157, at 387-88 (suggesting that such activities can promote eco-
nomic growth).
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boundaries and became someone else's property. 172 Nor was
there any reason for a firm to place any contractual limitations
on the activities of its suppliers. As a result, price theory and
the workable competition model recognized only "standard con-
tracts," that is, (spot) agreements of purchase and sale that
simply mediated passage of title from supplier to manufacturer
or manufacturer to consumer (or dealer).173 By contrast, price
theorists saw no beneficial purpose for so-called "nonstandard"
contracts, agreements that reached "beyond" the boundaries of
the firm and controlled the discretion of suppliers before the
firm took title to its inputs or the discretion of customers after
the firm parted with title to the product it sold. 74 Such con-
tracts, including complete vertical integration, were viewed as
a departure from the sort of moment-to-moment atomistic ri-
valry implied by the perfect competition model and its descen-
dant, workable competition. 75 Because these nonstandard
agreements had no apparent efficiency purposes, price theorists
presumed that such arrangements reflected a firm's use of
market power to acquire more power or to protect the power it
already possessed, usually by raising barriers to entry. 176 These
172. See generally supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text (explaining
how the perfect competition and workable competition models assumed away
bargaining costs, information costs, and opportunism).
173. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 23 (defining "classical market ex-
change-whereby a product is sold at a uniform price to all consumers without
restriction"); Langlois, supra note 131, at 834-35 (discussing classical market
exchange); see also SCITOVSKY, supra note 127, at 109-88 (discussing behavior
and market activities of firms without mentioning nonstandard contracts).
174. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 23-25 (distinguishing between
"classical market exchange" and "nonstandard contracting'); Langlois, supra
note 131, at 835 (discussing classical and nonstandard contracts).
175. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
176. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 370-71; Meese, supra note 15, at
115-23 (examining price theory's interpretation of nonstandard contracts as
expression of monopoly power); Williamson, supra note 166, at 272 (explaining
that applied price theory tradition of industrial organization took boundaries
of the firm as a "natural" given and viewed any attempt to change those
boundaries by partial or complete vertical integration as suspect). One econo-
mist summarized price theory's interpretation of these agreements as follows:
[Price theory] has only two categories, competitive and "other," and
anything that does not fit into the competitive box must be ipso facto
anticompetitive. As a result, economists had, at least until recently, a
tendency to brand as undesirable any nonstandard forms of contract.
We can see this tendency at work in the area of vertical arrange-
ments .... From the perspective of the classical theory of contract, all
these arrangements are very much nonstandard; and, through the
lens of the theory of perfect competition, all these arrangements are
inexplicable. It is thus an easy leap to categorize these nonstandard
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price-theoretic assumptions formed the basis for hostility to
any number of nonstandard contracts, each of which, it was
said, was inconsistent with workable competition. 177 The end
contracts as inefficient and reflective of "monopoly power."
Langlois, supra note 131, at 835 (footnote omitted); see also Christopher S.
Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE
J. ON REG. 171, 186-87 (2002) (discussing the Harvard school's hostility to-
ward complete vertical integration). Professor R.H. Coase summarized this
price-theoretic milieu as follows:
[I]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or
other-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explana-
tion. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number of unun-
derstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on
monopoly explanation is frequent.
R.H. COASE, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in COASE, su-
pra note 136, at 57, 67; see also BAIN, supra note 126, at 332 (concluding that
concentrated "[m]arket structure .. is to some extent created by conduct, al-
though the conduct in question generally is feasible because of certain basic
environmental and structural characteristics of industries that various sellers
can exploit to their advantage"). Despite the qualification "generally," Profes-
sor Bain offered no account of how or why such contracts would arise absent
an already concentrated market structure. Id. at 357 ("[A] good deal of vertical
integration ... although not actually uneconomical, is also not justified on the
basis of any cost savings .... [I]n most cases the rationale of the integration is
evidently the increase of the market power of the firms rather than a reduction
in cost.") (emphasis added). Another scholar educated at Harvard assumed
that any practice other than the "efficient organization of production" reflected
the exercise of market power. See MILLER, supra note 150, at 8 ("In a purely
competitive market competition becomes simply a matter of efficiency in or-
ganization of production and the correct determination of the quantity to be
produced-.... [There is [rarely a] market in which neither the demand nor the
supply is significantly affected by ... monopolistic ... forces."); id. at 200
(suggesting that tying contracts are necessarily the result of market power);
id. at 210 (arguing that exclusive dealing contracts are necessarily the result
of market control); see also OXENFELDT, supra note 137, at 210-14 (describing
various nonstandard contracts, including tying, exclusive dealing, and full-
line forcing, and concluding that such agreements were necessarily the result
of unequal "bargaining power"); MYRON W. WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF
COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 220-22 (1940) (noting
that tying implies market power by the seller); George J. Stigler, Mergers and
Preventative Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176 (1955) (opining that ties
are necessarily the result of monopoly power).
177. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 126, at 330-31 (describing tying, exclusive
dealing, and other contracts as "predatory" practices that thwart effective
competition); MILLER, supra note 150, at 199 (describing tying); id. at 210 (de-
scribing exclusive dealing); Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal
of the "New" Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 324 n.160 (1954)
(suggesting that tying contracts imply market power by seller); W. Arthur
Lewis, Notes on the Economics of Loyalty, 9 ECONOMICA 333 (1942); see also
DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 181-87 (suggesting that exclusive dealing
contracts are generally anticompetitive); STEVENS, supra note 152, at 75 (sug-
gesting that tying contracts are necessarily expressions of monopoly power);
id. at 90-91 (showing that exclusive dealing contracts are a result of economic
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result was an economic interpretation of firm behavior that
privileged property-based conduct over conduct involving the
negotiation and enforcement of nonstandard contracts.
Price theory, its theory of the firm, and the workable com-
petition model were not the exclusive province of economists in
ivory towers. This model also influenced the policy prescrip-
tions of legal scholars and policymakers interested in antitrust
regulation. 178 In particular, workable competition's account of
legitimate "competition" provided a benchmark against which
economists and others evaluated the causes and consequences
of nonstandard contracts when determining whether such
agreements offended the antitrust laws.
The classic articulation of this approach can be found in
the work of two Harvard scholars, Carl Kaysen and Donald
Turner. Both were economists, and one, Turner, was on the
faculty at Harvard Law School. 179 Both studied economics un-
der Edward Mason, an economist and dean of Harvard's School
of Public Administration, during the late 1940s and early
1950s.18 0 A leading price theorist, Dean Mason had authored
several articles on antitrust policy beginning in the 1930s, arti-
cles that reflected and helped articulate price theory's workable
competition approach.
81
power); Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive
Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, in 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 267, 307-08 (ar-
guing that exclusive dealing contracts are generally anticompetitive); Co-
manor, supra note 163, at 1430 (arguing that vertical distribution restraints
are generally anticompetitive); James M. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and
Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 552, 559-64
(1965) (suggesting that tying arrangements are generally anticompetitive);
Meese, supra note 15, at 115-23 (suggesting that contracts may be the result
of economic power, but may not necessarily be anticompetitive); Turner, supra
note 163, at 65-67 (arguing that tying arrangements are anticompetitive).
178. See Coase, supra note 126, at 66-67 (describing the particular influ-
ence that the price-theoretic approach to industrial organization had on anti-
trust policy).
179. See, e.g., Kingman Brewster, Jr. & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust at
Harvard, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Apr. 1956, at 6.
180. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 n.8 (1979) (stating that the position of the Harvard
school "is well conveyed in the writings of Edward S. Mason").
181. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 164, at 475-76; Mason, supra note 143, at
1266-71; Mason, supra note 148, at 34. See generally EDWARD S. MASON,
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957) (collecting
numerous essays by Mason on industrial organization and antitrust policy).
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Together Turner and Kaysen coauthored the generation's
definitive text on the economics of antitrust policy.182 Sup-
ported by the Merrill Foundation, the book grew out of several
years of discussions in Mason's working group, and Mason even
went so far as to claim that the book was in fact the result of a
group effort.18 3 The book, which began with a thirteen-page
preface by Mason, expressly invoked price theory's perfect com-
petition model as both a normative and a descriptive bench-
mark.1 8 4 As a result, the authors advocated only the elimina-
tion of those practices that distorted the allocation of resources
and destroyed wealth, without creating any overriding bene-
fits.1 8 5 Such practices were, they said, market failures properly
subject to regulation under the neoclassical paradigm.186 At the
same time, the authors recognized two desirable departures
from perfect competition: economies of scale and product differ-
entiation.1 8 7 While both could lead to market power, each also
produced benefits that would offset the harm associated with
such power.18 8 The authors proposed a straightforward test to
implement their policy of wealth maximization: any business
practice that would not be adopted by a similar firm operating
in a perfectly competitive market necessarily reflected the pos-
session and exercise of market power.18 9 Unless the practice
182. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28; cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, The Es-
sential Tension, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 225, 230-32 (1977) (explaining
that paradigms are reified in textbooks).
183. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at v-vi (describing influence of
working group discussions on authors' conclusions); Edward S. Mason, Preface
to KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at xix ("Although this volume has been
written by the two authors whose names are appended, the study is, in an im-
portant sense, the product of the discussion of a group of lawyers and econo-
mists extending over several years. The authors would be the first to admit
that the contribution of the group to the formulation of the ideas here pre-
sented has been large.").
184. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 7.
185. See id. at 11-13; see also Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1207-08 (1969)
(discussing the misallocation of resources).
186. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 12 (characterizing antitrust
regulation as involving the elimination of externalities (citing PIGOU, supra
note 149)).
187. See id. at 7-8 (invoking perfect competition as a regulatory bench-
mark but recognizing exceptions for economies of scale and product differen-
tiation); id. at 8 ("[T]hough the model of [perfectly] competitive market struc-
ture is not usable as such in our definition of competition, other concepts of the
model are.").
188. See id. at 7-8.
189. See id. at 8 ("Where firms can persistently behave over substantial
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merely enhanced product differentiation or created economies
of scale, the arrangement should fall to antitrust regulation. 190
While Kaysen and Turner provided a systematic view of
the antitrust field, their reliance on the perfect competition
baseline, altered uniquely to recognize economies of scale and
product differentiation, was nothing new. Instead, this test re-
flected the principles of workable competition previously laid
down by other scholars, including Mason, to whom both schol-
ars acknowledged a significant intellectual debt. 191 Indeed,
nineteen years earlier, another of Mason's former students had
opined, in a project that began as a Ph.D. thesis, that any prac-
tice other than the "efficient organization of production" re-
flected an exercise of market power and should be banned so as
to further workable competition. 192
For Kaysen and Turner, invocation of this modified perfect
competition heuristic spelled doom for nonstandard contracts,
which limited rivalry, raised barriers to entry, produced no
cognizable benefits, and thus, it was said, exercised or created
market power to the detriment of consumers. 193 Antitrust pol-
icy should intervene in the market to eradicate such "anticom-
petitive" practices when feasible, and such intervention would
eliminate market imperfections, render each industry as "com-
petitive" as possible, and assure optimal prices, output, and
quality.194 Many economists had previously expressed similar
views, and other antitrust scholars would follow suit, arguing
that courts should condemn various nonstandard contracts as
"anticompetitive" attempts to create, protect, or exercise mar-
periods of time in a manner which differs from the behavior that the competi-
tive market would impose on competitive firms facing similar cost and demand
conditions, they can be identified as possessing market power."); id. at 75 (de-
fining market power more extensively).
190. See id. at 75-82 (outlining policy directed at prohibiting "unreasonable
market power" not derived from economies of scale or product differentiation).
191. See supra notes 158-61, 181, and accompanying text.
192. See MILLER, supra note 150, at xii, 8.
193. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 157-59 (arguing that tying
contracts necessarily reflect an exercise of market power); id. at 156-57 (argu-
ing that concerted refusals to deal are nearly always anticompetitive and thus
should be unlawful per se). It should be noted that Professors Kaysen and
Turner made no attempt to explain those tying contracts imposed in appar-
ently competitive markets. Such arrangements, they said were, "random small
transactions of no consequence." See id. at 159; cf. KUHN, supra note 164, at
52-65 (noting that scientists treat phenomena inexplicable under current
models as "anomalies").
194. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
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ket power. 195 Instead of imposing such agreements, it was said,
manufacturers should rely upon an unrestricted market to pur-
chase and distribute their products. 196
Like the workable competition model, Kaysen and Turner's
approach did more than justify the condemnation of nonstan-
dard agreements. The modified perfect competition heuristic
also created a safe harbor for any number of internal or unilat-
eral practices, even those that might lead to the acquisition of
195. See supra note 147 (collecting authorities predating Kaysen and
Turner). There are a number of classic exemplars of this approach. See BAIN,
supra note 126; DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36; EARL W. KINTNER, AN
ANTITRUST PRIMER (1964); MILLER, supra note 150; LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ &
JOHN J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES: FREE
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1977); STOCKING & WATKINS, su-
pra note 146; LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST (1977); Comanor, supra note
163. See generally Jacobs, supra note 23, at 226-27 (contending that Harvard
school of industrial organization dominated antitrust thought in the 1960s).
Indeed, even Professor John M. Clark, praised by Professor Freidrich
Hayek for embracing an expansive definition of "competition," defined compe-
tition in a manner that seemed to exclude contractual limits on the discretion
of firms, i.e., nonstandard contracts: "Competition between business units in
the production and sale of goods is the effort of such units, acting independ-
ently of one another (without concerted action), each trying to make a profit-
able volume of sales in the face of the offers of other sellers of identical or
closely similar products." JOHN MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC
PROCESS 13 (1961); see also Clark, supra note 158, at 241 (arguing that the
perfect competition model did not provide a useful benchmark for judging the
efficacy of competition in actual markets); HAYEK, supra note 142, at 92
(same).
196. See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 181-87 ("[It is difficult to see
why many of the mutual benefits and socially beneficent consequences of ex-
clusive dealing require coercion [i.e., contractual requirement] for their
achievement."); Bok, supra note 177, at 307-08 ("[It is strange that dealers
will not follow this policy without being compelled to do so by contract, for the
advantages that result should benefit them as well as the firms from which
they buy."). Others argued that purchasers were capable of deciding for them-
selves whether to purchase a product that a seller wished to "tie" to a main
product. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 177, at 558-64; Kahn, supra note 177,
at 324 & n.160; William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of
Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REV. 913, 946 (1952); Louis B.
Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clay-
ton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 10, 27 (1949) ("[T7he efficiency of uniting two prod-
ucts in use [should] be judged by the end user."); Turner, supra note 163, at
66-67. Still others assumed that dealers would provide optimal levels of ad-
vertising and promotional services absent any vertical restraints. See, e.g.,
Comanor, supra note 163, at 1430 (recognizing free rider problem but assert-
ing that an "unrestricted market" would provide sufficient presale promotional
services by dealers).
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market power. 197 So, for instance, the authors argued that a
monopoly achieved through internal expansion that realized
economies of scale should be beyond the reach of antitrust regu-
lation, even though some market power would result. 198 Simi-
larly, the authors argued that mergers between firms with a
combined 20% share of a relevant market should be unlawful,
unless the merging parties could show that the transaction cre-
ated efficiencies, in the form of economies of scale, that could
not be achieved through other means. 199 Finally, while the au-
thors advocated the dissolution of firms in concentrated indus-
tries characterized by oligopolistic interdependence, they rec-
ognized an exception for those industries where high
concentration was necessary to realize economies of scale. 2
00
Like the workable competition model and previous scholars be-
fore them, Kaysen and Turner drew a clear line between prop-
erty-based "internal" conduct, on the one hand, and contracts
that extended the firm's reach beyond its own boundaries, on
the other.20 '
Many have attributed the "workable competition" model to
a Harvard school of industrial organization. 20 2 It is certainly
true that Harvard economists played a prominent role in devel-
oping, articulating, and applying the workable competition
model. Still, Harvard scholars were not the exclusive practitio-
ners of price theory and "workable competition"; other scholars
also embraced price theory and applied it to industrial organi-
zation. For instance, it was Frank Knight of the University of
Chicago who first formalized the perfect competition model.20 3
197. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 58 ('Ve would therefore
make no direct attempt to eliminate market power derived from economies of
scale, valid patents, or the introduction of new processes, products, or market-
ing techniques ...."); see also supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining how workable competition model counseled a "hands off' approach to
such practices).
198. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 113; see also Turner, supra
note 185, at 1217-25 (commenting that a monopoly obtained and maintained
through economies of scale should be beyond antitrust attack).
199. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 133-34.
200. See id. at 113-14; see also Turner, supra note 185, at 1228-31 (ex-
plaining how efficiency could justify a monopoly).
201. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (explaining how model
of workable competition drew this distinction).
202. See Jacobs, supra note 23, at 227; Posner, supra note 180, at 928-32
(arguing that the hospitable "Chicago" approach to antitrust rests upon rigor-
ous application of price theory); Yoo, supra note 176, at 186.
203. See KNIGHT, supra note 127, at 76-86.
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Also, Knight's student, George Stigler, would author a text on
price theory that embraced the technological conception of the
firm.204 Later, he would opine that a firm could only obtain
agreement to a tying contract by exercising market power. 205
Even Robert Bork, who would lead the charge against anti-
trust's inhospitality tradition, fell prey to price theory. In 1954,
for instance, he would argue that vertical integration could
achieve two purposes: the evasion of taxes or other regulations,
or the realization of "internal efficiencies." 206 Thus, price the-
ory's influence on industrial organization and antitrust policy
was more pervasive than sometimes portrayed.
B. PRICE THEORY AND WORKABLE COMPETITION IN THE COURTS
1. Early Influence
As explained earlier, courts have implemented section 2's
ban on monopolization by drawing a distinction between "nor-
mal" competitive practices, on the one hand, and "undue" or
"unreasonable" restrictions, on the other.20 7 More precisely,
modern monopolization doctrine requires courts to determine
whether a practice that excludes rivals from the marketplace
does so on "some basis other than efficiency."208 Finally, this
"Rule of Reason" implies that courts would look to economic
theory to determine whether a contract or other practice was
"undue," on the one hand, or "normal," on the other.209
Given these doctrinal premises, it should come as no sur-
prise that price theory's conception of legitimate competition
came to influence antitrust jurisprudence. By the 1930s, even
before the full articulation of the workable competition model,
204. See STIGLER, supra note 127, at 109-10.
205. See George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 176, 176 (1955). At the time, Stigler was teaching at Columbia. Af-
ter moving to Chicago, Stigler would opine that ties were likely efforts to en-
gage in price discrimination. Such discrimination, of course, depended on the
assumption that the firm inducing the tie had market power. See George J.
Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block Booking, 1963 SUP. CT.
REV. 152, 152-54.
206. See Bork, supra note 145, at 200 (describing the benefits of vertical
integration as "bypass[ing] a monopoly at one level, or... enabling the
achievement of internal efficiencies").
207. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
209. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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courts began to reach results consistent with the price-theoretic
paradigm, ultimately producing the so-called inhospitality tra-
dition of antitrust. 210 A prime exemplar of such influence can be
found in the Court's treatment of tying contracts, in cases not
arising under section 2. The Court initially subjected such
agreements to friendly Rule of Reason treatment. 211 In the
1930s, however, the Court abruptly changed course, holding
that such agreements were unlawful per se whenever obtained
by a firm with market power. 212 Indeed, as early as 1949, the
Court cited the work of a former student of Edward Mason for
the proposition that firms could only obtain agreement to such
a contract by exercising preexisting market power to coerce
customers to accept it.213 While the nominal requirement of
market power could have screened out a meaningful subset of
cases, courts found such power whenever the market for the ty-
ing product departed from perfect competition, rendering the
requirement barely relevant.214 The Court showed similar hos-
210. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60
TEX. L. REV. 705, 715 (1982) (describing the so-called inhospitality tradition of
antitrust law).
211. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) (reversing decision by Federal
Trade Commission that tying contract was an unfair method of competition);
Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1935), affd, 299
U.S. 3 (1936) (affirming decision by lower court that tying contract imposed by
General Motors did not violate section 3 of the Clayton Act); see also Victor H.
Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69
MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1016-70 (1985) (recounting Supreme Court's evolving
treatment of tying contracts).
212. See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 399 (1947); Int'l Bus.
Mach., Inc. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936); see also MACHOVEC,
supra note 128, at 268-76 (explaining that economists did not articulate and
embrace the perfect competition model until the early 1920s).
213. See Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949)
(citing MILLER, supra note 150, at 199); see also Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (same) (citing MILLER, supra note 150,
at 199).
214. So, for instance, courts held that sellers had sufficient economic power
whenever they possessed a product with "unique attributes" that was "attrac-
tive to consumers," i.e., whenever the market in question was characterized by
product differentiation. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46-48
(1962) (holding that the possession of a copyright creates presumption of eco-
nomic power); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143-
44 (1948) (same); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir.
1971). Indeed, as suggested in the text, courts even went so far as to find that
the existence of such contracts alone implied the "power" to impose them. See
Fortner Enters. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969); Loew's, 371 U.S.
at 49 (finding that the fact of market foreclosure confirmed presumption that
copyright conferred economic power); N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
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tility toward exclusive dealing contracts, voiding any such
agreement that foreclosed competing manufacturers from a
"substantial" portion of the market, which the Court defined as
7% or more.215 According to the Court, such contracts placed a
"clog on competition," as they tempered moment-to-moment in-
tradealer rivalry and gave rise to barriers to entry.216 In short,
judicial characterization of nonstandard contracts mimicked
workable competition's theory of legitimate competition. 217
While price theory exercised significant influence over doc-
trines governing concerted action, monopoly law remained rela-
tively impervious to price-theoretic influences, at least as a rhe-
torical matter. Even after section 1 doctrine had come to reflect
workable competition logic, many courts continued to invoke
the metaphor of "intent" or "deliberateness" when determining
whether a firm had "monopolized" in violation of section 2.218
Others, however, rejected "intent" as a relevant standard, with-
out offering any coherent substitute. Indeed, the most impor-
7-8 (1957) ("The very existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself
compelling evidence of the defendant's great power . . . ."); cf. id. at 6-7 (stat-
ing that no "economic power" would be present if "one of a dozen food stores in
a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar"). In
short, any departure from perfect competition-including the very existence of
tying contracts-was deemed evidence of economic power. See Meese, supra
note 24, at 34-35 (recounting Court's very relaxed definition of "economic
power" during this period).
215. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. passim (holding that exclusive dealing
contracts necessarily "substantially lessen[ed] competition" where manufac-
turer bound 6.7% of region's dealers); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99
F. Supp. 280, 286 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affld, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (finding exclusive
dealing contract that bound 6% of region's dealers unlawful). It should be
noted that each of these decisions arose under section 3 of the Clayton Act,
which forbids exclusive dealing contracts that "substantially lessen competi-
tion." See 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1914) (repealed 1990).
216. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 314.
217. See Meese, supra note 15, at 124-34. Lower courts also embraced
price-theoretic rhetoric to justify hostility toward nonstandard contracts. For
instance, one court voided tying contracts because they purportedly interfered
with an open competitive market:
The economic merit in tying rivets to machines and an economic
justification for such tying will not suffice to prevent the operation of
the statute. The Clayton Act is intended to preserve competitive condi-
tions. The open market not the court should be the forum for the pres-
entation of claims as to the merits of tied articles. The lessees are
quite capable of judging for themselves in an atmosphere of competi-
tion whether or not the rivets of one manufacturer will work in the
machines of another.
Judson L. Thompson MFG. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 150 F.2d 952, 958 (1st
Cir. 1945) (emphasis added).
218. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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tant decision of the time, United States v. Aluminum Company
of America (Alcoa), which rejected an intent-based standard,
was internally incoherent. 219 There, the United States alleged
that Alcoa had monopolized the market for aluminum ingot in
contravention of section 2. The Government focused its efforts
on showing that Alcoa "intended" to maintain its monopoly. 220
Acting on behalf of the Supreme Court, a Second Circuit panel
reversed the trial court and found that Alcoa had, in fact, main-
tained its monopoly power in an unlawful manner by continu-
ally expanding to meet the needs of prospective customers. 221
In so doing, the Court dispensed with any requirement that the
Government establish nefarious intent, stating that the only
"intent" that was relevant was the intent to perform forbidden
acts. 222 Unfortunately, the decision left potential defendants to
guess which acts were, in fact "forbidden."223
219. See 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
220. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 432 ("By far the greatest part of
the fabulous record piled up in the case at bar, was concerned with proving
such an intent.").
221. See id. at 430 ("It would completely misconstrue 'Alcoa's' position in
1940 to hold that it was the passive beneficiary of a monopoly, following an
involuntary elimination of competitors by automatically operative economic
forces."); id. at 431 ("It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always antici-
pate increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Noth-
ing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others en-
tered the field.").
222. See id. at 431-32 ("We disregard any question of intent.... [N]o in-
tent is relevant except that which is relevant to any liability, criminal or civil:
i.e., an intent to bring about the forbidden act.").
223. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 611(b), at 21 (arguing
that there is "an internal inconsistency" in Alcoa's definition of exclusionary
conduct); id. 613(d), at 23 (concluding that the rationale of Alcoa is unclear
and that the decision can be read any number of ways); Mason, supra note
143, at 1273 ("Although [the Alcoa] decision broke new legal ground, it is, from
an economist's point of view, marred by what is at best some very dubious
economics ... the evidence concerning intent to exclude others is difficult to
distinguish from ordinary, intelligent competitive action."); id. at 1275 ("[It
would appear extremely difficult to distinguish between a progressive embrac-
ing 'of each new opportunity' and what would ordinarily be considered desir-
able competitive performance."); Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Devel-
opments-1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980) ("[A] literal application of
[Alcoa's] language would, ironically enough, jeopardize any efforts by a mo-
nopolist, no matter how pure the origin of its power, to engage in competitive
activity."); see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
273 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[Ihe cryptic Alcoa opinion [is] a litigant's wishing well,
into which, it sometimes seems, one may peer and find nearly anything he
wishes.").
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Shortly after Alcoa, the Supreme Court also suggested that
a plaintiff could prevail in monopolization litigation without
showing nefarious intent.2 24 At the same time, the Court
avoided any endorsement of the actual result in that decision,
holding simply that a monopolist could not "use ... monopoly
power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to
gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor."
225
The Court did not, however, suggest any overarching frame-
work for discerning whether, in fact, a monopoly was abusing
its power. That task would befall a Harvard economist.
2. United Shoe Machinery and "Competition on the Merits"
Monopolization doctrine did not remain immune from
price-theoretic influences for long. In a case that would remake
monopolization doctrine, the United States brought suit in
1949 against the United Shoe Machinery Corporation, claiming
that the firm had "monopolized" the market for shoe machin-
ery. In what the trial court termed a "scattershot" case, the
Government challenged any number of United Shoe's practices,
including its large research operation, acquisitions of minor
competitors and patents, price discrimination, refusal to share
technology with rivals, and the practice of introducing new
products in response to competitive challenges. 226 The Govern-
ment also challenged the firm's practice of leasing many of its
machines instead of selling them outright, as well as various
lease terms. In particular, the Government objected to provi-
sions requiring lessees to pay cancellation fees if they returned
the machines before the end of the lease term, as well as so-
called "full capacity clauses," which required lessees to employ
United Shoe's machines ahead of others when there was not
work sufficient to occupy both machines. 227 Finally, the Gov-
ernment challenged the firm's practice of requiring lessees to
purchase replacement parts as well as repair and maintenance
services from United Shoe.228
224. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1947).
225. Id. at 107.
226. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 314 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (chiding the Government for
"unforgivably unselective tactics pursued in this case").
227. See id. at 319.
228. See Complaint 89, United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (No. 7198), reprinted in KAYSEN, supra note 7, at
app. A, at 373 (describing the requirement that lessees also purchase replace-
ment parts from United); id. at 22, reprinted in KAYSEN, supra note 7, at
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The next year, in an unprecedented move, the trial judge
contacted a Harvard economist-Edward Mason-in search of a
law clerk to help sort through the Government's case.229 Mason
recommended Carl Kaysen, a former student and assistant pro-
fessor at Harvard who had not yet written his dissertation. 230
Judge Charles Wyzanski treated Kaysen as a sort of special
master and tasked him with preparing a report containing both
factual findings and recommendations on liability and rem-
edy.231
Kaysen, it should be noted, was the consummate price
theorist. While some students rebel against their teachers,
Kaysen swallowed Mason's ideas hook, line, and sinker.232 In-
deed, while serving as Wyzanski's clerk, Kaysen continued to
lecture at Harvard and participate in Mason's discussion group,
which sought to develop a useful standard for implementing
the concept of workable competition. 233 In addition to Mason,
the group included other price theorists like Joe Bain, Robert
Bishop, and Morris Adelman, as well as Kingman Brewster,
who taught Antitrust at Harvard at the time.234 While Kaysen
app. A, at 350 (describing the requirement that lessees also purchase mainte-
nance service from United).
229. See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 713-14 (1987) (recounting the author's appointment as a law
clerk); see also United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 314 (chiding the Govern-
ment for "unforgivably unselective tactics pursued... in this case").
230. See Kaysen, supra note 229, at 714.
231. See id. at 714-15; see also Carl Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge's
Law Clerk in Sherman Act Cases, 12 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. PROC. 43 (1958).
232. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at viii ("My debt to Dean Mason has been
growing over ten years of association with him as a student and colleague, and
continues to grow. Whatever there is of value in the analytical scheme used
here, and in my conception of applying economic analysis to the determination
of the issues in an anti-trust suit, I owe chiefly to his teaching.").
233. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at viii; see also Edward S. Mason, Market
Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 471, at 471
n.* (May 1956) (describing "collaborative work with a group of economists and
lawyers in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on a study of monopoly and competition
financed by the Merrill Foundation for the Advancement of Financial Knowl-
edge"). It should be noted that the Merrill Foundation also subsidized Profes-
sor Kaysen's subsequent text on antitrust law. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra
note 28, at vi.
234. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at viii (describing various participants in
the working group). The group would later include Donald Turner. See
KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at xix. Professor Bain, it should be noted, is
often described as the leader of the Harvard school of industrial organization.
See BAIN, supra note 126; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga, Industrial Organiza-
tion and Human Action, 19 CATO J. 233, 234 (1999) (calling Bain's work the
most influential textbook on industrial organization during the 1950s and
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did not discuss the case in the working group, he did benefit
greatly from the "general discussions" that took place there.235
Less than a decade later, he would coauthor a text that reified
the group's conclusions. 236
Kaysen applied a price theorist's model to the United Shoe
case with a vengeance, relying upon price theory's conception of
the firm and the concomitant workable competition model to
sort through the Government's scattershot case. 2 37 The result
was a lengthy report, a case study of the shoe machinery mar-
ket in general, and United Shoe's position and conduct in it, in
particular. Indeed, chapters 2-8 of the report doubled as Kay-
sen's Ph.D. thesis, under Mason's supervision. 238 The episode
seemed to confirm the quip of one Nobel laureate, that if an
economist wanted to determine whether a market was worka-
bly competitive, he or she hired a smart and diligent graduate
student to author a dissertation about the industry.239
Kaysen began by rejecting wholesale the Government's in-
tent-based template for evaluating the firm's conduct. 240 To
1960s).
235. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at viii ("The nature of my responsibilities to
the Court precluded my discussion with [the members of the working group]
the specific issues of the case, but our general discussions contributed greatly
to my legal and economic education.").
236. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
237. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr. et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 693, 703 (1990) ("One cannot fault Judge Wyzanski for 'ignoring eco-
nomics' because in deciding the Shoe case he had the very latest advice from
the Harvard Department of Economics."); cf. Mason, supra note 164, at 475-76
(arguing that useful antitrust analysis requires the application of economic
models to interpret causes and consequences of particular trade practices).
238. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at viii.
239. According to Stigler, "To determine whether any industry is workably
competitive, therefore, simply have a good graduate student write his disser-
tation on the industry and render a verdict. It is crucial to this test, of course,
that no second graduate student be allowed to study the industry." See George
W. Stocking, Discussion on the Attorney General Report, 46 AM. ECON. REV.
496, 505 (1956); see also Elzinga, supra note 234, at 237 ("Edward Mason's
graduate students at Harvard marked their entrance to the field of Industrial
Organization by doing a doctoral dissertation on the structure-conduct-
performance of particular industries.").
240. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at 16 ('The analysis of the present record in
this [case] study does not follow the organization of the Complaint."); id. at
335 ("Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that an overall view of the market
and United's position in it hardly emerged from the Government's presenta-
tion of its case at all, so heavily was it pointed toward 'intent."'); id. at 343 ("In
part, the poor preparation of the Government [at the remedy stage] arose from
the fact that intent and conduct were uppermost in the minds of the lawyers
who tried the Government case.").
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him, the relevant question was quite simple: (1) did United
Shoe have monopoly power and if so, (2) did the firm's perform-
ance and conduct reflect efforts to use or maintain that
power. 241 In applying this second prong, he sought to distin-
guish between internal, technological activities, on the one
hand, and external, contractual activities, on the other. In so
doing, Kaysen rejected the claim by the United States that
United Shoe had improperly acquired or enforced its patents. 242
He also rejected the Government's claim that United Shoe's ac-
quisitions reflected predatory conduct toward the acquired
firms. 243 At the same time, however, Kaysen found that United
Shoe's size and 75% share of the market were not compelled by
technological considerations leading to economies of scale. 244
Moreover, following price theory's conception of the firm and
the workable competition model to their conclusion, Kaysen
opined that United Shoe's lease-only policy, the content of its
leases, and tying clauses were "coercive" devices that created
barriers to entry and thus protected United Shoe's monopoly
position. 245 In short, Kaysen found no redeeming virtues what-
soever in such agreements. Because United Shoe's monopoly
was not the result of economies of scale, superior research or
other such attributes, Kaysen said, the court should declare the
firm in violation of the Act.246
241. See id. at 16-17.
242. See id. at 100-06.
243. See id. at 16-19 (drawing a general distinction between a monopoly
based upon technical efficiency, on the one hand, and the "policy of firms in
the market," such as exclusive dealing, on the other).
244. See id. at 92-99 (rejecting the argument that United Shoe was a natu-
ral monopoly). Kaysen did not dismiss the existence of any economies of scale
in the industry. Instead, he found that United Shoe was operating at well over
the minimum efficient scale, with the result that there was room in the mar-
ket for at least one other firm operating at minimum efficient scale. See id. at
97 ("In sum, then, the evidence on scale and efficiency in the provision of ser-
vice, such as it is, suggests that a company of United Shoe's size may have ad-
vantages over smaller companies, but that these advantages are likely to be
small and with respect to companies of, say, half United's size, non-existent.").
245. See id. at 64-73, 100-12, 265-66, 275-78; see also id. at 275 (finding
that the elimination of United Shoe's leasing practices would be the "most im-
portant single alteration in the operation of the shoe machinery market lead-
ing to an increase in the degree of competition therein .... [together with
other remedies], this change may be expected to lower significantly the exist-
ing barriers to competition").
246. See id. at 207-08 (summarizing the conclusion that United Shoe's mo-
nopoly was not the result of superior performance or economies of scale); id. at
265-66 (summarizing the conclusion that United Shoe's activities in the sup-
plies market contributed to the firm's market power without producing any
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Judge Wyzanski's opinion hewed closely to Kaysen's analy-
sis on the question of liability. 247 Like Kaysen, he found that
United Shoe possessed a monopoly in the market for shoe ma-
chinery. 248 Again like Kaysen, he rejected the longstanding "in-
tent" standard in favor of a more objective approach, invoking
Judge Learned Hand's Alcoa opinion on this score. 249 Mere mo-
nopoly power, however, did not suffice to establish liability, and
the court discerned three possible tests for liability from the
case law. Under the first test, the Government could prevail
only if it showed that United Shoe had engaged in a practice
independently unreasonable under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 25 0 According to the second, the Government could prevail
by showing that United Shoe had maintained its monopoly by
means of an "exclusionary practice," regardless whether the
practice was independently unlawful under section 1.251 The
third standard was even more hostile to United Shoe, at least
rhetorically, as it would have allowed the Government to pre-
vail unless United Shoe could affirmatively prove that it owed
its monopoly "solely" to:
superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, (including ac-
cessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or technological ef-
ficiency, (including scientific research), low margins of profit main-
tained permanently and without discrimination, or licenses conferred
by, and used within, the limits of law, (including patents on one's own
inventions, or franchises granted directly to the enterprise by a public
authority).2 52
offsetting social advantage).
247. See Kaysen, supra note 229, at 714 n.2 ("The opinion follows my
analysis fairly closely in the matter of liability."); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.,
The Judicial View of Section 2 Litigation, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 45, 49 (1978) ("I
have often said, what is true, that Carl Kaysen wrote the music and I wrote
the words ... ").
248. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 338-41
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (finding that United
Shoe possessed a monopoly in the domestic shoe machinery market because its
share of the market approached 85% and there were significant barriers to en-
try).
249. Id. at 346.
250. See id. at 342 (opining that, under the first approach, "[a]n enterprise
has monopolized in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act if it has acquired
or maintained a power to exclude others as a result of using an unreasonable
'restraint of trade' in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act" (citing United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948))).
251. See id. at 342 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106
(1947)).
252. See id.
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The court expressed a preference for the first standard,
and opined that United Shoe had offended it.253 Nonetheless,
the court could not stop there, given what it viewed as binding
authority: the Supreme Court's earlier decision holding that
United Shoe's leasing and tying practices did not offend section
1.254 At the same time, the court held that United Shoe had of-
fended each of the second two standards. In particular, the
court held that United Shoe possessed monopoly power and
that its continued power was not attributable "solely to defen-
dant's ability, economies of scale, research, natural advantages,
and adaptation to inevitable economic laws," but also to its
leasing practices and tying agreements: 255
In one sense, the leasing system and the miscellaneous activities
just referred to ... were natural and normal, for they were, in Judge
Hand's words, "honestly industrial." They are the sort of activities
that would be engaged in by other honorable firms. And, to a large ex-
tent, the leasing practices conform to long-standing traditions in the
shoe machinery business. Yet, they are not practices which can be
properly described as the inevitable consequences of ability, natural
forces, or law. They represent something more than the use of acces-
sible resources, the process of invention and innovation, and the em-
ployment of those techniques of employment, financing, production,
and distribution, which a competitive society must foster. They are
contracts, arrangements, and policies which, instead of encouraging
competition based on pure merit, further the dominance of a particu-
lar firm. In this sense, they are unnatural barriers; they unnecessar-
ily exclude actual and potential competition; they restrict a free mar-
ket.256
The tying and leasing clauses, then, while "honestly indus-
trial," went beyond "competition based on pure merit" and were
"unnatural barriers" that excluded competitors "unnecessar-
ily."25 7
253. See id. at 343 ("If the matter were res integra, this Court would adopt
the first approach ... ").
254. See id.; see also United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451
(1922) (finding that the lease provisions violated section 3 of the Clayton Act,
but not section 1 of the Sherman Act); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
247 U.S. 32 (1918) (finding that lease provisions did not offend section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
255. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 343.
256. See id. at 344-45 (emphasis added); see also id. at 344 (finding that
tying contracts made entry by competitors more difficult by depriving the
market of independent service providers).
257. Id. at 344-45; cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951) (finding that forcing advertisers to boycott competitor violated section
2); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-10 (1947) (holding that exclu-
sive supply agreement was a "use" of monopoly power to foreclose competi-
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Kaysen's report and the opinion that followed both marked
significant departures from then-extant monopolization stan-
dards. Both were also quintessential manifestations of price
theory and its workable competition paradigm.258 Each drew a
distinction between property-based "internal" activities and
"contractual" activities. Internal activities included "efficient
design and improvement of machines," "prompt and knowl-
edgeable service," "research and development," refusal to share
the fruits of that research, and "economies of scale."259 The
court expressly found that such tactics made entry by competi-
tors more difficult. 260 Nonetheless, they were "beyond criti-
cism," as they constituted "superior skill, foresight, and indus-
try."26 1 By contrast, United Shoe's leases and tying contracts
were conscious "business policies," "contracts, arrangements,
and policies" which, instead of encouraging "competition based
on pure merit," erected "unnatural" barriers to competition. 262
In sum, then, United Shoe essentially announced a rule of
per se liability for monopolists that engaged in contractual
practices that impaired the competitive opportunities of ri-
vals. 263 In contrast, purely internal activities were per se law-
ful. 264 While other decisions of the era rested upon hostility to-
ward nonstandard contracts, none invoked the concept of
"competition on the merits" or suggested the existence of a safe
tion).
258. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 343-46; KAYSEN, supra note
7, at 16-17.
259. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 344; see also id. at 333 (find-
ing that United Shoe had "never offered to license all, or its principal, shoe
machinery patents").
260. See id. at 344 ("To combat United's market control, a competitor must
be prepared with knowledge of shoemaking, engineering skill, capacity to in-
vent around patents, and financial resources sufficient to bear the expense of
long developmental and experimental processes."). See generally supra notes
38-39 and accompanying text (explaining that production of high-quality
products at low prices will exclude less efficient rivals).
261. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 344; see also KAYSEN, supra
note 7, at 16-19 (asserting that a monopoly maintained by means of economies
of scale is unobjectionable).
262. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 344-45; see also KAYSEN, su-
pra note 7, at 16-17 (asserting that courts should condemn a monopoly that
"arises because of the policy of firms in the market, e.g., the acquisition of
competitors, or the use of exclusive-distribution agreements in situations in
which distribution channels are limited").
263. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 343-45.
264. See id.
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harbor for such activities. 265 Just as nineteenth-century econo-
mists saw nature, even God himself, in the competitive market,
so too did Judge Wyzanski rely upon a naturalistic conception
of industrial practice to distinguish among various forms of
conduct that might "exclude" a firm's rivals from the market-
place.266 Thus, while both internal, property-based conduct and
contractual conduct gave rise to barriers to entry that had an
exclusionary impact, the latter barriers were "unnatural" and
unnecessary, because they arose from contracts or agreements
that reflected an exercise of market power. 267 The former, by
contrast, were natural competitive methods, even the result of
"inevitable economic laws" to which United Shoe, a passive en-
tity, merely "adapted."268 Price theory, its theory of the firm,
and the workable competition model were so taken for granted
that some conduct appeared natural; only departures from this
baseline were inherently suspect.
To the modern eye, the paradigm announced in United
Shoe may seem inevitably hostile to defendants. In the context
of the times, however, the decision was not so one-sided. Recall
that decisions like Alcoa seemed to suggest that liability arose
whenever a monopolist aggressively embraced new opportuni-
ties, if only through property-based, internal expansion and
above-cost pricing. 269 Indeed, the Government condemned
265. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-56
(1951); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-10 (1948).
266. See Meese, supra note 14, at 15-16 (explaining how some nineteenth-
century political economists believed that God ordained economic laws associ-
ated with the classical paradigm).
267. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 344-45.
268. See id. at 343. Judge Wyzanski drew a similar distinction in a subse-
quent passage. Speaking of United Shoe's leasing policies and tying arrange-
ments, he wrote:
Yet, they are not practices which can be properly described as the in-
evitable consequences of ability, natural forces, or law. They repre-
sent something more than the use of accessible resources, the process
of invention and innovation, and the employment of those techniques
of employment, financing, production, and distribution, which a com-
petitive society must foster.
Id. at 344; see also id. at 345 ("United is [only] denied the right to exercise ef-
fective control of the market by business policies that are not the inevitable
consequences of its capacities or its natural advantages."); id. ("[T]he law does
not allow an enterprise that maintains control of a market through practices
not economically inevitable, to justify that control because of its supposed so-
cial advantage.").
269. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text; see also Griffith, 334
U.S. at 105-06 (embracing Alcoa's rejection of intent standard without endors-
ing a particular result).
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United Shoe on exactly these grounds, invoking Alcoa to argue
that United Shoe's consistent embrace of new opportunities
was indicative of an intent to monopolize. 270 Moreover, the
Government challenged a number of practices, including inter-
nal activities such as the introduction of new machines in re-
sponse to competitive challenges and aggressive research, de-
velopment, and patenting.271 At the same time, some scholars
advocated a policy of active deconcentration, giving little or no
regard for the efficiencies that such a policy would destroy.272
United Shoe rejected these challenges, making it absolutely
plain that activities taking place within the firm are presump-
tively lawful, even if they should raise barriers to entry. 273
Thus, while United Shoe announced a rule of per se condemna-
tion for certain forms of contractual exclusion, it simultane-
ously created a safe harbor for property-based, internal activi-
ties, a result consistent with the views of numerous price
theorists. 274
The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Wyzanski's opinion,
which set the tone for the way in which courts, enforcers, and
various scholars would approach monopolization law to this
very day.275 Lower courts relied on the distinction between (in-
270. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 329.
271. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (detailing the Gov-
ernment's allegations in United Shoe).
272. See George Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of
Monopolistic Size, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 615 (1940); Edward H. Levi, The Anti-
trust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 183 (1947); Eugene V.
Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI.
L. REV. 567 (1947). See generally William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Decon-
centration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1132-39 (1989) (discussing the applicability
of the Sherman Act to deconcentration policy).
273. See Robinson, supra note 223, at 3-4 (pointing out that the United
Shoe opinion departed from Alcoa in a manner favorable to monopolists).
274. See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 36, at 63 (endorsing the approach of
United Shoe); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 268 (same); STOCKING, su-
pra note 158, at 379-81 (praising Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United Shoe);
Turner, supra note 185, at 1217-21 (noting that a monopoly based on unex-
pired patents or economies of scale should be unassailable). Even before
United Shoe, some scholars had advocated such a safe harbor for purely inter-
nal conduct. See Mason, supra note 143, at 1273-75 (criticizing Alcoa's defini-
tion of exclusion as overbroad and unduly vague); see also Mason, supra note
157, at 387-88 (arguing that courts should tolerate market power where such
concentration is dictated by economies of scale); cf. MILLER, supra note 150, at
411 (noting that active deconcentration policy might interfere with economies
of scale).
275. See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)
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ternal) legitimate or "fair" competition, on the one hand, and
"exclusionary" (contractual) conduct on the other.276 In 1966,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed this distinction in United States
v. Grinnell Corp.27 7 There, the defendant had allegedly monopo-
lized the market for so-called "central station security services,"
whereby firms installed security alarms in private homes and
then monitored the alarms from a central location. 278 In lan-
guage reminiscent of United Shoe, the Court held that a mo-
nopoly would not offend section 2 if obtained by "superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident."279 The Court said
the defendant's conduct fell well outside this safe harbor.280 In
particular, the defendant had acquired and maintained its mo-
nopoly by, among other things, inducing subscribers to enter
five-year, exclusive contracts and retaining title, i.e., leasing,
the alarm systems installed in subscribers' homes. 281 These
contractual devices, the Court said, were "substantial barriers
(per curiam); see also, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 195, at 95-99 (concluding
that the holding of United Shoe revised Alcoa and correctly stated the law of
monopolization).
276. See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742-43
(9th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-
75 (2d Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 926-27 (10th Cir.
1975) (holding that section 2 only forbids practices that constitute a "use" of
monopoly power and thus does not reach internal conduct like innovation);
Am. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th Cir.
1963) ('When one has acquired a natural monopoly by means which are nei-
ther exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory, he is not disempowered to defend his
position fairly."). Just after United Shoe, one court of appeals summarized the
law under section 2 as follows:
The Sherman Act was not directed against one "who happens by
his skill and energy to command an innocent and legitimate monopoly
of a business." One who gains a large portion of a market by manufac-
turing a better product and by furnishing better service to his cus-
tomers, which constitutes legitimate competition, is not denounced by
the Sherman Act.
Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 938 (10th Cir. 1954) (en banc) (citation
omitted); see also id. at 932-33 (distinguishing leases from those involved in
United Shoe on the ground that only the latter deterred lessees from using
competitors' products).
277. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
278. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 566-67 (describing central station security
services).
279. See id. at 570-71; cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953) (holding that various activities internal to the
firm constituted "superior skill, foresight and industry" and thus did not vio-
late section 2 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
430 (2d Cir. 1945))), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
280. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 578.
281. See id.
[89:743806
MONOPOLIZATION
to competition" as well as a manifestation of "coercive power"
on the part of the defendant. 28 2 Like Judge Wyzanski, the
Grinnell Court embraced a price-theoretic model of legitimate
"competition," which involved moment-by-moment rivalry,
without the mitigating influence of contract.28 3 While the Court
conceded that the agreements may have produced some bene-
fits, it declined to allow the defendants to justify the arrange-
ments, choosing instead to relegate such an analysis to the
remedy stage. 28 4 Lower courts would draw a similar distinction
between "competition on the merits" and other forms of exclu-
sion. 28 5 Indeed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals went so far
as to reject the result in Judge Hand's Alcoa decision, holding
that internal expansion and the realization of economies of
scale could not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.286
The enforcement agencies also agreed with this approach.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for instance, embraced
United Shoe's distinction between conduct that was "economi-
cally inevitable," on the one hand, and that which consisted of
conscious "business policies" that excluded competitors, on the
282. See id.
283. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (explaining that price
theory equated "competition" with moment-to-moment rivalry unconstrained
by nonstandard contracts).
284. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 578. The Couri explained:
On this record it appears that these practices constitute substantial
barriers to competition and that relief against them is appropriate.
The pros and cons are argued with considerable vehemence here.
Again, we cannot resolve them on this record. The various aspects of
this controversy must be explored by the District Court and suitable
protective provisions included in the decree that deprives these two
devices of the coercive power that they apparently have had towards
restraining competition and creating a monopoly.
Id.
285. See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742-43
(9th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273-
75 (2d Cir. 1979) (distinguishing between taking advantage of economies of
scale and the "use of power" to impair competition on the merits); see also
Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 985 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A]n entrepreneur is not
protected from 'competition on the merits'-the 'summum bonum of the
Sherman Act."'); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701,
709 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that proof that the monopolist "misused" its power
is necessary for liability under section 2); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d
894, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1975) (same); Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924,
938 (10th Cir. 1954) (noting that section 2 does not forbid "gain[ing] a large
portion of a market by manufacturing a better product and by furnishing bet-
ter service to customers").
286. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273-75; see also Robinson, supra note
223, at 5-13 (discussing Berkey Photo's rejection of Alcoa).
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other.28 7 So, for instance, requirements contracts entered by a
monopolist were inherently suspect, and thus unlawful, absent
a strong showing of justification. 288 In contrast, so-called inter-
nal conduct, including output decisions and refusals to share
technology with rivals, was presumed lawful, even if it injured
or excluded competitors. 28 9 Moreover, as explained earlier, the
Department of Justice relied wholeheartedly upon this distinc-
tion when litigating the Microsoft case. 290
C. PRICE THEORY'S CONTINUING INFLUENCE ON
MONOPOLIZATION DOCTRINE
Modern section 2 precedents still draw a strong distinction
between property-based "competition on the merits" and vari-
ous forms of contractual exclusion. 291 The continued adherence
by courts and the enforcement agencies to this distinction is not
surprising in light of the continued scholarly support for it. As
explained earlier, economic theory has always exercised some
influence over antitrust doctrine. 292 Still, courts rarely absorb
that theory directly from its source, as Judge Wyzanski did in
United Shoe, but instead rely upon intermediaries, such as le-
gal scholars and members of the practicing bar. For instance,
when the Supreme Court relied upon transaction cost reason-
ing to repudiate the per se rule against nonprice vertical re-
straints, it did not cite the seminal work of economist Lester
287. See In re Balfour, 74 F.T.C. 345, 498-99 (1968) (relying upon United
Shoe for the distinction between conduct that was "economically inevitable,"
and that which was the result of the firm's "free choice of business policies");
id. at 499-502 (finding that exclusive supply contracts and exclusive dealing
arrangements violated this standard); see also In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C.
669, 768-73 (1978) (relying on United Shoe and Grinnell to find a monopoly
unlawful).
288. See In re Koppers Co., 77 F.T.C. 1675, 1684 (1970) (holding that re-
quirements contracts "are particularly suspect when used by a monopolist"
and that such agreements were unlawful absent a 'very strong justification"').
289. See In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 745-46 (1980)
(invoking United Shoe's distinction between "contracts, arrangements, and
policies which instead of encouraging competition based on pure merit, further
the dominance of a particular firm. In this sense, they are unnatural barriers;
they unnecessarily exclude actual and potential competition; they restrict a
free market." (quoting United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 110 F. Supp.
295, 344-45) (D. Mass. 1953))); see also id. at 746-48 (finding that the defen-
dant's continued expansion and refusal to license technology to competitors
was not exclusionary conduct).
290. See supra notes 90-119 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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Telser. 293 Instead, the Court chose to rely upon the work of aca-
demic lawyers that applied these principles in scholarly articles
directed at noneconomists. 294
The antitrust scholars with the most influence over courts
and the enforcement agencies have repeatedly embraced price
theory's conception of the firm and the distinction between
"competition on the merits" and contractual exclusion. In their
1959 work on the economics of antitrust policy, Professors Kay-
sen and Turner endorsed the United Shoe formulation and con-
demned efforts to forbid efficient expansion through competi-
tion on the merits.295 Almost two decades later, Professors
Turner and Philip Areeda would author their monumental and
influential treatise on antitrust law.296 The two had this to say
about the definition of "exclusion" appropriate for litigation un-
der section 2:
[T]he first step in defining "'exclusionary"' conduct is to state what it
clearly is not. Our concern about monopoly and the opportunities of
rivals must not be allowed to obscure the objective of antitrust law
which seeks to protect the process of competition on the merits and the
economic results associated with workable competition. Accordingly,
non-exploitative pricing, higher output, improved product quality, en-
ergetic market penetration, successful research and development,
cost-reducing innovations, and the like are welcomed by the Sherman
Act and are not therefore to be considered "exclusionary" for §2 pur-
poses even if monopoly results. We attempt no further catalogue of
desirable behavior at this point, but rest for the moment on the desir-
ability of behavior constituting competition on the merits-the supe-
rior skill, foresight, and industry of which Judge Hand spoke. Anti-
trust law should not base the imposition of sanctions on the very
conduct it would encourage. Behavior that is no more restrictive of ri-
293. See Lester G. Telser, Why Do Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 86 (1960).
294. See Cont. T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13 (1977) (cit-
ing numerous articles by legal scholars critical of the per se rule against non-
price vertical restraints); id. at 55 (citing the work of Richard Posner for the
proposition that vertical restraints can overcome free riding by dealers); see
also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.4 (1988) (relying
upon the work of Robert Bork for the definition of "ancillary" restraints); An-
drew I. Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of
Legal Change, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 8 (documenting the impact of legal
scholarship on Justice Powell's decision and opinion in Sylvania).
295. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 268; id. at 22 ("[T]he
Sherman Act has been interpreted-and properly, we think-to leave room for
legal monopolies, that is, for monopolies acquired solely by competitive merit
.. ") (emphasis added).
296. See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978);
infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text (documenting the significant influ-
ence of this treatise on the Supreme Court).
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vals' opportunities than is reasonably necessary to effect competition
on the merits is and should be approved by Sherman Act §2. Such be-
havior is, after all, indispensable if the antitrust laws are to achieve
their objective. Thus, "exclusionary" comprehends at the most behav-
ior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but
also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does so in
an unnecessarily restrictive way.
297
This paragraph, with its repeated invocation of "competi-
tion on the merits" and reference to the "opportunities of rivals"
and "workable competition" exemplifies the remarkable staying
power of price theory's workable competition paradigm and,
with it, the distinction between (internal) property-based "com-
petition on the merits," on the one hand, and contractual "ex-
clusion" on the other.298 Indeed, the authors expressly noted
that their formulation was consistent with that embraced by
Carl Kaysen, announced by Judge Wyzanski, and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in United Shoe a quarter century earlier.
299
At the same time, however, the passage suggests a slight de-
parture from United Shoe's apparent per se condemnation of
exclusionary agreements. 300 To be precise, the passage does not
condemn any and all conduct that is not "competition on the
merits" so defined. Instead, the passage apparently recognizes
that some (undefined) conduct not deemed "competition on the
merits" that "impairs the opportunities of rivals" might some-
how "further" competition on the merits.30 1 Still, the authors do
not explain what sort of conduct that is not "competition on the
merits" can nonetheless further this process. At any rate, the
authors do not give carte blanche to this undefined conduct,
concluding instead that such tactics should only be lawful if
they are the least restrictive means of furthering such competi-
tion-scrutiny they would not apply to above-cost pricing deci-
sions.302 Other influential scholars agreed with this approach,
297. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 296, 626(b), at 77-78 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
298. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 704-06
(1975) (arguing that pricing above variable cost should not violate section 2 of
the Sherman Act).
299. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 296, 626(b), at 78 n.14 (endors-
ing the United Shoe formulation).
300. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text; see also United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (embracing a similar approach).
301. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 296, 626(b), at 78.
302. See id. (approving of such conduct only if it does not limit rivalry "in
an unnecessarily restrictive way"); Areeda & Turner, supra note 298, at 704-
09 (arguing that courts should treat above-cost pricing as lawful); see also 3
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adopting similar formulations during the same era.30 3 Less
than ten years later, the Supreme Court would quote the last
two sentences of this paragraph as stating the appropriate
definition of "exclusionary conduct" under section 2.304 Like the
authors, the Court did not explain what it meant to "further"
competition on the merits.
This passage is not simply a historical artifact.30 5 Indeed,
just recently, Harvard University issued a revised version of
the treatise, now coauthored by Professor Herbert Hovenk-
amp-Professor Areeda's coauthor until the latter's untimely
passing in 1992. The new treatise repeats the 1978 passage
verbatim, as Professor Hovenkamp's considered judgment re-
garding the definition of "exclusionary conduct" applicable un-
der section 2 of the Sherman Act. 30 6 Many other scholars con-
tinue to embrace this formulation, although the agreement is
by no means universal.30 7
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 38, 651(c)-(d), at 79-81 (stating that absent
a business justification, proof that conduct injures rivals should establish a
violation of section 2).
303. See EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO ANTITRUST
AND TRADE REGULATION LAWS FOR BUSINESSMEN 104-05 (2d ed. 1973);
SULLIVAN, supra note 195, at 99-105; see also id. at 101-02 (treating a mo-
nopolist that gains its position because of patents, early entry, or economies of
scale as a "passive beneficiary of market conditions"); Robinson, supra note
223, at 10-13 (endorsing Berkey Photo's distinction between "competition on
the merits" and the use of "monopoly power" to exclude competition).
304. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
n.32 (1985).
305. See Richard S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Re-
ply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 51 (1984) (claiming, incor-
rectly as it has turned out, that "[t]he inhospitality tradition is dead, or at
least dying").
306. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 651(c), at 78-79; see
also Hovenkamp, supra note 17 at 1040 (providing a virtually identical defini-
tion of "exclusionary" conduct). It should be noted that Professor Hovenkamp
felt free to express his disagreement with other conclusions contained in the
previous version of the treatise. E.g., 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38,
630(a), at 44-46 (expressing disagreement with the treatise's 1978 treat-
ment of proposals to break up inefficient monopolies).
307. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 42, at 100-03; Baker, supra
note 55, at 502-08; Piraino, supra note 38, at 844-48; Salop & Romaine, supra
note 119, 649-53; see also Elhauge, supra note 62, at 320-30 (advocating en-
hanced scrutiny of exclusionary contracts). Other scholars seek a more relaxed
approach to such conduct. See, e.g., Lopatka & Page, supra note 42, at 386-92;
Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
693 (2000) (criticizing the FTC's approach to monopolization law as unduly
hostile to conduct that is potentially procompetitive).
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Given this treatise's acceptance of the United Shoe formu-
lation, it is no surprise that courts continue to embrace the dis-
tinction between "competition on the merits" and contractual
exclusion. By all discernible measures, Professor Areeda was
the most influential antitrust scholar of his generation, and his
influence continues to this day. Fifty different Supreme Court
opinions cite his treatise or other work with approval; over one
thousand decisions in the lower federal courts do the same. 308
Justice Stephen Breyer was on the mark when he quipped that
most advocates would prefer to cite two paragraphs of Areeda
on Antitrust in a Supreme Court brief instead of four courts of
appeals and three Supreme Court Justices. 309
III. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY
OF THE FIRM
A. A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMIC THEORY
If price theory and its workable competition model were
the only lens available for examining industrial behavior, then
modern monopolization law would make perfect sense, resting,
as it would, on economic science's best theory of the firm and
the practices in which firms engage. Price theory, however, is
not the only economic paradigm relevant to questions of indus-
trial organization and antitrust policy. Indeed, just as price
theory and its workable competition model had solidified their
grip on antitrust policy, a competing economic paradigm began
to emerge in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE).
Price theory, it will be recalled, had treated "the firm" as the
basic building block of the market and assumed that the main
function of the firm was technological. 310 According to price
theory, firms performed a unique role of allocation, calculation,
and production within a market economy. 311 At the same time,
price theory saw no rationale for a firm to employ contracts
that reached beyond its boundaries and influenced the behavior
of its trading partners before or after the firm held title to the
product in question.
308. By contrast, the Supreme Court has cited the work of Judge Bork sev-
enteen times.
309. See Stephen Breyer et al., In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARv.
L. REV. 889, 890 (1996).
310. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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While price theory took the existence of firms as a given
and then asked what they did, TCE began with a surprising
question: why do firms exist in the first place?312 In particular,
Professor Ronald Coase, the founder of TCE, performed a
unique thought experiment, imagining that all activities that
take place within firms (such as allocation, calculation, and
production) instead take place on the market through a series
of costless transactions between independent individuals.
3 13
This experiment seemed to follow naturally, and ironically,
from price theory's own tendency to assume away the costs of
such transactions. 3 14  Given this hypothetical possibility,
economists could no longer characterize firms as unique vehi-
cles for allocation, calculation, or production. To be sure, tech-
nology might be such that cost-minimizing production required
individuals to employ particular assets in proximity--or even
"under the same roof." The classic example of such technology-
based integration given by price theorists had been the combi-
nation of iron manufacture with steel production to reduce fuel
costs associated with reheating iron before converting it into
steel.3 15 Still, practitioners of TCE realized that even where two
or more activities took place in close proximity, no law of na-
312. See Coase, supra note 139, at 390 ("Our task is to discover.., why a
firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy.").
313. Fifty years after the fact, Professor Coase described this experiment
as follows:
Let us start by assuming that we have an economic system with-
out firms, difficult though it may be to conceive of such a thing. All
transactions are carried out as a result of contracts between factors,
with the services to be provided to each other specified in the contract
and without any direction involved .... In such a system, the alloca-
tion of resources would respond directly to the structure of prices....
R.H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 38 (1988);
see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 4 (1983) ("If all costs of transaction were zero, a customer buying [a
part] would make a separate payment to each of the many contributing to its
production."); Coase, supra note 139, at 388 ("[H]aving regard to the fact that
if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on
without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organiza-
tion?"); Demsetz, supra note 137, at 145 ("Why do firms emerge as viable insti-
tutions when the perfect decentralization model amply demonstrates the allo-
cative proficiency of the prices that emerge from impersonal markets?"). See
generally Thomas S. Kuhn, A Function for Thought Experiments, in THE
ESSENTIAL TENSION, supra note 182, at 240-65 (examining the role of thought
experiments in challenging assumptions behind existing models).
314. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (documenting price
theory's tendency to assume away these costs).
315. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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ture or technology required that the same individual or entity
own all the assets related to the activities or employ all of those
individuals who preformed them. Instead, TCE's thought ex-
periment revealed that one individual could, for example, own a
blast furnace and produce iron while another owned the con-
verter and other equipment necessary to transform the iron
into steel.3 16 Such separate ownership, of course, would not
preclude the owners from agreeing to locate the assets in close
proximity, even under the same roof.317 Given this realization,
the existence of the firm that owned and directed all such as-
sets suddenly became a mystery instead of an obvious manifes-
tation of technological necessity. 318
As its name suggests, TCE found the answer to this co-
nundrum in the concept of transaction costs. 3 19 Unlike price
316. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 83-84 (1975) (concluding that technological
considerations cannot explain vertical integration in the steel industry);
Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 388 (explaining that individuals
could theoretically rely on continuous market contracting to direct production);
Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transactions Costs and the New In-
stitutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS & WELFARE
395, 396-97 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1985) (explaining that technical economies
cannot explain boundaries of the firm because, absent transaction costs, such
economies can "be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned
by independent individuals"); see also Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters.
Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189-91 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing an arrangement
whereby separate firms operated stores in the same building); Coase, Nature
of the Firm, supra note 139, at 388 ("In a department store, the allocation
of ... sections to... various building locations ... may be done by the control-
ling authority or the result of competitive price bidding for space. In the Lan-
cashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent power and shop-room and can ob-
tain looms and yarn on credit."). Similarly, two or more airlines might operate
from the same terminal, employ the same ground crew, display similar trade-
marks, and operate under the same "code" for reservation purposes, even
though both remain legally separate and have different owners. See Michael
E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 437-41 (1987) (describing such par-
tial contractual integration between otherwise independent firms).
317. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
318. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 388 ("[H]aving re-
gard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production
could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is
there any organization?").
319. See id. at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a
firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism."); see
also R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3, 17
(1988) ("The solution was to realize that there were costs of making transac-
tions in a market economy and ... to incorporate them into the analysis. This
was not done in economics at that time--nor, may I add, is it in most present-
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theory, which ignored or assumed away information costs, bar-
gaining costs, and opportunism, TCE recognized these costs as
important determinants of the content of economic activity.
320
To be sure, individuals could, theoretically, rely upon market
contracting to replicate the activities that take place within
firms. In the real world, however, such contracting is not with-
out its costs. 321 Individuals must identify potential trading
partners, determine the price and quality of the products or
services they are offering, and negotiate agreements governing
each transaction. 322 Moreover, when negotiating such agree-
ments, individuals must anticipate and guard against the pos-
sibility that their trading partners will behave in an opportun-
istic fashion, thereby extracting an inordinate share of the
fruits of the joint activity in question. 323 While price theory as-
sumed that individuals could costlessly anticipate and defeat
such behavior through perfect contracting, TCE's recognition of
bargaining and information costs implied the existence of op-
portunism in the "real world."324
According to TCE, individuals could avoid some of these
costs by relying upon "the firm" to conduct economic activity. 325
So, for instance, a manufacturer could avoid the cost of con-
tinually bargaining with its independent suppliers of labor by
hiring such individuals as employees, subject to the direction
day economic theory.").
320. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (explaining that price
theory assumed away these costs of relying upon the market).
321. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 390-91.
322. See id.; Coase, supra note 313, at 38-42 (emphasizing these types of
transaction costs); see also COASE, supra note 136, at 6 (describing the costs of
contracting).
323. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 7 (discussing role of opportunism
in TCE); see also Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 141, 144-48 (1979) ("Policing and enforcement costs are incurred be-
cause there is a lack of knowledge as to whether one (or both) of the parties
involved in the agreement will violate his part of the bargain: if there were
adequate foreknowledge ... these costs could be avoided .... ").
324. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (explaining that price
theory's propensity to assume away opportunism flowed naturally from its as-
sumption that bargaining and information costs were zero); see also Dahlman,
supra note 323, at 148; cf. KNIGHT, supra note 127, at 78-79 (noting that the
perfect competition model assumes away information costs and thus fraud and
opportunism).
325. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 390 ("The main rea-
son why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost
of using the price mechanism.").
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(within limits) of the employer. 326 Similarly, the firm could
avoid the cost of negotiating over the use of a specialized piece
of property by simply purchasing the item, owning it, and di-
recting employees to use it in a manner that maximizes the
firm's profits.327 Finally, a manufacturer or other business en-
tity could avoid the risk that independent contractors or prop-
erty owners would behave in an opportunistic fashion by hiring
employees and/or purchasing specialized assets, thereby reduc-
ing the costs that individuals would otherwise incur by relying
upon market contracting to conduct all economic activity.328
TCE's new paradigm entirely undermined price theory's
account of the firm and its concomitant distinction between
"the firm" and "the market." According to price theory, firms
perform a unique technological function: the transformation of
inputs purchased on the market into outputs sold there. 329 In
this world, the only benign rationale for complete vertical inte-
gration was the ability to realize property-based technological
efficiencies. TCE exploded this notion by showing that indi-
viduals could realize technological efficiencies resulting from
the use of related assets just as well through market contract-
ing.330 Consider, for instance, the classic example of the inte-
gration of iron making and steel manufacturing to realize
thermal economies. 33 1 According to TCE, technological consid-
erations simply cannot explain a steel company's decision to in-
326. See id. at 391 (describing the firm's contract as one in which an em-
ployee "agrees to obey the direction of an entrepreneur within certain limits");
id. (assuming that "the firm" is characterized by a single contract empowering
the owner to "direct" the activity of a given factor of production); see also
Cheung, supra note 313, at 10 (remarking that reliance upon "the firm" to
conduct economic activity involves "direct[ion] by a visible hand"); Scott E.
Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 185-97 (1988)
(describing various ways in which organization of activity within a firm results
in superior ability to control employees).
327. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302-07, 319-22
(1978).
328. See id. at 308-10 (contending that General Motors purchased its sup-
plier of automobile bodies to avoid threats of opportunism by the supplier).
329. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
330. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 86-89; Goldberg, supra note 316,
at 396-97; see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 388 (explain-
ing that individuals could theoretically rely on continuous market contracting
to direct production).
331. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., BAIN, supra
note 126, at 381 (discussing an example of the integration of iron-making with
steel-making).
[89:743
2005] MONOPOLIZATION
tegrate backwards into iron production. 332 Instead, TCE views
the vertical integration of these two technologically separate
processes within a single firm as a method of reducing the
transaction costs that would result from continuous contracting
between two owners of technologically separate and specialized
processes. 333
Practitioners of TCE, then, put on a "different thinking
cap" and thus saw the firm and complete vertical integration in
an entirely new way.33 4 For these scholars, the firm was any-
thing but a technologically-determined production function.
TCE recharacterized the firm as a governance structure de-
signed for economic relationships otherwise beset by high
transaction costs. 335 Moreover, while price theorists saw the
firm as a single, monolithic entity, TCE recognized the firm as
a collection of individuals who voluntarily associate by contract
with the party or parties that hold title to "the firm's" property
and own the right to receive the revenues generated thereby.336
To be sure, practitioners of TCE occasionally appear to posit a
distinction between "market contracting" and the "direction" of
activity "within" the firm.33 7 Indeed, Professor Coase himself
332. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 86-89 (concluding that most pro-
duction processes are consistent with a variety of governance structures so
that technological considerations cannot generally explain vertical integra-
tion); WILLIAMSON, supra note 316, at 83-84 (contending that technological
considerations do not explain vertical integration of iron and steel production).
See generally Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, passim.
333. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 86-89; WILLIAMSON, supra note
316, at 83-84.
334. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 1300-
1800, 13 (rev. ed., Free Press 1957) (explaining that scientific revolutions in-
volve "the art of handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them
in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different
framework, all of which virtually means putting on a different kind of think-
ing-cap for the moment").
335. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 13 ("Rather than characterize the
firm as a production function, transaction cost economics maintains that the
firm is (for many purposes at least) more usefully regarded as a governance
structure.").
336. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794-95 (1972).
337. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy in this
regard that Professor Areeda, a proponent of distinct treatment for unilateral
and concerted intrabrand restraints, asserts that Professor Coase drew a dis-
tinction between "managing" activity within a firm, "as opposed to contract or
market." See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1467(f) & n.47, at 266-
70 (citing Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 386). Professor
Areeda's apparent mischaracterization of Coase's analysis reflects the sort of
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likened the "direction" of economic activity within the firm to
central planning!338 Nonetheless, more discriminating analysis
reveals that there is no such distinction. The power to "direct"
economic activity "within" a firm, including the practical ability
to dispose of firm property, is a creature of contracts that par-
ties negotiate and enforce in "the market." While employers do
"direct" employees in some sense, they do so pursuant to con-
tracts that empower them to do so. 339 Indeed, Professor Coase
equated "the firm" with a particular type of contract, namely,
one in which an employee or other factor of production "agrees
to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain lim-
its." 340 Thus, the employee follows the directions of her superior
because she has agreed to do so-at least until she resigns.34 1
price-theoretic mind-set that drives antitrust's current distinction between
"unilateral" and "concerted" action. See id. 1462(c), at 223-24 (concluding
that intrafirm activity does not constitute concerted action because it involves
the employer's "direction" of employees).
338. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 389 n.3.
339. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 78 (equating internal organiza-
tion with "unified contracting"); Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at
389 & n.3 (noting that "planning" that takes place within the firm is voluntary
and pursuant to contract); see also Masten, supra note 326, at 195 (observing
that parties could replicate the various control properties associated with the
firm by contract).
340. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 391. Coase further
notes:
A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a
series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation
were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this
series of contracts is substituted one.
Id.; see also Cheung, supra note 313, at 5 (stating that a firm involves "a form
of contract that binds the input owner to follow directions instead of determin-
ing his own course by continual reference to the market prices of a variety of
activities he may perform"); R.H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 19, 28 (1988) (stating that the firm is defined by "a special kind
of contract").
341. Some have suggested that the fact that most employees can resign at
any time undermines the claim that firms possess special control attributes.
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 336, at 777. This argument does not seem
convincing. To be sure, most employees are not contractually obligated to re-
main with their firms for a significant period. The same is true for franchisees
and other "independent" firms that might supply distribution services. None-
theless, employees differ from franchisees because they are bound to follow the
directions of their employer so long as they remain employees. They also have
the right to utilize the employer's property-including trademarks. By direct-
ing employees pursuant to such contracts, employers can prevent some forms
of opportunism. See Klein et al., supra note 327, at 302 (noting that a firm can
prevent opportunism simply by firing employees who misuse property).
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In this very important way, the employee is like a franchisee
who follows those instructions that the franchise contract em-
powers the franchisor to give. 342
As a result, TCE concludes that what economists and anti-
trust scholars deem "a firm," capable of "unilateral" action dis-
posing of its own property, is in fact a "nexus of contracts" be-
tween various individuals that supply labor, capital, and other
inputs in pursuit of an economic objective. 34 3 Moreover, within
this framework, "unilateral" action by a completely integrated
firm in fact involves certain forms of collaboration pursuant to
a particular nonstandard contract that society chooses to treat
as conduct of a single, artificial entity. 344 Such "unilateral" ac-
tion also involves reliance in one guise or another upon back-
ground legal rules created and enforced by the state, rules that
individual actors can always change by contract. For instance,
the power of "a firm" to set the price of "its property" depends
upon law that grants the firm title and allows those who act for
this entity to negotiate contracts with employees who limit
their pricing discretion.345 By vesting some individuals with the
residual product of the firm's activity, background rules assure
that these individuals have incentives to exercise their control
rights in a manner that enhances social welfare. 34 6
342. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 433-
38 (3d. Cir. 1997) (describing franchise contract allowing franchisor to specify
exact ingredients for many franchise products); Martino v. McDonald's Sys.,
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (describing and evaluating the require-
ment that McDonald's franchisees sell Coca-Cola instead of other brands of
cola beverage).
343. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 336, passim; Cheung, supra note
313, at 3 ("The word 'firm' is simply a shorthand description of a way to organ-
ize activities under contractual arrangements that differ from those of ordi-
nary product markets."); Coase, supra note 313, at 41 (stating that the "rela-
tionship" known as the firm "come[s] about only when the organizer has
contracts with several factors whose activities he coordinates."); see also, e.g.,
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (characterizing the modern corporation as a
"nexus of contracts").
344. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
345. See Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm,
83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (2004).
346. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 8-9,
52-53, 78 (1989) (explaining that economic theory predicts parties will maxi-
mize their joint welfare by allocating control rights to party or parties that
reap the net rewards of the activity in question); Alchian & Demsetz, supra
note 336, passim.
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The realization that firms are particular types of contracts
that exist solely to reduce transaction costs also helped econo-
mists and legal scholars interpret other methods of contractual
organization short of complete vertical integration. After all,
individuals do not merely choose between "the firm" and "the
(spot) market"-there are any number of arrangements that
are "in between." Franchising, sales agencies, and consign-
ments all blend some elements of the firm (control) with ele-
ments of the market (independence), blurring the distinction
between the two.347
Price theory's allocational and technological account of the
firm provided no benign explanation for these intermediate
forms of integration, instead treating all nonstandard contracts
as expressions of monopoly power or attempts to acquire it by,
for instance, raising barriers to entry and interfering with
"competition on the merits."348 TCE, by contrast, offered a non-
technological explanation for various forms of integration,
whether complete or partial. Just as complete integration of
economic activity within a firm can avoid the costs of transact-
ing, TCE said, so too can less complete forms of integration that
take the form of market contracting. 349 While such arrange-
ments do not involve the level of control associated with the
complete ownership of property or the employer/employee rela-
tionship, the agreements creating such relationships can none-
theless vest in a buyer or seller enough authority to attenuate
the transaction costs that pure market contracting might oth-
347. See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 313, at 19 ("The polar cases [of the firm
and the market] are complicated.... [A]ny type of input may support a variety
of contractual arrangements. We surmise that these very complications...
have arisen from attempts to save transaction costs that were not avoidable in
the polar cases."); Coase, supra note 340, at 27; Klein et al., supra note 327, at
326 ("[The] primary distinction between transactions made within a firm and
transactions made in the marketplace may be too simplistic. Many long-term
contractual relationships ... blur the line between the market and the firm.");
see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 392 n.1 ("[I]t is not pos-
sible to draw a hard and fast line which determines whether there is a firm or
not. There may be more or less direction.").
348. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578 (1966) (finding that "lease only"
policy and exclusive dealing contracts were "coercive" efforts to raise barriers
to entry); F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 317, 321 (1966) (finding that
exclusive dealing offended the "central policy of the Sherman Act" by "tak[ing]
away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market").
349. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 23-29, 185-95, 370-73;
Klein et al., supra note 327, at 302-07.
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erwise involve. 350 At the same time, partial integration may
avoid some of the downsides of total integration. 35 1 For in-
stance, by concentrating the costs and benefits of a particular
activity in a single owner, partial integration may preserve the
sort of high-powered incentives associated with the market. 35 2
In some instances, then, partial integration can produce the
"best of both worlds": control of the sort necessary to prevent
opportunism coupled with the incentive and specialization
benefits of the market.35 3 Indeed Professor Oliver Williamson,
the leading modern exponent of TCE, concludes that partial in-
tegration is presumptively superior to complete integration. Ac-
cording to Professor Williamson, the various disadvantages of
complete integration render such a strategy "the last resort,"
that actors should embrace only after various forms of partial
integration fail. 354
350. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 28-37; see also Coase, supra
note 313, at 42-46 (arguing that long-term contracting can often reduce trans-
action costs and serve as a good substitute for complete integration); Coase,
supra note 340, at 28 (suggesting that franchising provides an example of a
"mixed relationship" sharing attributes of the firm and the market); Klein et
al., supra note 327, at 302-07.
351. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
352. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 158-59 (explaining how partial
integration can preserve high-powered incentives); Alan J. Meese, Property
Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 586-92 (2004)
(explaining how reliance upon independent firms to distribute a firm's product
can help create optimal distribution incentives); see also Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1094-
95 (1981) (explaining that parties to a long-term contract will structure their
relationship so as to replicate decisions of a single firm).
353. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 157-58 (arguing that such
considerations explain automobile manufacturers' decisions to rely on fran-
chised dealers); Levine, supra note 316, at 441 (arguing that such considera-
tions explain airlines' decision to own only a portion of their commuter carri-
ers); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise
Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 226-30 (1978) (interpreting franchise contracts
in this manner); see also Coase, supra note 137, at 716 (contending that trans-
action cost considerations can explain any number of commercial practices).
Professor Williamson continues:
Vertical market restrictions can be interpreted as a decision [to ab-
jure complete integration] .... If most hazards can be relieved
[through such partial integration] without incurring the added bu-
reaucratic cost ... of unified ownership, then hybrid modes, of which
franchising is an example, will be employed (provided that the con-
tractual restrictions that accrue thereto are not treated as unlawful).
Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization? 23 (Dec. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/imio/
williamson.pdf.
354. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 21 ("[A]s added bureaucratic costs
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B. TCE's NEW VERSION OF (CONTRACTUAL) COMPETITION
Economists and legal scholars applied the lessons of TCE
to various antitrust problems, slowly undermining the intellec-
tual basis for antitrust's inhospitality tradition in the proc-
ess.355 Perhaps most famously, TCE offered a beneficial expla-
nation for intrabrand restraints such as minimum resale price
maintenance or exclusive territories. 356 These restraints all re-
strict competition between various dealers selling a particular
manufacturer's product after transfer of title. Such arrange-
ments, it is said, were means of overcoming the failure in the
market for distributional services caused by free riding by op-
portunistic dealers or venture partners. 35 7 As a result, such re-
straints were analogous to a decision by a single firm to adver-
tise its product while at the same time instructing its
employees to charge a high enough price to cover the cost of
such promotion. 358 While such restrictions eliminated in-
accrue upon taking a transaction out of the market and organizing it inter-
nally, internal organization is usefully thought of as the organization form of
last resort: try markets, try hybrids, and have recourse to the firm only when
all else fails.").
355. I do not mean to suggest that TCE arose exogenously with no concern
for antitrust problems. Quite the contrary, it appears that TCE arose in sig-
nificant part to address antitrust problems for which price theory provided an
inadequate solution. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 316, at 83-84; Telser, supra
note 293 (examining why manufacturers might desire exemption from the
Sherman Act in the form of so-called "Fair Trade" laws); see also Robert H.
Bork & Ward S. Bowman Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 587,
593-99 (1964) (arguing that the absence of meaningful concentration in most
antitrust cases suggests that practices could not harm consumers and were in
fact designed to create efficiencies).
356. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (de-
claring horizontal division of territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture
unlawful per se); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (declaring
minimum resale price maintenance a coercive practice and unlawful per se).
357. See Telser, supra note 293, at 96-99 (arguing that minimum resale
price maintenance can combat dealer free riding and thus ensure an optimal
level of promotional services); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 430-38 (1978) (showing that territorial restraints ancillary to a le-
gitimate joint venture could overcome free riding by firms that distribute the
venture's brand); Meese, supra note 352, at 598-99. Other scholars have at-
tempted to refine Telser's analysis. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Mur-
phy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1988); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price
Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984); see also
Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the
Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 80-90 (1994) (discussing then-
extant theories and the empirical support for those theories).
358. See BORK, supra note 357, at 435-36.
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trabrand competition, they could also enhance another, and
more important form of rivalry: interbrand competition.359
By definition, of course, intrabrand restraints govern only
a single brand of product: they are thus not "exclusionary" in
any meaningful sense.360 However, TCE also offered explana-
tions for agreements such as tying contracts, long-term leases,
nonstandard lease provisions, and exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, each of which price theorists and courts had treated as
exclusionary contracts not justified by any legitimate bene-
fits.361 So, for instance, some scholars argued that tying con-
tracts could protect manufacturers or franchisors from oppor-
tunistic purchasing decisions by customers or franchisees. 362
Such agreements allowed franchisors to replicate the quality
standards of vertically integrated firms while retaining the in-
centive advantages of an independent franchise system.363 Also,
contracts requiring a purchaser or lessee of complex machinery
also to purchase maintenance services from the manufacturer
could allow the manufacturer continually to gather information
about the operation of its product, thus facilitating further im-
provements in the good.364 Without such a contractual re-
quirement, purchasers or lessees might obtain their services
from independent organizations, depriving the manufacturer of
the knowledge it might otherwise generate if it provided the
repair services itself.365 Here again, tying contracts could repli-
359. See id. at 430-38.
360. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, at 441 (explaining the distinc-
tion between intrabrand and interbrand restraints).
361. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text (explaining judicial
hostility toward monopolists' use of such contracts).
362. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of
Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 359-61 (1985) (arguing that
franchise tying contracts can protect goodwill of the franchise system against
opportunistic shirking by franchisees); Rubin, supra note 353, at 226-30 (ar-
guing that both parties gain when control mechanisms align the interests of
franchisee and franchisor); see also Meese, supra note 24, at 53-54 (discussing
dynamics between consumers seeking to maximize utility and a firm's produc-
tion decisions).
363. See Rubin, supra note 353, at 231; cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 352,
at 1094-95 (concluding that parties to a contract will adopt provisions causing
them to replicate decisions of a fully integrated firm).
364. Meese, supra note 24, at 65 (outlining this rationale).
365. Id. (explaining why purchasers would not internalize the full benefits
of the creation of such information, with the result that some contractual re-
quirement would be necessary). To be sure, the manufacturer could enter con-
tracts with each independent service provider requiring the latter to gather
such information and transmit it to the manufacturer. However, such a solu-
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cate the purchasing decisions of a fully integrated firm while at
the same time preserving some of the benefits of market-based
decision making by otherwise independent entities.
Other scholars focused on exclusive dealing contracts,
showing that such agreements could encourage a firm to make
investments specific to a particular relationship by preventing
the firm's trading partner from dealing with others.36 6 For ex-
ample, an automobile manufacturer could induce a manufac-
turer of automobile bodies to make investments that are only
useful in the context of the relationship in question by promis-
ing not to deal with other auto body firms, thus excluding those
firms from a portion of the marketplace. 367 In this way, the two
firms could replicate the results produced by complete integra-
tion without incurring the incentive costs of such a drastic
course.3 68 Other manufacturers might employ such agreements
to prevent opportunism by dealers. For instance, a manufac-
turer that makes promotional investments might fear that
dealers will employ the manufacturer's trademark and associ-
ated goodwill to attract consumers while at the same time en-
couraging such customers to purchase products manufactured
by others. By requiring a dealer to trade with it to the exclusion
of other firms, a manufacturer could thereby protect its return
tion would entail costs and risks over and above those associated with com-
plete integration, i.e., reliance upon employees to acquire such data. See id. at
65; see also Masten, supra note 326, passim (arguing that certain legal attrib-
utes associated with the firm facilitate the production and dissemination of
information within it).
366. See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Owner-
ship: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 199, 201 (1988). Some lawyers had suggested this rationale long before
economists did. See Milton Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Ad-
ministration, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 417, 424 (1966) (suggesting that an exclu-
sive buying provision can constitute "a vital quid pro quo to avoid placing the
seller at the dealer's mercy"); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271, 278-91 (1898) (recounting common law's willingness to enforce
agreement preventing employee from working for other employers on the
ground that such agreements induced employers to make investments in
training employees bound by such agreements).
367. Klein, supra note 366, at 201 (employing this example).
368. See id. at 204 (noting that complete vertical integration often involves
"incentive-type costs"); Klein et al., supra note 327, at 307 (noting that com-
plete vertical integration involves "ownership costs" that firms compare to
transaction costs when choosing between long-term contracting and complete
integration); cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 352, at 1094-95 (predicting that
parties will adopt contracts governing their relationship that will induce them
to replicate the behavior of a single, unified firm).
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on promotional investments. 369 At the same time, the manufac-
turer could realize the benefits of a decentralized approach to
distribution, an approach that requires independent dealers to
bear the risk that comes with purchase of the manufacturer's
product.370
Scholars have also offered transaction cost explanations for
leasing provisions such as those condemned in United Shoe.371
For instance, two scholars have argued that the decision to
lease machines instead of selling them outright ensured that
United Shoe retained the requisite incentives to provide its cus-
tomers with high quality machines given the difficulty of dis-
cerning quality of the machines at the time of sale and the high
cost of negotiating and enforcing warranties governing durable
goods.372 In short, TCE suggested explanations for any number
of nonstandard "exclusionary" contracts that economists had
previously treated as necessarily "monopolistic." 373
TCE's explanation for nonstandard contracts undermined
price theory's focus on the "passage of title" as an event that
purportedly distinguished harmful restraints from "competition
on the merits."374 Indeed, like "competition on the merits,"
which rests upon a firm's possession and invocation of property
rights, TCE's explanations for nonstandard contracts depended
upon the exclusive, indeed, "exclusionary" effects of the agree-
369. See Howard Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-11 (1982)
(contending that exclusive dealing contracts could prevent dealers from pro-
moting inferior brands and thus free riding on the manufacturer's promotional
efforts). This explanation, of course, depends upon a claim that, absent some
method of contractual control, dealers would find such a strategy rational.
Such a strategy would be rational from a dealer's perspective if a manufac-
turer expended a significantly greater amount per unit of output on promotion
than its competitors, with the result that a dealer could enhance its profits by
steering customers toward products with lower wholesale prices, and thus
higher dealer margins, than those of the manufacturer in question.
370. See Meese, supra note 352, at 595-98.
371. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 297 U.S. 32 (1918); see supra
notes 245-46 and accompanying text (describing United Shoe court's condem-
nation of the firm's leases).
372. See Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33, 42-43, 67-68
(1993); see also Wiley et al., supra note 237, at 710 (offering a different trans-
action cost rationale for these agreements).
373. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (detailing price-
theorists' hostility toward nonstandard contracts).
374. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (explaining that worka-
ble competition's interpretation of economic activity rested upon a distinction
between property and contract and thus saw great significance in the passage
of title).
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ments in question. For instance, exclusive dealing contracts
protect a manufacturer's promotional investments by creating a
sort of property right in the fruits of such expenditures, the
same right possessed by fully integrated firms.3 75 Similarly,
agreements requiring franchisees to purchase certain inputs
certainly exclude some rival sellers of such inputs from the
market. Still, this exclusion can ensure that the franchisees
that employ high quality inputs can reap the reward of doing
so, without suffering at the hands of free-riding fellow franchi-
sees.3 76 Although exclusionary, such agreements effectively
grant a property right to those franchisees that maintain high
quality standards3 7
Such contractual rights certainly create "barriers to entry"
in some sense. 378 Still, this is true of all property, whether cre-
ated by contract or positive law.3 79 An automobile manufac-
turer can exclude potential rivals from its factory, realizing
economies of scale and driving rivals from the market, because
the law of real property empowers it to do so.3 8 0 In the same
way, a software firm can exclude potential rivals by relying
upon the law of copyright. Nonetheless, society tolerates such
375. See Marvel, supra note 369, at 6-11 (characterizing exclusive dealing
contracts in this manner); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70
(1987) (explaining how enforcement of trademarks encourages investments in
quality of products sold under the marks).
376. See supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
377. See Rubin, supra note 353, at 227-29 (arguing that franchise con-
tracts empower franchisors to police shirking franchisees, thus protecting in-
centives to enhance quality); see also Josef Windsperger, The Nature of Fran-
chising: A Property Rights Approach, 2 REV. ECON. 130 (1996).
378. See Meese, supra note 352, at 593-95.
379. See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 49
(1982); Langlois, supra note 131, at 831; Wesley J. Liebeler, Exclusion and Ef-
ficiency, 11 REGULATION 34, 38-39 (1987); see also Elhauge, supra note 62, at
296-98 (employing the same logic to defend refusals to deal).
380. See Liebeler, supra note 379, at 38 (employing this example). Profes-
sor Harold Demsetz has explained how "property rights" and "barriers to en-
try" are really two sides of the same coin:
Even the operation of an unregulated market system presupposes
the general recognition of property rights, but the problem of defining
ownership is precisely that of creating properly scaled legal barriers
to entry .... An owner of resources may be barred legally from using
(his) resources simply to occupy and operate the facilities of someone
already in the industry. He must first meet the cost hurdle of secur-
ing the "owner's" permission.
Demsetz, supra note 379, at 49 (emphasis omitted).
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barriers because they encourage desirable activities. 381 Simi-
larly, contractual property may bar the entry of rivals in order
to encourage socially useful activities by eliminating market
failures that might otherwise occur.382
C. TCE's NEW MODEL OF COMPETITION
TCE did more than provide new explanations for a variety
of practices. It also implied an entirely different model of le-
gitimate "competition" relevant to section 2's distinction be-
tween "normal" "competition on the merits," on the one hand,
and presumptively unlawful contractual exclusion, on the
other.38 3 Price theory's account of the firm and the workable
competition school equated legitimate "competition" with prop-
erty-based, technological rivalry between autonomous firms,
unconstrained by nonstandard contracts.384 Contracts that lim-
ited rivalry between otherwise independent firms were incon-
sistent with "workable competition," and thus were "market
failures" that government should correct via the antitrust
laws.385
According to the new paradigm, however, it was price-
theoretic "competition on the merits" that would often lead to
market failure and thus interfere with the best attainable allo-
cation of resources. Instead of producing the most favorable
mixture of price, output, and quality, reliance upon technologi-
cal rivalry and standard "spot market" contracts to conduct
economic activity often led to suboptimal results from the per-
spective of society and consumers.386 Far from "destroying" use-
ful competition and enhancing market power, then, complete
vertical integration and various forms of nonstandard contract-
ing often promoted competition and consumer welfare by guid-
ing the allocation of resources closer to the socially optimal re-
sult that a well-functioning market would produce in the
absence of transaction costs. 38 7
381. See Demsetz, supra note 379, at 48-49.
382. See id.; Liebeler, supra note 379, at 39.
383. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text (explaining this distinc-
tion).
384. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
387. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75
CAL. L. REV. 933, 947-48 (1987) (arguing that vertical restraints are forms of
partial integration that overcome market failures and associated distortions of
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The realization that "exclusive" agreements can serve effi-
ciency purposes required a redefinition of the sort of "workable
competition" that price theorists thought desirable. 388 As a re-
sult, just as price theory itself treated certain "imperfect" prac-
tices as (workably) competitive, so too, it seems, does TCE and
its theory of the firm mandate the recognition that at least
some nonstandard "exclusionary" contracts in fact further the
ultimate goal of "workable competition" as defined by price
theorists. 389 The competition that takes place in the real world
and between various groups ultimately depends upon the insti-
tution of private contracts, many of which, including "the firm"
itself, are "nonstandard."390 Innovation includes the discovery
of new organizational forms and the application of old forms to
new contexts.391 Indeed, as Professor Coase pointed out, many
markets deemed "perfectly competitive" are in fact the end re-
sult of complex contracts limiting rivalry between competi-
the allocation of resources); Coase, supra note 126, at 68 (arguing that non-
standard contracts and other practices are often "a necessary element in
bringing about a competitive situation"); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Ver-
tical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Ap-
proach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 987-88 (1979) ("Organizational changes that
give rise to cost savings in any of these respects will, if not accompanied by
offsetting price distortions, invariably yield social gains."); supra notes 348-54
and accompanying text; cf. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 28, at 12-13 (argu-
ing that anticompetitive arrangements should be void to further "competition"
in each industry and enhance social welfare (citing PIGOU, supra note 149)).
388. See supra notes 348-54 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (showing that courts
embraced this technological model of competition during the inhospitality era);
see also Mason, supra note 143, at 1266-71 (outlining concept and goals of
workable competition); supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (explaining
that Standard Oil equated "competition" with "rivalry").
390. See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688(1978); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977); Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911); cf. HAYEK, supra note 142, at 96 (arguing
that various activities inexplicable under price theory's model of competition
are in fact necessary to achieving a competitive result).
391. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 84-85 (1942) (arguing that price competition is "a matter of com-
parative indifference" when compared to "the competition from [a] new com-
modity, the new technology, the new source of supply, [or] the new type of or-
ganization") (emphasis added); Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Lenses and the
Uses of Transaction Cost Economics Reasoning, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION,
AND COMPETITIVENESS, 137, 139-40 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds.,
1992) ("That the 'same technical facilities' produce with a 'great variety of
costs' comes as no surprise if nontrivial cost consequences result when firms
are organized and managed differently.").
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tors.392 Such contractual competition cannot produce perfect re-
sults-no human institution ever can. Nonetheless, the result
is superior to that which would obtain in a (real) world without
nonstandard contracting. 393 While such agreements exclude ri-
vals from some portion of the marketplace, these contracts
"promote" and "enhance" the sort of real world "competition"
that would "develop trade" and advance society's welfare.
394
Given this recognition of contractual competition, proof that a
nonstandard contract limits rivalry or excludes rivals from a
portion of the market in no way indicates that it is "anticom-
petitive," monopolistic, or otherwise inconsistent with the goals
of "workable competition."
D. TCE'S INFLUENCE OVER ANTITRUST: SECTION 1
TCE would soon come to influence antitrust policy and doc-
trine, at least under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In particu-
392. See COASE, supra note 136, at 8-9 (explaining that commodities ex-
changes depend upon enforcement of "intricate system of rules and regula-
tions"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1, 1 (1984) ("Every market entails substantial cooperation over some domain
in order to facilitate competition elsewhere .... The Chicago Board of Trade,
perhaps the closest of modern markets to the textbook ideal, has a sheaf of
rules and cooperative arrangements that reduce the cost of competition."); cf.
Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 616 (1898) (sustaining rules ancil-
lary to cattle exchange whose object was to "provide for the ready transaction
of the business of the associates by obtaining a general headquarters for its
conduct, and thus to ensure a quick and certain market for the sale or pur-
chase of the article dealt in"); HAYEK, supra note 142, at 96 ("[T]he whole or-
ganization of the market serves mainly the need of spreading the information
on which the buyer is to act.") (emphasis added).
393. Professor Hayek cautioned economists not to judge the competition
that takes place in the real world by comparing such rivalry to that which ap-
pears in textbooks:
The basis of comparison, on the grounds of which the achievement of
competition [in the real world] ought to be judged, cannot be a situa-
tion which is different from the objective facts and which cannot be
brought about by any known means. It ought to be the situation as it
would exist if competition were prevented from operating. Not the ap-
proach to an unachievable and meaningless ideal but the improve-
ment upon the conditions that would exist without competition should
be the test.
HAYEK, supra note 142, at 100. Applying Professor Hayek's wisdom, then,
many decisions during the price-theoretic era prevented competition from op-
erating.
394. See Coase, supra note 126, at 68; see also supra notes 13-19 and ac-
companying text (explaining that the American Tobacco decision held that
"normal" conduct that "advanced trade" could not offend section 2 of the
Sherman Act).
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lar, numerous scholars embraced TCE's teachings that non-
standard contracts are presumptively efforts to economize on
the transaction costs that result from reliance upon "the mar-
ket" to conduct economic activity. 395 These scholars and other
antitrust lawyers transmitted their views to the courts, who in
turn modulated or rejected altogether certain per se rules
against nonstandard contracts in a manner that reflected this
new academic consensus.396 So, for instance, in 1977 the Su-
preme Court expressly invoked transaction-cost reasoning to
justify the repudiation of recent precedent declaring vertical
nonprice distribution restraints unlawful per se.397 Several
years later, the Court again invoked scholarly commentary to
narrow the scope of the per se rule against horizontal price set-
ting. 398 More recently, the Court invoked such reasoning in par-
tial justification of its repudiation of the per se rule against
maximum vertical price fixing.399 At the same time, the Court
moderated other per se rules without expressly invoking trans-
action cost reasoning. 400 In each case the Court adjusted or re-
jected earlier decisions in light of evolving economic theory, just
as Standard Oil and American Tobacco anticipated. 401
395. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 14, at 804-05; Richard A. Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger, and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
282 (1975).
396. I tell this story in some detail in Meese, supra note 15, at 134-44.
397. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-59 (1977)
(relying upon academic commentary to reject per se rule against location
clauses and other nonprice vertical restraints); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 724-31 & nn.3-4 (1988) (relying in part on aca-
demic commentary to reject per se rule against maximum resale price mainte-
nance).
398. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-04
(1984) (relying in part on academic commentary to reject per se rule against
horizontal price cooperation by sports league); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979) (finding that horizontal price fixing ancil-
lary to joint venture was subject to Rule of Reason analysis where such price
fixing was necessary to the creation of a different product).
399. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16-19 (1997) (invoking academic
commentary to reject per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance).
400. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29
(1984) (raising the quantum of "market power" required to establish a per se
unlawful tying contract).
401. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (explaining how Rule of
Reason announced in Standard Oil and American Tobacco required courts to
alter doctrine in light of changing economic theory); see also Khan, 522 U.S. at
20-22 (explaining that the common law nature of the Sherman Act empowers
courts to adjust doctrine in light of advances in economic theory and rejecting
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Still, TCE's influence on section 1 doctrine is not complete.
For instance, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to jet-
tison the per se rule against minimum resale price mainte-
nance, despite TCE's unchallenged conclusion that such
agreements can in some instances minimize the cost of relying
on unfettered markets to conduct economic activity.40 2 In the
same way, the Court has continued to adhere to the per se rule
against horizontal maximum price fixing, claiming that such
contracts interfere with the "forces of a competitive market."
403
TCE's influence seems particularly absent where so-called
"exclusionary" contracts are involved. For instance, despite
withering critiques, the Court has retained the per se rule
against tying contracts obtained by firms with market power.
40 4
Moreover, the Court has not entertained a case involving an
exclusive dealing contract for over forty years.40 5 Nor has the
Court entertained any case involving a vertical merger or other
form of vertical integration since the early 1970s. 40 6 As a result,
precedent that is "on the books" shows little influence of the
transaction cost paradigm when it comes to contracts that ex-
clude rivals from a significant portion of the marketplace.
IV. TCE AND MONOPOLIZATION DOCTRINE
As explained earlier, modern monopolization law remains
largely unchanged since United Shoe.40 7 Perhaps the survival of
per se rule against maximum resale price fixing that had been "widely criti-
cized since its inception"); Cont'l T.V, 433 U.S. at 45-48 (relying in part upon
"great weight" of scholarly criticism as rationale for departure from prior deci-
sion banning exclusive territories).
402. See Cont'l T.V., 433 U.S. at 51 n.18; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. at 724-26 (adhering to per se rule against minimum resale price mainte-
nance) (dicta); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)
(declining invitation of Amicus Curiae United States to reconsider per se ban
on minimum resale price maintenance).
403. See Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346-48 (1982)
(quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53) (1968). It should be
noted that the enforcement agencies still adhere to this distinction. See Dept.
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Antitrust Enforce-
ment Policy in Health Care, § 8(B)(1), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153, at
20,817 (Sept. 5, 1996).
404. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 15-16; see also
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992)
(applying the per se rule).
405. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325-29
(1961).
406. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
407. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
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the United Shoe formulation despite the influence of TCE in
various doctrinal contexts under section 1 suggests that TCE is
less relevant to questions arising under section 2 than to those
arising under section 1. However, close analysis reveals that,
despite its longevity, the United Shoe formulation does not
withstand analysis under the transaction cost paradigm and its
theory of the firm. Moreover, application of transaction cost
reasoning should impel significant adjustments in monopoliza-
tion doctrine.
A. How TCE UNDERMINES MODERN MONOPOLIZATION LAW
Consider again the definition of exclusionary conduct au-
thored by Professors Areeda and Turner twenty-six years ago
and repeated recently by Professor Hovenkamp. 408 That discus-
sion, it will be recalled, essentially endorses United Shoe's dis-
tinction between property-based "competition based on pure
merit" and "exclusionary" contracts. 40 9 Within price theory's
workable competition model, this distinction makes perfect
sense. 410 Yet when viewed through the lens of the transaction
cost paradigm, the discussion simply elicits a variety of ques-
tions. Consider, for instance, the authors' assumption that "an-
titrust ... seeks to protect the process of competition on the
merits and the economic results associated with workable com-
petition."411 At one level, this is an absolutely accurate state-
ment: antitrust does, and always has, sought to protect what
the two authors call "competition on the merits."412 At another
level, the statement simply prompts the question raised by any
academic discussion of exclusion, i.e., should antitrust only pro-
tect competition on the merits? And, perhaps more importantly,
how should antitrust treat those contracts-tying contracts, ex-
clusive dealing, leasing and the like-that seem to price theo-
rists, anyway, to "interfere" with what the authors call "the
408. See supra note 297 and accompanying text; see also 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 651(c), at 78.
409. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 237-62 and accompanying text (noting link between
neoclassical price theory and the United Shoe formulation).
411. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 296, 626(b), at 77 (emphasis
added); see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 651(c), at 78.
412. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)
(noting in dicta that above-cost pricing is "competition on the merits" and thus
lawful per se).
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process of competition on the merits" and "workable competi-
tion"?413
Consider now the claim that "competition on the merits" is
"desirable," and that antitrust should not impose "sanctions on
the very conduct it would encourage."414 Again, this statement
makes perfect sense so far as it goes. Certainly antitrust hopes
to encourage (technological) "competition on the merits." But, is
this all that the Act seeks to encourage? As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes noted a century ago, the Sherman Act does not
mention "competition" as a desideratum. 415 Instead, section 1
forbids contracts "in restraint of trade or commerce," while sec-
tion 2 forbids monopolization of "any part" of trade or com-
merce.416 Thus, the statute reflects its constitutional moorings,
by regulating ("making regular") interstate commerce. 417 Early
case law agreed with Holmes's assessment, and recognized that
some restraints were necessary to advance commerce and
trade, even if they "excluded" some rivals from the market or a
portion of it.418 As a result, these courts held that the Act only
banned "undue" contractual restrictions on competition, defin-
ing as undue those that reduced commercial activity and thus
harmed consumers. 419 Any complete definition of the sort of
413. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (explaining assump-
tion by price theorists and others that nonstandard restraints interfere with
"competition on the merits").
414. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 296, 626(b), at 77.
415. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("The court below argued as if maintaining competition were the
expressed object of the act. The act says nothing about competition.").
416. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
417. See MARTIN SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM 113 (1988) (arguing that Congress rejected early drafts of the
Sherman Act that banned restraints interfering with "free competition" for
constitutional reasons); see also Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 139-46 (2001) (explaining that the
Commerce Clause merely empowered Congress to "make regular" commerce
among the several states).
418. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text; see also Am. Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911) (noting that a ban on "nor-
mal" contracts or methods would "render difficult if not impossible any move-
ment of trade in the channels of interstate commerce-the free movement of
which it was the purpose of the statute to protect").
419. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180-81; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); see also United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 59-65 (1918) (finding that contractual restrictions on
use of rival products were reasonable); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
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"exclusion" condemned by the Act must include some manner
for determining those contracts the Act seeks to "encourage"
and those it does not. Similar questions emerge from an earlier
paragraph in the same work, quoted in the Microsoft deci-
sion.420 Recall that the D.C. Circuit rejected any requirement
that the United States prove that the firm's tactics had actually
injured consumers. 421
TCE helps suggest some answers to the question that cur-
rent law and the Areeda/Hovenkamp/Turner formulation both
avoid. In particular, TCE offers an alternative explanation for
many exclusionary agreements, an explanation more hospitable
than that produced by price theory. To be sure, TCE does not
rebut the obvious fact that some contracts can "exclude" com-
petitors from the marketplace, and thus thwart "competition on
the merits," as price theorists and courts have defined that
term. At the same time, however, TCE suggests that many of
these contracts produce significant benefits, benefits unrelated
to any expectation of protecting or obtaining monopoly power.
In other words, TCE suggests that many such contracts are
"normal" or "ordinary" in the sense that courts used that term
when they first gave meaning to the Act.422 While such con-
tracts may exclude competitors from the marketplace, they of-
ten do so "on the basis of efficiency," and not because of some
expectation of market power.423
TCE's conclusion that many "exclusionary" contracts are in
fact "normal" or "ordinary" has important implications for the
law of monopolization. As explained earlier, even property-
based "competition on the merits" is "exclusionary" in the most
straightforward sense of that word. As one scholar has noted,
nothing excludes potential competitors from the marketplace
more effectively than low prices or high quality.424 Nonetheless,
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence.") (emphasis added).
420. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (describing Microsoft
decision as an exemplar of the law's distinction between "competition on the
merits" and contractual exclusion).
421. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
422. See Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 178-80; Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S.
at 58-62; see also United Shoe Mach., 247 U.S. at 63-67 (holding that lease
agreements were not "exclusionary" in part because they had been adopted in
competitive markets and served useful purposes).
423. Cf. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605 (1985) (noting that section 2 does not forbid conduct that excludes rivals
on the basis of efficiency).
424. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, at 553 ("Nothing is a more effective
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courts have repeatedly and uniformly followed United Shoe's
holding that such "exclusion"-which the court attributed to
"inevitable economic law"-is effectively beyond the reach of
section 2.425 Thus, a firm can realize economies of scale or in-
vent a new product or rely upon the law of property-
intellectual or otherwise-to exclude competitors from access to
its facilities or other important inputs, and courts will not ex-
amine such exclusion to determine whether it is "reasonable"
on balance. 426 Indeed, in United Shoe itself, the court declined
to scrutinize the defendant's refusal to share its technological
improvements with competitors. 42 7 Instead, courts will only
void "internal" conduct if there is no plausible legitimate pur-
pose for it.
Given the teachings of TCE, the question naturally arises:
why not apply the same logic to nonstandard contracts as
courts currently apply to, say, a firm's creation of a new prod-
barrier to entry than a firm's capacity to produce a high quality product at a
low price, or to provide improved service to its customers."); Piraino, supra
note 38, at 818 (same); see also Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170
F.3d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that reputation alone cannot be
deemed a "barrier to entry" for antitrust purposes); Advo, Inc. v. Phil. News-
papers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); United States v.
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 984 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We fail to see how the
existence of good will achieved through effective service is an impediment to,
rather than the natural result of, competition."); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[W]e can think of no more effec-
tive exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it
opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a
great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and
the elite of personnel."); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 651(c), at
78-79.
425. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; see also Brooke Group,
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993); Aspen
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. at 600-01; Berkey Photo, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the realization of technological
economies or other benefits of large size does not offend section 2); cf. United
Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. 295, at 344-45 (noting that internal conduct that
simply conforms to inevitable economic laws is not "exclusionary" for purpose
of section 2).
426. See, e.g., In re E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 746-51
(1980) (holding that failure to license proprietary technology was not unlawful
exclusion, even though it prevented the entry of competitors); Berkey Photo
Inc., 603 F.2d at 279-85 (rejecting claim that Kodak's invention of a new cam-
era and failure to disclose its invention to rivals contravened section 2); see
also United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 353-59 (1947) (rejecting
decree that required defendants to share technical know-how with competi-
tors).
427. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (discussing United
Shoe's holding on this score).
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uct, or, for that matter, the introduction of a new marketing
campaign? Such contracts may well exclude rivals from the
market, or at least a portion of it and thus, like other forms of
property, create a "harrier to entry."428 Then, so too may the
creation of a new product or the campaign to promote it.429
Given the teachings of TCE, it would seem that the two forms
of conduct are identical for antitrust purposes, in that both ex-
clude rivals but also have plausible efficiency purposes.
In response, one could argue that a new product and an as-
sociated marketing campaign always enhance the welfare of
consumers and is thus distinct from exclusionary contracts.
The mere fact, however, that such a campaign helps a firm ob-
tain or retain a monopoly does not itself establish that such a
monopoly is superior to the status quo ante or the state of af-
fairs that would have been obtained but for the campaign. By
necessity, firms must be able to invoke their property rights;
otherwise, markets would cease to function. 43 0 Indeed, Profes-
sor Areeda once argued that Rule of Reason analysis of internal
pricing, supply, or purchasing decisions would overtax the legal
system and unduly burden business firms.431 At the same time,
the creation of a new product or production process leaves ri-
vals perfectly free to pursue their own innovations. In this way,
it might be said, such "competition on the merits" can be dis-
tinguished from contractual practices like exclusive dealing,
even if the latter are presumptively "normal" in the sense that
firms would often enter them without any expectation of creat-
428. Demsetz, supra note 379, at 48-49.
429. See Elhauge, supra note 62, at 296 ("[I]t is precisely the prospect of
being able to exclude rivals from one's property and charge a price above the
marginal cost of using it that is necessary to encourage the prior investments
that created the property ... ").
430. See United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 344-45 (characterizing "com-
petition based on pure merit" as involving "practices which can be properly
described as the inevitable consequences of ability, natural forces, or law"
while treating contractual exclusion as involving "unnecessary" practices).
431. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 59, at 220. Professor Areeda notes:
[T]o see a firm's internal price or supplier decisions as a conspiracy at
all may also be to see a restraint. And subjecting virtually every deci-
sion made within a firm to Sherman Act § 1 scrutiny would not only
overtax the physical limits of our antitrust enforcement institutions,
it would also involve judges and commissioners with the daily busi-
ness decisions of every firm.
Id.; see also id. 1464(c), at 235-36 ("Conspiracies among unrelated units are
relatively infrequent."); Coase, supra note 137, at 714 ("[M]ost resources in a
modern economic system are employed within firms....").
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ing or maintaining monopoly power. 432 While both exclude ri-
vals from the market presumptively based upon efficiency, only
one, it might be said, leaves rivals a "fighting chance" to enter
or remain in the market. A rival who falls prey to a better
product or lower prices can blame itself for the failure; one ex-
cluded by a contract can point to the "coercion" inherent in such
an arrangement. 433
Nonetheless, TCE and its theory of the firm suggest that
any such distinctions are more illusory than real. As an initial
matter, even so-called "unilateral" conduct by a single firm is
almost always "concerted action" between numerous individu-
als working pursuant to a nexus of contracts. 434 These con-
tracts, in turn, often provide the firm's owners with exclusive
access to certain property or talents (human capital). According
to TCE, then, what price theory calls (technological) "competi-
tion on the merits" is more than an exercise of property rights.
It is also a sort of legal or social construction, which requires
the negotiation and enforcement of any number of agreements
between input owners that have the express purpose of exclud-
ing rivals from resources that the rivals would deem important,
even necessary to effective competition. So, for instance, a shoe
machinery corporation or software manufacturer that engages
in extensive research and development will no doubt require its
432. See KAYSEN, supra note 7, at 339 (suggesting that monopoly based
upon superior skill is less likely to be permanent); SULLIVAN, supra note 195,
at 100 (arguing that courts should distinguish between conduct that merely
"utilize[es] existing market opportunities" and that which "foreclos[es] ... po-
tential competitors as might have been alert enough to grasp an opportunity
before the defendant firm had done so").
433. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
482 (1992) (noting that the offense of monopolization involves the "use of mo-
nopoly power 'to foreclose competition"' (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 107 (1948))); id. at 483-86 (finding that tying contracts would consti-
tute such an unlawful use of market power absent a showing of justification);
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that
contractual restrictions on PC makers' use of competing browsers constituted
a "us[e] of Microsoft's market power" that raised barriers to entry); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-76 (2d Cir. 1979) (opin-
ing that section 2 requires courts to distinguish between mere possession of
monopoly power and "use" of that power to "tighten [the monopolist's] hold on
the market").
434. See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying text (explaining TCE's con-
clusion that "the firm" is in fact a nexus of contracts between individuals); see
also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 139, at 393 (noting that a firm,
therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence
when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur); Masten, su-
pra note 326, at 184.
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engineers or software writers to sign contracts that prevent
them from "moonlighting" for a competitor and even from work-
ing for a competitor for a substantial period of time after they
depart from their employer. 4 35 Such contracts may also prevent
these employees from releasing trade secrets at any time dur-
ing and following their employment. Indeed, even without such
contractual limitations, background rules of tort law forbid ri-
vals from inducing a firm's employees to switch employers in
the middle of their contractual terms. 436 Similarly, once these
engineers or software writers invent a new product or write a
new piece of software, the firm can often rely upon property
law, both "real" and "intellectual," to exclude those who seek to
copy it.437 Finally, the law of trademark allows mark owners to
exclude from the use of the mark those individuals or firms
that do not first obtain (contractual) consent of the owner.438
Each of these agreements or rules is "exclusionary" in the
sense that it limits the opportunities of actual or potential ri-
vals by depriving them of access to potential inputs. In some
cases such limits are contractual, in others they are based on
the positive law of property, law that parties can always waive
by contract. For instance, while patent law allows parties to
protect their intellectual property, such protection will often
435. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th
Cir. 1898). Judge Taft noted in the opinion:
It was of importance that business men and professional men should
have every motive to employ the ablest assistants, and to instruct
them thoroughly, but they would naturally be reluctant to do so
unless such assistants were able to bind themselves not to set up a ri-
val business in the vicinity after learning the details and secrets of
their employers.
Id. The opinion also noted that covenants not to compete by employees were
presumptively reasonable and enforceable. See id. at 281-82; see also Ronald
J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575 (1999).
436. See Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K.B. 1853); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
437. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-
45 (D. Mass. 1953) (holding that United Shoe's acquisition and enforcement of
patents did not offend section 2).
438. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 18-20
(1989); see also Demsetz, supra note 379, at 49 (explaining that trademark law
creates a barrier to entry for those who might otherwise sell their own prod-
ucts under a rival's mark); Liebeler, supra note 379, at 39 (stating that such
rules are enforced "because we believe the benefits of increased incentives to
inventors and authors exceed the costs of the market power associated with
such rights").
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entail a (contractual) requirement that a firm's employees or
other agents not agree to waive the firm's rights to such prop-
erty without the owner's consent. Similarly, the institution of
franchising rests upon the power of the franchise system to
consent-or refuse to consent-to the use of the trademark by
new franchisees. 439 By refusing to consent to such use, the fran-
chisee system can deprive potential rivals of access to an im-
portant input: the ability to operate under the trademark of the
franchise system. While often characterized as "unilateral" ac-
tion, such consent-or withholding of consent-is in fact the re-
sult of a joint venture between numerous "independent" fran-
chisees. 440 In the same way, Ford's refusal to allow General
Motors or Isuzu to use its factory to produce pickup trucks may
increase the cost of production that these firms must incur.44 1
Viewed through the lens of price theory, such a refusal looks
like a unilateral decision by Ford to deny others access to its
property. If, however, one applies the transaction cost para-
digm, one finds that the refusal is the product of an "agree-
ment" between Ford's numerous owners, directors, officers, and
employees, the latter of whom essentially "rent" capital from
Ford.442 Each such provision raises the costs of rivals; some-
times these increases will be trivial, but sometimes they will be
439. Rubin, supra note 353, at 227-28.
440. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 125, at 181-82 (characterizing franchise
contract as joint venture between otherwise independent firms); Alan J.
Meese, Farewell to The Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the
Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 491-92 (2000) (explaining that opera-
tion of a franchise system constitutes a continuing horizontal agreement be-
tween actual or potential competitors). Professor Hovenkamp notes:
[Riestauranteurs scattered across a wide area might develop joint
menus, building plans, and methods of doing business, and then pro-
mote their 'chain' nationally. This national name recognition will en-
able them to reach traveling customers that might otherwise avoid a
local restaurant about which they know nothing. The Topco case...
involved such a venture.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, at 205; see also Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship
v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that co-
operation between franchisees is horizontal in nature).
441. See Demsetz, supra note 379, at 49; Liebeler, supra note 379, at 38
("[E]xclusionary rights take the form of legal barriers to entry; their purpose
and effect is to raise others' (including rivals') costs of using goods protected by
the barriers. Ford Motor Company, for example, cannot use a General Motors
plant without incurring the cost of getting the latter's permission.").
442. Cf. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 334, at 18 (explaining that scientists
sometimes see old data in new ways after "putting on a different kind of think-
ing-cap"); KUHN, supra note 164, at 114-17 (noting that paradigm shifts cause
individuals to reinterpret previously observed phenomena).
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substantial. More importantly, what courts call "competition on
the merits" is in fact the result of numerous contracts between
input owners that necessarily exclude competing firms from
particular resources and thus create "barriers to entry. 44 3
Put another way, application of TCE and its theory of the
firm reveals that the "exclusionary impact" of property rights is
ultimately the result of contracts among various input owners.
At the same time, "exclusionary agreements" between "inde-
pendent firms" create potentially beneficial contractual prop-
erty rights and are thus economically indistinguishable from
the unilateral or internal conduct of an integrated firm exercis-
ing its own property rights.
Here the Microsoft case-the most important monopoliza-
tion decision in decades-provides a useful example.444 Assume
for a moment that the firm is vertically integrated into the
manufacture of personal computers, which the firm distributes
through a separate division. 445 Assume further that the firm
has a large share of the PC market, say 50%, and chooses to
develop a new browser-IE. Assume further that the firm offers
that browser for free to all consumers who purchase a Microsoft
PC, but also allows consumers to decline this option.446 Finally,
assume that the firm declines repeated requests from manufac-
turers of competing browsers to offer consumers the choice of
other browsers when they purchase the machine.
By definition, this creation of IE and its inclusion on all
Microsoft PCs would "exclude" other manufacturers of browsers
443. See Demsetz, supra note 379, at 49-52 (arguing that productive com-
petition depends upon creation and enforcement of property rights); Liebeler,
supra note 379, at 38-39 (same); see also HAYEK, supra note 142, at 110-11
("That a functioning market presupposes not only prevention of violence and
fraud but the protection of certain rights, such as property, and the enforce-
ment of contracts, is always taken for granted.").
444. See supra Part I.D and accompanying text (detailing claims and hold-
ing in Microsoft).
445. This assumption is not far-fetched since both Apple and IBM are ver-
tically integrated in this manner. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital
Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing how IBM, Apple, and
Sun Microsystems all produce their own operating systems and PCs); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 1999) (explaining that
Apple and IBM both produce operating systems for their PCs).
446. By giving consumers this option, Microsoft would avoid any claim that
the arrangement is a tying contract. Of course, even without such an explicit
right, each consumer would have the ability to decline to use Microsoft's
browser.
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from an important channel of distribution. 447 The same result
would occur if Microsoft purchased a different firm's browser
and chose to include only it on its PCs. Absent such absolute
exclusion, such a unilateral refusal to allow a competitor to use
the firm's property would still be presumed lawful. 448 Under
current law, a plaintiff could rebut this presumption by show-
ing that the refusal entirely eliminated competition by rivals
without any offsetting benefits.449 By contrast, if Microsoft
achieved the same result by contract with "independent" manu-
facturers of PCs, such a restriction would give rise to a prima
facie case that Microsoft had violated section 2, even if a plain-
tiff had numerous alternate channels of distribution and thus
could not prove the existence of consumer harm.450 Once such a
case arose, Microsoft could only avoid liability by adducing evi-
dence that the arrangement produced significant benefits. 451
Moreover, even if Microsoft made such a showing, the plaintiff
could still prevail if it showed that the defendant could achieve
the same benefits with a means less restrictive of competi-
tion.4 52
447. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 67-71 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding that contractual exclusion of Netscape from a portion of an im-
portant channel of distribution sufficed to establish a prima facie case).
448. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370,
378 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("You cannot conscript your competitor's
salesmen to sell your product even if the competitor has monopoly power and
you are a struggling new entrant."); see also Verizon Communications, Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 879-80 (2004) (holding a re-
fusal to deal lawful absent additional evidence that refusal could only serve
anticompetitive objective); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137
(1998) (concluding that the freedom to choose one supplier to the detriment of
others "lies close to the heart of the competitive process" and that "the freedom
of the individual right to contract is not unduly or improperly exercised [is] the
most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly" (quoting Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911))); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991); In re E.I. Dupont de Nemours
& Co., 96 F.T.C. 650, 745-46 (1980); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 333, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1953) (holding that a refusal to
share technology with rivals did not violate section 2).
449. See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 544; Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider
Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 567-69 (2d Cir. 1990).
450. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 67-71 (finding such a prima facie case
where Microsoft entered agreements that excluded rivals from a significant
portion of an important distribution channel); see also supra notes 54-60 and
accompanying text (describing judicial hostility toward such contracts under
current law).
451. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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B. TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF UNLAWFUL CONTRACTUAL
EXCLUSION
As explained above, current law draws an indefensible dis-
tinction between two forms of conduct that excludes rivals. On
the one hand, conduct that is purely internal to the firm, such
as pricing decisions and product design, is presumed lawful,
even if such conduct exclude all of a firm's competitors from the
marketplace. Moreover, plaintiffs that challenge such conduct
face a heavy burden. In particular, to establish a prima facie
case, plaintiffs generally must show that the challenged con-
duct cannot be explained absent a hypothesis that the defen-
dant expects to obtain or preserve market power by excluding
rivals. 453 So, for instance, a plaintiff challenging a monopolist's
prices must do more than show that the defendant's prices en-
tirely excluded it from the marketplace as such exclusion may
simply be the result of beneficial low prices. Instead, the plain-
tiff must show that the defendant has priced below some meas-
ure of the defendant's costs. Finally, while such a showing will
suffice to make out a prima facie case, the defendant can none-
theless avoid liability by showing that such below-cost pricing
in fact makes sense, even if the defendant does not obtain or
preserve market power. 45 4
By contrast, so-called contractual exclusion, that is, ar-
rangements that reach beyond an individual firm and bind
competitor's suppliers or customers, are the object of intense
judicial scrutiny. First, plaintiffs challenging such arrange-
ments may establish a prima facie case simply by showing that
they exclude some rivals from a "substantial" portion of the
marketplace. This presumption rests upon price theory's model
of (workable) competition, which saw no legitimate purpose for
such agreements which supposedly "raise barriers to entry" and
thwart "competition on the merits."4 55 Furthermore, once plain-
tiffs establish such a case, defendants that seek to rebut it bear
a heavy burden. In particular, a defendant must do more than
show that the restraint produces benefits, i.e., is rational ab-
sent the possession or expectation of market power. Instead,
the defendant must rebut any claim that less restrictive means
453. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (detailing standards
that courts apply to internal conduct).
455. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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will achieve the same objectives as the challenged restraint.456
Indeed, in Microsoft the D.C. Circuit imposed an additional
hurdle, holding that defendants must show that a restraint's
benefits outweigh its harms. 457
This Article has shown that modern law's disparate treat-
ment of "internal" and "contractual" exclusion reflects the con-
tinuing influence of price theory's theory of the firm and the de-
rivative workable competition model. Recently, economists
have generated a more realistic paradigm, TCE. Application of
TCE and its theory of the firm undermines price theory's ac-
count of vertical integration generally and the existence of
firms in particular. At the same time, TCE offers its own theory
of the firm, a theory that also explains a wide variety of non-
standard contracts that price theory deemed "monopolistic"
and/or exclusionary. In particular, TCE demonstrates that the
"firm" is simply a "nexus of contracts" designed to reduce the
cost of relying upon atomistic markets to conduct economic ac-
tivity. At the same time, TCE concludes many nonstandard
contracts can also reduce transaction costs, while at the same
time avoiding the downside of relying upon a completely inte-
grated firm to conduct economic activity.458 TCE's conception of
the firm and other nonstandard contracts suggests that any
distinction between "internal" and "contractual" exclusion is
entirely illusory. More fundamentally, just as "competition on
the merits" can exclude rivals on the basis of efficiency and
without any expectation of market power, so too can various
nonstandard contracts that reach beyond the firm.459
Recognition that internal conduct and contractual exclu-
sion can produce similar economic benefits suggests that courts
should subject such conduct to similar levels of scrutiny. More
precisely, faithful application of the Rule of Reason requires
courts to adjust current doctrine in light of changes in economic
theory to harmonize the treatment of "internal" and "contrac-
tual" exclusion. 460 Antitrust courts could achieve this objective
456. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (describing standards
governing contracted exclusion).
457. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 343-47 and accompanying text (detailing TCE's ac-
count of the firm and other nonstandard contracts).
459. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (explaining that Stan-
dard Oil and American Tobacco require courts to adjust antitrust doctrine
when necessary to reflect the evolution of economic theory).
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by adjusting monopolization doctrine in several ways.
First, and most importantly, courts should adjust the re-
quirements for establishing a prima facie case that contractual
conduct constitutes a violation of section 2. In particular, plain-
tiffs alleging that a particular agreement unduly interferes
with "competition on the merits" should have to establish the
structural prerequisites for the creation of anticompetitive
harm. So, for instance, a plaintiff challenging an exclusive deal-
ing arrangement as monopolistic should do more than simply
show that the agreement excludes a rival from a "substantial"
portion of an "important" distribution channel. 46 1 Instead,
courts should require plaintiffs to show that market conditions
are such that exclusion of this rival will likely harm consumers
by raising or maintaining prices. 462 To this end, the plaintiff
would have to show, among other things, that other channels of
distribution were significantly more expensive than the chan-
nel preempted by the defendant.4 63 The plaintiff would also
have to show that the cost of distribution was a significant por-
tion of the cost of the final product, with the result that higher
input prices would significantly disadvantage one or more of
the defendant's rivals.464 Moreover, the plaintiff would have to
rebut any claim that disadvantaged rivals could protect them-
selves by adopting strategies that counteract an agreement's
exclusive impact.465 Finally, the plaintiff would have to show
that a policy disadvantaging it could affect ultimate market
prices to the detriment of consumers.466
While proof of these conditions should suffice to establish a
prima facie case, such proof should not itself establish liability.
After all, proof that conditions are ripe for an anticompetitive
strategy does not mean that such a strategy is actually afoot.
Moreover, proof that such conditions are present does not ex-
clude or even tend to exclude the possibility that the challenged
461. Cf. supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (explaining that current
law allows plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by making such a minimal
showing); supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (describing holding in
Microsoft case to this effect).
462. Cf. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 105, at 213.
463. See id. at 223-27, 234-36.
464. See id. at 255.
465. See id. at 268-72; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (exploring various means vic-
tims may employ to resist exclusionary strategies).
466. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 105, at 262-66.
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arrangement overcomes a market failure.4 67 As a result, courts
should recognize and entertain arguments that such exclusion-
ary agreements can overcome market failures by creating con-
tractual property rights which ensure that individuals and
firms internalize the costs and benefits of their actions.
468
Thus, courts should allow defendants to rebut such a prima fa-
cie case by showing that the restraint in question in fact over-
comes a market failure and thereby produces significant cogni-
zable benefits. 46 9
Courts could, of course, balance such benefits against the
anticompetitive harm purportedly produced by such arrange-
ments.470 Courts could also subject such proof to the sort of less
restrictive alternative test employed under current law.471 Both
forms of scrutiny rest upon the assumption that any benefits of
such restraints necessarily coexist with anticompetitive ef-
fects. 472 Still, courts have rejected such intrusive review where
a plaintiff challenges above-cost pricing, the introduction of
new products, or a refusal to deal. 473 Here, courts implicitly
conclude that the benefits of such conduct outweigh any result-
ing harm. 474 In the same way, courts should reject such scru-
tiny in cases where the defendant shows that an exclusionary
467. See id. at 277-78.
468. See supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text (describing how such
agreements can overcome market failures by creating the contractual equiva-
lent of property rights); cf. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 651(c)
(declining to explain how exclusionary contracts can further competition on
the merits).
469. Cf. Meese, supra note 15, at 161-67 (advocating similar approach to
Rule of Reason analysis).
470. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding that courts should balance a restraint's benefits against the harms it
produces once the defendant rebuts a prima facie case); see also Meese, supra
note 15, at 108-10 (describing the balancing that takes place in Rule of Rea-
son litigation under section 1).
471. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (describing courts' ap-
plication of this test where defendants have proven that a restraint produces
significant benefits).
472. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Trans
Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188-91 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that a refusal to deal is justified so long as defendant offers a non-
pretextual plausible business justification); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377-79 (7th Cir. 1986).
474. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (explaining how
workable competition model depended on this assumption); Williamson, supra
note 157, at 21-22 (noting that mergers that create significant efficiencies al-
most certainly enhance total welfare).
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agreement produces significant efficiencies.475 Indeed, proof
that a restraint produces such benefits undermines any as-
sumption that the benefits produced by the restraint coexist
with anticompetitive effects. After all, once a defendant shows
that a restraint produces significant benefits, the mere fact
that the restraint excludes rivals from a marketplace that
meets the prerequisites for a successful anticompetitive strat-
egy no longer suffices to support a presumption of consumer
harm. Such exclusion is equally consistent with the defendant's
claim that the restraint, like any other property, simply over-
comes a market failure.476 In these circumstances, courts
should dispense with balancing or examining "less restrictive
alternatives" and instead accord such conduct the same treat-
ment as, say, above-cost pricing by a monopolist: per se legal-
ity. 477
CONCLUSION
Modern monopolization law rests upon a distinction be-
tween property-based "competition on the merits," on the one
hand, and contractual exclusion, on the other. In particular,
current law treats the former conduct as presumptively lawful
while subjecting the latter to exacting scrutiny. This Article has
shown that current law rests upon price theory's outmoded con-
ception of the firm and the derivative model of workable compe-
tition. This model treats property-based, internal conduct as
presumptively efficient while at the same time condemning a
firm's attempt to disadvantage rivals by using contracts to con-
strain the discretion of customers or suppliers.
Application of a competing model-TCE-undermines the
distinction between internal conduct and contractual exclusion.
TCE undermines price theory's technological conception of the
firm and concludes that the firm is itself a nonstandard con-
tract that individuals employ to reduce the cost of market con-
tracting. TCE also shows that, like the firm, various exclusion-
ary contracts can overcome market failures by creating the
475. See Meese, supra note 15, at 161-67.
476. See id. (arguing that proof showing a restraint produces benefits un-
dermines any presumption that such benefits coexist with anticompetitive ef-
fects).
477. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 63 (1918)
(reasoning that the adoption of restraints before a firm possessed a monopoly
suggested they produced benefits); id. at 65-67 (concluding that restraints
that produced benefits did not offend section 2).
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equivalent of property rights that cause actors to internalize
the costs and benefits of their activities. While such agreements
can exclude rivals from the marketplace, they often do so on the
basis of efficiency and are thus economically indistinguishable
from internal "competition on the merits." The realization that
internal and contractual exclusion are economically similar re-
quires courts to adjust antitrust doctrine accordingly. In par-
ticular, courts should treat contractual exclusion in the same
way they currently treat "competition on the merits," rejecting
challenges to any agreements that produce significant benefits,
regardless of exclusionary impact.
